Alexander Victor Hrybinsky

The appellant was convicted of robbery and having his face masked with intent.

At trial, an accomplice who had previously given a videotaped statement identifying the appellant recanted and testified that the appellant was not involved.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning regarding the accomplice's evidence.

The appellant appealed, arguing the warning should not have been given for a witness whose trial testimony favoured the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The majority held the trial judge did not err in giving the warning for a 'mixed witness' with a serious criminal record.

The concurring judge found the warning was an error but applied the curative proviso, concluding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred given the strong Crown case.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction and eight-year sentence arising from a beating death during a home invasion robbery.

The Crown's case relied heavily on an unsavoury witness who testified that the appellant and a co-accused went to the deceased's house and returned making incriminating statements.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding confirmatory evidence, reasonable doubt, party liability, and by characterizing another witness's evidence as 'useless'.

The Court of Appeal found the jury charge functionally appropriate and fundamentally fair, concluding that any errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of a joint enterprise robbery.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order staying nine charges of fraud over $5,000 against the respondent due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges arose from alleged misrepresentations of a publicly traded company's financial affairs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's assessment of the inherent time requirements and his allocation of institutional delay.

The Court found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the Crown's accommodation of co-accused counsels' schedules contributed to the unreasonable delay, and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent was charged with sexual assault.

On the scheduled trial date, no court was available, and the trial was adjourned for eight months.

The trial judge subsequently stayed the charge, finding a violation of s. 11(b) of the Charter due to institutional delay.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to conduct the required Morin analysis and ignored the societal interest in a trial on the merits and the lack of prejudice to the respondent.

The stay was vacated and the matter remitted for trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his statements to police and in failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding accomplice evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the voluntariness of the statements despite police failure to follow videotaping guidelines.

The Court also held that the omission of a Vetrovec warning was not fatal, as the accomplices had resiled from their KGB statements and gave exculpatory evidence at trial, making them more akin to defence witnesses.

The young offender appealed his sentence for armed robbery and other offences.

The trial judge had imposed a 33-month custody sentence in addition to 6 months of pre-trial custody, resulting in an effective sentence of 39 months.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 42(15) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the total sentence cannot exceed the 3-year (36-month) maximum, and pre-trial custody must be included in this calculation.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence was reduced to 30 months, and an improperly imposed probation order was struck.

The youth appellant was convicted of robbery, trafficking, and other offences, and sentenced to 33 months in custody in addition to six months of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed, arguing the effective 39-month sentence exceeded the three-year maximum under s. 42(15) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that pre-sentence custody must be included when calculating the maximum sentence.

The sentence was reduced to 30 months, and a concurrent probation order was struck down for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant, charged with first degree murder, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The bail judge had ordered detention based solely on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c).

The Court of Appeal found that the bail judge overstated the strength of the Crown's case and failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. Hall.

The Court concluded that the appellant's continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, set aside the detention order, and granted bail.

The appellant, a city councilor, appealed his convictions and sentence for accepting bribes to facilitate zoning by-law changes.

He raised issues regarding the joinder of counts, the constitutionality and validity of wiretap authorizations, voice identification by the trial judge, and the admission of similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the offences required a penitentiary sentence, making a conditional sentence unavailable.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the stay was just over 14 months, with 12 months of institutional delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not err in assessing actual prejudice, including psychological harm, strict bail conditions, and additional expenses.

The Court also agreed that the offer of 'Blitz Court' dates did not shorten the systemic period in this case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, weapons dangerous, and mischief, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict was not unreasonable given the fingerprint evidence and the appellant's failure to testify.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge's reasons were brief, conclusory, and failed to address significant frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence, rendering them inadequate under R. v. Sheppard.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal noted that while a conditional sentence may have been inappropriate at the time it was imposed, it would not be in the interests of justice to incarcerate the respondent now.

The respondent had completed 11 months of the sentence without issue, completed half of her community service hours, and was pregnant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed a reversible error by misapplying the third step of the W.(D.) framework, effectively reversing the burden of proof by requiring the accused's evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the complainant's evidence was not true.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his fraud conviction, arguing that the information specified the wrong corporate victim and that the Crown failed to prove the cheque was cashed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the variance in the information and holding that the filing of a proof of claim and delivery of the cheque were sufficient to prove a risk of deprivation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following an incident with his former fiancée.

At trial, the complainant's family doctor testified for the defence that she examined the complainant shortly after the incident and did not observe any injuries to her breasts, contradicting the complainant's testimony.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, concluding the doctor must have missed the injury.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's testimony regarding the medical examination and failed to properly weigh it against the doctor's evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his custodial sentence for robbery, arguing the trial judge failed to specifically mention s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code regarding his aboriginal status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was aware of and considered the appellant's aboriginal status.

The Court held that the serious nature of the crime, which caused severe physical and psychological injuries to the victim, meant the appellant's aboriginal status should not result in a significantly different sentence from that of a non-aboriginal offender.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for an assault with a weapon due to a mental disorder.

The Review Board ordered his transfer to a medium security hospital with privileges, applying the 'least onerous and least restrictive' test to the conditions of his detention.

The Court of Appeal held this test only applied to the choice of disposition, not the conditions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the 'least onerous and least restrictive' requirement under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code applies to both the disposition and the particular conditions forming part of it.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving over eighty, dangerous driving, and impaired driving.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by placing Centre of Forensic Sciences seals on vials of his blood, which had been drawn for medical purposes, prior to obtaining a search warrant.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the issue of bolus drinking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the brief sealing of the vials did not interfere with the appellant's spatial, physical, or informational privacy interests and thus did not constitute an unreasonable seizure.

The court also found the jury charge on the burden of proof regarding bolus drinking was sufficient.

The applicant, a municipal councillor convicted of criminal offences, was granted bail pending appeal with a condition prohibiting him from performing his duties for the balance of his term.

The Crown sought an additional condition prohibiting him from running in the upcoming municipal election.

The court dismissed the Crown's request, finding no statutory bar under the Municipal Elections Act and little risk of reoffending, concluding that it should be left to the electorate to decide whether to elect someone with his criminal record.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

After discharging his counsel, he sought a physical copy of the complainant's videotaped statement.

The Crown refused to provide the physical tape but offered supervised viewing at the Crown's office.

The accused was convicted at trial.

On appeal, the summary conviction appeal court granted a stay of proceedings, finding the Crown's restriction on access unjustified.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown's disclosure obligations to an unrepresented accused in sensitive cases are satisfied by providing supervised access to the videotape.

The conviction was restored and the stay of proceedings was set aside.