Laskin C.J.

The appellant appealed an order of absolute adoption in respect of his two children, initially raising a constitutional question regarding the paramountcy of the Divorce Act over the Child Welfare Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the position taken by the appellant's counsel emptied the appeal of any constitutional issue.

As leave to appeal was granted solely on the constitutional question, the appeal was quashed with no order as to costs.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code, where the underlying offence was indecent assault.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of drunkenness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding drunkenness and the mental elements of constructive murder, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice because the jury's verdict indicated they were satisfied the appellant had the capacity to commit the indecent assault.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant and respondent lived together in a common law relationship for almost twenty years.

During this time, the respondent supported the appellant financially while he saved his income, and later she worked extensively in their beekeeping business.

The properties and business were held entirely in the appellant's name.

Upon separation, the respondent sought a declaration of entitlement to a one-half interest in the lands and the beekeeping business.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent was entitled to a one-half interest based on the doctrine of constructive trust.

The Court found that the appellant had been unjustly enriched by the respondent's financial support and unpaid labour, and that it would be unjust to allow him to retain the full benefit of her contributions.

The appellants sold their manufacturing business to the respondents and signed a restrictive covenant prohibiting them from competing for five years after the sale or after terminating their employment, whichever was later.

Nine years later, the appellants resigned and started a competing business.

The respondents sued for breach of the covenant.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision that the covenant was clear, unambiguous, and enforceable.

The Court found the covenant reasonable between the parties and in the public interest, rejecting the appellants' arguments that the respondents' alleged monopolistic practices rendered the covenant void.

The appellant, a probationary police constable, was dismissed by the chief of police.

The collective agreement and regulations vested the power of dismissal exclusively in the Board of Commissioners of Police.

The Board later confirmed the dismissal without passing a resolution, taking minutes, or notifying the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dismissal was unlawful because the chief of police had no authority to dismiss the appellant, and the Board failed to fulfill its statutory function by not notifying the appellant or giving him an opportunity to be heard.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant was reinstated.

The appellant appealed her conviction for first degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge failed to hold a voir dire on a crucial statement allegedly made by the accused to a police officer.

The Court reaffirmed its previous decision in Erven v. The Queen and held that the curative proviso in section 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code did not apply.

The respondent subcontractor entered into a construction contract containing a clause waiving its mechanics' lien rights.

When the contractor failed to make progress payments, constituting a fundamental breach, the respondent treated the contract as at an end and filed a lien.

The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that the question of whether an exclusionary clause applies following a fundamental breach is a matter of construction of the contract.

The Court held that the waiver clause ceased to bind the respondent upon the fundamental breach, and section 5(1) of the Mechanics' Lien Act did not foreclose the lien irrespective of the fate of the contract.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal which upheld the Trial Division's finding that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim regarding a joint venture contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Federal Court of Appeal was correct in its assessment of jurisdiction based on previous jurisprudence.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal regarding a contract for the sale of land.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that time was not of the essence in the contract and the vendor had accepted the conditions as terms imposing obligations upon him.

The Court held that the vendor was in default and guilty of premature repudiation, restoring the trial judge's award of damages to the purchasers.

The respondents appealed a CRTC decision approving a telephone rate increase to the Governor in Council under s. 64(1) of the National Transportation Act.

The Governor in Council denied the petitions without providing the respondents an opportunity to respond to submissions from government officials and the CRTC.

The respondents sought a declaration that the Governor in Council owed them a duty of fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Governor in Council was exercising a legislative function and was not subject to a duty of fairness or natural justice in these circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The Province of Manitoba assessed Air Canada for retail sales tax on its aircraft, repair parts, and services used during overflights through Manitoba airspace and temporary stopovers, as well as on liquor served to passengers.

Air Canada successfully challenged the assessment in the Manitoba courts.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the mere entry of aircraft into the airspace over Manitoba does not give the aircraft a situs within the Province to support a tax under section 92(2) of the British North America Act.

The Court further found that the taxing statute itself did not capture overflights or temporary stopovers, as there was no bringing of property into the Province or consumption within it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a member of the regular armed forces, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of trafficking and possession of narcotics under the Narcotic Control Act, pursuant to section 120 of the National Defence Act.

He appealed on the grounds that trial by a military tribunal for ordinary criminal offences deprived him of his right to an independent and impartial tribunal and his right to equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the military justice system was established pursuant to a valid federal objective under section 91(7) of the British North America Act and did not offend the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The appellant, an expropriated owner, had land taken for highway purposes by the respondent.

Arbitrators fixed compensation and awarded compound interest based on 90-day finance company paper rates.

The respondent argued that s. 3 of the Interest Act limited the rate to 5% simple interest.

The Supreme Court of British Columbia held the rate was limited to 5% but could be compounded.

The Court of Appeal held it was limited to 5% simple interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that where a statute provides for interest and remits the rate to an adjudicator, the rate is 'fixed by law' within the meaning of s. 3 of the Interest Act, and thus the 5% limit does not apply.

The arbitrators' award of compound interest was restored.

The appellant was charged with rape.

During the preliminary inquiry, the presiding judge refused to allow the appellant to question the complainant about her sexual conduct with others during an in camera hearing under section 142 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was committed for trial and sought to quash the committal by way of certiorari.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that certiorari to quash a committal for trial is only available for lack of jurisdiction, such as a complete denial of the right to cross-examine or call witnesses.

The judge's refusal to compel the complainant to testify at the in camera hearing was an exercise of discretion and did not amount to a denial of natural justice or a jurisdictional error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a plastic surgeon, incorporated a private hospital and entered into an employment contract with it, assigning his surgical fees to the hospital in exchange for a salary.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed the assigned fees as the respondent's personal income, arguing the hospital was illegally practising medicine.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the respondent, not the hospital, was practising medicine, and the assignment of fees to the hospital under a valid employment contract did not make the fees assessable to the respondent.

The appellant, an Indian, was charged with fishing during a closed season contrary to the federal Fisheries Act.

He argued that clause 13 of the 1929 agreement between Canada and Manitoba gave him the right to fish for food at all seasons.

The trial judge dismissed the charge, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that clause 13 only applied to provincial laws.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming that the agreement did not exempt the appellant from the federal Fisheries Act, following its previous decision in Daniels v. White and The Queen.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in a restricted drug, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of intercepted private communications.

The appellant contended there was no evidence upon which the authorizing judge could have granted the wiretap authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed this ground of appeal, holding that even if such an authorization is reviewable by a trial judge, the Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings that there was some evidence to support the authorization.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding a carrier's liability for damage caused by delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered a brief oral judgment dismissing the appeal, finding no error in the disposition made by the courts below.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of contempt in the face of the court after repeatedly calling the Crown Attorney corrupt during proceedings.

The trial judge held a show cause hearing and convicted the appellant, imposing a fine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in proceeding summarily, that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that he was denied the opportunity to make final submissions.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the summary procedure, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no denial of natural justice.

The appellant orthopedic surgeon performed a disc operation on the respondent.

Following complications, a second operation by a different surgeon revealed extruded disc material, and the respondent was left with permanent disabilities.

The respondent sued for negligence and battery, alleging a lack of informed consent because the appellant did not disclose that it was his first such operation in private practice, nor did he detail the possible risks.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a surgeon is not obligated to disclose their specific level of experience if they are fully qualified, nor are they required to disclose mere possible risks inherent in any operation unless specifically asked.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.