C. Verner

The accused, charged with sexual service and human trafficking offences, brought a motion for directions on whether he was required to bring an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code before adducing evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity.

The accused argued that s. 276 does not explicitly list sexual services or human trafficking offences.

The court conducted a statutory interpretation analysis, relying on recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, and concluded that the s. 276 regime does apply to these offences.

The accused was directed to bring a s. 276 application before adducing such evidence.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and choking.

On the eve of the preliminary hearing, the Crown withdrew the choking charge, disentitling the accused to a preliminary hearing.

The accused sought to re-elect to a judge-alone trial in Provincial Court, but the Crown refused consent unless the accused waived his s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The accused brought an abuse of process motion.

The court found the Crown's conduct fell outside core prosecutorial discretion and was not fair and objective, amounting to an abuse of process under s. 7 of the Charter.

The court granted the motion, allowing the accused to re-elect without conditions.

The moving party, Soil Engineering Ltd., sought costs for a motion brought the previous year to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The court noted that the plaintiff did not complain of any wrongdoing by the moving party in the statement of claim, yet the moving party had to bring multiple motions due to the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01 and a previous costs award to another defendant, the court awarded the moving party $8,500 in costs.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after his vehicle drifted into oncoming traffic, resulting in a fatal collision.

The Crown argued the accused was awake but inattentive for 14 seconds.

The defence argued there was a reasonable possibility the accused fell asleep at the wheel without prior warning.

The court found that the driving was objectively dangerous, but there was a reasonable possibility the accused fell asleep and had no reason to foresee the risk of falling asleep.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving, failing to comply with a breath demand, and dangerous driving.

At trial, she argued that her drink had been spiked, leading to involuntary intoxication.

The trial judge rejected this defence and convicted her.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge had applied the wrong standard of proof, erroneously requiring the defence to establish a 'likelihood' of involuntary intoxication rather than merely raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, who was 15 years old and had cognitive limitations at the time of the offences, sought an extension of time to appeal a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) verdict entered 12 years prior.

The applicant argued that he only recently understood the indefinite nature of the NCR disposition and raised several grounds of appeal, including a flawed plea process and fresh psychiatric evidence suggesting he was not NCR.

The court granted the extension, finding that in cases involving youthful offenders with cognitive deficits, the merit of the appeal is the central factor, and the applicant had demonstrated sufficient merit to justify the extension.