Andrew J. Roman

The applicant sought judicial review of an adjudicator's decision ordering the disclosure of parts of a bus services contract between the applicant and a municipality.

The adjudicator found that the third party exemption under s. 10(1) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act did not apply because the information was mutually generated through negotiation, rather than supplied by the applicant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the adjudicator's decision was reasonable and that the applicant failed to establish that the inferred disclosure or immutability exceptions applied.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of the Environment's alleged failure to intervene and enforce an approved waste management plan under s. 27 of the Waste Diversion Act, 2002.

The applicant argued that changes to tendering criteria constituted a 'material change' requiring the Minister's approval.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, finding that the Minister has no statutory duty to intervene or supervise operational decisions, and that the decision of what constitutes a 'material change' is a policy-laden function beyond the court's jurisdiction.

The applicant sought an adjournment of its application for judicial review to develop new evidence.

The Divisional Court addressed preliminary issues and exercised its discretion under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to decline to hear the application.

The court found the matter was not a review of a quasi-judicial decision, primarily concerned commercial interests, would require the court to perform a trial function, and that the applicant lacked standing.

The application was quashed without a determination on the merits.

Applicants sought a declaration that a municipal by-law banning the possession, sale, or consumption of shark fin products within the city was ultra vires.

The court examined whether the by-law had a valid municipal purpose under the City of Toronto Act, 2006, including whether it related to the environmental, social, or health well-being of the city.

While recognizing the deferential approach generally afforded to municipal by-laws, the court held that the alleged environmental objective of preventing shark extinction did not constitute a municipal issue and that the by-law would not produce an identifiable benefit to the city.

The court further found that cruelty to sharks occurring outside the municipality and speculative health concerns did not sufficiently relate to the social or health well-being of city residents.

The by-law was therefore beyond the city's legislative authority.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal from a decision refusing certification of a class action, and the dismissal of the defendant's cross-appeal regarding costs, the Divisional Court determined the costs of the appeal.

The court found that the action involved a matter of public interest, particularly given the promulgation of the Cigarette Ignition Propensity Regulations.

Applying section 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act and Rule 57, the court ordered that each side bear its own costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for certification of a class action against Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited.

The proposed class action alleged that the respondent's cigarettes were defectively designed because they posed an unreasonable risk of igniting residential fires.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's findings that the proposed class definitions were unacceptably merits-based, that a class action was not the preferable procedure due to overwhelming individual causation issues, and that the proposed litigation plan was unworkable.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding costs was also dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which found it had jurisdiction to hear a complaint regarding a withdrawn job offer following a positive pre-employment drug test for marijuana.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to dismiss the complaint, as recreational marijuana use without actual or perceived disability does not fall under the protected ground of disability in the Human Rights Code.

The Court granted an order of prohibition preventing the Tribunal from hearing the complaint.

The applicants brought an application for judicial review to quash the respondent municipality's issuance of nine new taxicab owner licences to a competitor.

The municipality had used a Request for Proposal (RFP) process to select the recipient, rather than the criteria set out in its taxi by-law.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was correctness.

The court found the issuance was a nullity because the municipal council never actually passed a resolution approving the issuance.

Furthermore, the RFP process was unlawful because it imposed criteria and conditions not authorized by the taxi by-law or the Municipal Act.

The application was granted and the issuance of the licences was quashed.

The applicant sought an order of prohibition to prevent the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario from hearing a complaint referred to it by the Ontario Human Rights Commission.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint, and that the Tribunal was incorrect or unreasonable in deciding it had jurisdiction.

The complaint was dismissed, with detailed reasons to follow.

The appellant developed a cancer-fighting drug containing paclitaxel, a medicine in the public domain.

The respondent held patents for specific formulations and uses of paclitaxel.

The appellant applied for a Notice of Compliance (NOC) as a new drug, not relying on the respondent's data.

The Minister issued the NOC.

The respondent sought to quash the NOC, arguing that under s. 5(1.1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, the mere presence of paclitaxel triggered a statutory freeze.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 5(1.1) does not apply to innovative drugs but is confined to generic copies.

The Minister was entitled to issue the NOC without subjecting the appellant to the statutory freeze.

The moving parties on this costs motion sought costs for their opposition to a stay motion, an application for leave to appeal, and the costs motion itself, claiming up to $67,000.

The Court of Appeal awarded $20,000 in costs for the stay proceeding, noting that the Ministry's decision to terminate the charity's funding had been quashed.

The court declined to alter its previous costs order of $1,500 for the leave to appeal motion.

The applicants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following a successful application against the Ministry of Community and Social Services, which had cancelled its contract with the applicant charitable organization and seized its property without authority.

The Divisional Court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, noting the government's unfair treatment of the applicant and the complexity of the proceedings.

Costs were fixed at $120,000 plus GST.

The applicant, a non-profit charity providing services to developmentally disabled individuals, sought judicial review of a Ministry decision terminating its funding and directing another agency to take over its operations and property.

The Ministry made the decision without notice, citing a loss of confidence following a series of serious occurrences.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding the decision was the exercise of a statutory power and thus amenable to judicial review.

The court held the decision was illegal and made without jurisdiction because the Ministry failed to obtain the required order in council under the Ministry of Community and Social Services Act.

Furthermore, the decision was patently unreasonable and breached the duty of fairness owed to the applicant.

The applicant, a non-profit organization providing services to developmentally disabled individuals, sought judicial review of the Ministry's decision to terminate its funding without notice and direct another agency to take over its operations and property.

The Ministry cited a loss of confidence following several 'serious occurrences'.

The Divisional Court held that the Ministry's actions constituted the exercise of a statutory power subject to judicial review.

The Court found the decision to be illegal, patently unreasonable, and a breach of the duty of fairness, as the Ministry failed to obtain the required Order in Council to seize the property and failed to provide the applicant with fair warning or an opportunity to respond.

The application was granted, and the Ministry was ordered to restore funding and return management to the applicant.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which upheld a decision of the CRTC allowing an amendment to a cable television broadcasting licence to increase installation and monthly fees.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, finding no error of law by the Federal Court of Appeal.

The respondents appealed a CRTC decision approving a telephone rate increase to the Governor in Council under s. 64(1) of the National Transportation Act.

The Governor in Council denied the petitions without providing the respondents an opportunity to respond to submissions from government officials and the CRTC.

The respondents sought a declaration that the Governor in Council owed them a duty of fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Governor in Council was exercising a legislative function and was not subject to a duty of fairness or natural justice in these circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.