Jeanine E. LeRoy

The appellant pleaded guilty to marihuana production and was sentenced to 12 months in prison, along with a forfeiture order for his 122-acre farm property.

He appealed the forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by adopting an overly strict test for relief from forfeiture under s. 19.1(3) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's framework from R. v. Craig, the Court held that a forfeiture order would have a disproportionate impact given the appellant's minor role, lack of property modifications, and the fact that the property was primarily used as a legitimate farm and residence.

The appeal was allowed and the forfeiture order was set aside.

The appellant appealed from a conviction entered on December 6, 2005, and a sentence imposed on February 3, 2006, by a judge and jury.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal in a brief endorsement.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were insufficient given his acquittal on criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's driving was a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court noted the appellant was joy riding, driving extremely quickly, and failed to slow down despite seeing an ATV, meaning his distraction by a stereo was not a mere momentary lapse but part of a pattern of dangerous driving.

The trial judge properly applied the modified objective test for dangerous driving.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant's evidence and that his knowledge of the complainant's fear, or recklessness thereto, was self-evident.

The court also found ample evidence to support the finding of harassment and no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief.

The Crown appealed the sentence of two years less a day imprisonment plus two years of probation imposed on the respondent for the attempted murder of his estranged wife.

The respondent had intentionally driven his vehicle into his wife's vehicle.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence unfit, noting that the appropriate sentence would have been six years imprisonment less credit for time served, given the domestic context and the planned nature of the attack.

However, because the respondent had already been released and there was no evidence of further misconduct, the Court declined to re-incarcerate him, instead allowing the appeal only to increase the probation period from two to three years.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for impaired driving causing death and breach of recognizance.

At trial, the central issue was whether the appellant or the deceased passenger was driving when the vehicle rolled into a ditch.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the driver, noting it was amply supported by witness testimony and expert evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued for a conditional sentence based on his aboriginal background and Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 12-month sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the aggravating factors, including a high blood alcohol level and a prior drinking and driving conviction.

The appellant appealed his custodial sentence for robbery, arguing the trial judge failed to specifically mention s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code regarding his aboriginal status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was aware of and considered the appellant's aboriginal status.

The Court held that the serious nature of the crime, which caused severe physical and psychological injuries to the victim, meant the appellant's aboriginal status should not result in a significantly different sentence from that of a non-aboriginal offender.

The appellant appealed his sentence for the forceful sexual assault of a 13-year-old girl.

The trial judge had declined to impose a conditional sentence, finding that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence given the violence, threats, and profound impact on the complainant.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not manifestly excessive, despite the appellant's positive background and family support contributions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of sexual assault.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused based on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, relying on the complainant's equivocal conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to consider a crucial interchange between the parties when assessing whether the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain consent under s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.