Ritchie J.

The appellant appealed an order of absolute adoption in respect of his two children, initially raising a constitutional question regarding the paramountcy of the Divorce Act over the Child Welfare Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the position taken by the appellant's counsel emptied the appeal of any constitutional issue.

As leave to appeal was granted solely on the constitutional question, the appeal was quashed with no order as to costs.

The appellant and respondent lived together in a common law relationship for almost twenty years.

During this time, the respondent supported the appellant financially while he saved his income, and later she worked extensively in their beekeeping business.

The properties and business were held entirely in the appellant's name.

Upon separation, the respondent sought a declaration of entitlement to a one-half interest in the lands and the beekeeping business.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent was entitled to a one-half interest based on the doctrine of constructive trust.

The Court found that the appellant had been unjustly enriched by the respondent's financial support and unpaid labour, and that it would be unjust to allow him to retain the full benefit of her contributions.

The appellant, a probationary police constable, was dismissed by the chief of police.

The collective agreement and regulations vested the power of dismissal exclusively in the Board of Commissioners of Police.

The Board later confirmed the dismissal without passing a resolution, taking minutes, or notifying the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dismissal was unlawful because the chief of police had no authority to dismiss the appellant, and the Board failed to fulfill its statutory function by not notifying the appellant or giving him an opportunity to be heard.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant was reinstated.

The appellant appealed her conviction for first degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge failed to hold a voir dire on a crucial statement allegedly made by the accused to a police officer.

The Court reaffirmed its previous decision in Erven v. The Queen and held that the curative proviso in section 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code did not apply.

The respondent subcontractor entered into a construction contract containing a clause waiving its mechanics' lien rights.

When the contractor failed to make progress payments, constituting a fundamental breach, the respondent treated the contract as at an end and filed a lien.

The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that the question of whether an exclusionary clause applies following a fundamental breach is a matter of construction of the contract.

The Court held that the waiver clause ceased to bind the respondent upon the fundamental breach, and section 5(1) of the Mechanics' Lien Act did not foreclose the lien irrespective of the fate of the contract.

The appellant, an Indian, was charged with fishing during a closed season contrary to the federal Fisheries Act.

He argued that clause 13 of the 1929 agreement between Canada and Manitoba gave him the right to fish for food at all seasons.

The trial judge dismissed the charge, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that clause 13 only applied to provincial laws.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming that the agreement did not exempt the appellant from the federal Fisheries Act, following its previous decision in Daniels v. White and The Queen.

The applicant, Gulf Oil Corporation, applied to the Supreme Court of Canada under s. 43 of the Canada Evidence Act to enforce letters rogatory issued by United States courts.

The letters sought the production of documents held by the applicant's Canadian subsidiaries for use in US anti-trust litigation regarding a uranium cartel.

The Canadian government opposed disclosure on public policy grounds, citing the Uranium Information Security Regulations and Canadian sovereignty.

The Court assumed jurisdiction but dismissed the application, holding that it would be a wrongful exercise of discretion to enforce the letters rogatory contrary to the stated public policy of the Canadian government.