Sharon E. Lavine

Following the release of the court's reasons for judgment, the court received written submissions regarding the costs of the forfeiture hearing.

The court awarded the respondent costs of the forfeiture hearing fixed at $40,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The Attorney General appealed the dismissal of an application for civil forfeiture of a residential property under s. 8(1) of the Civil Remedies Act.

The property owner's son had used the property for a marijuana grow operation and drug trafficking.

The application judge dismissed the forfeiture, finding an unexplained six-year delay by the Attorney General.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in his findings on delay and by ignoring the lack of a limitation period under s. 8(5).

However, conducting a fresh analysis, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that forfeiture would clearly not be in the interests of justice because the owner was not complicit, did not profit from the crimes, and had made significant efforts to help his son overcome his drug addiction.

The three accused, former senior executives of Nortel Networks Corporation, were charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that they deliberately misrepresented Nortel's financial results by manipulating accrued liability balances to meet earnings targets and trigger bonus payments.

The court conducted a detailed review of Nortel's accounting practices, the use of accrued liabilities, and the restatements of its financial results.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately misrepresented the financial results or that the financial statements were materially misstated.

The accused were found not guilty on both counts.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking particulars requiring the Crown to specify the alleged misrepresentations, fraudulent conduct, and false accounting entries underlying charges relating to financial reporting of a public corporation.

The motion relied on s. 587 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the indictment lacked sufficient detail for the preparation of a defence.

The court reviewed the extensive investigations, disclosure, and related regulatory proceedings already known to the accused and concluded that they were aware of the case they had to meet.

The court held that the areas of dispute were sufficiently delineated and that further particulars were unnecessary for trial fairness or evidentiary rulings.

The application for particulars was dismissed.

The appellant, a physician, was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to seven years in prison for the death of his wife, which was caused by multi-drug toxicity from anaesthetics he injected.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay due to unreasonable delay, in her jury instructions on unlawful act manslaughter, motive, and causation, and in sentencing him based on unlawful act manslaughter rather than criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to make independent factual findings consistent with the jury's verdict for sentencing purposes.

The appellant appealed his designation as a long-term offender and his sentence of 8.5 years imprisonment followed by 8 years of community supervision for 17 predicate offences, including arson and harassment.

He argued that the assessing psychiatrist improperly relied on a police statement that had been ruled inadmissible at trial due to a Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal held that while the statement should not have been considered, the error was trivial and did not affect the outcome, applying the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii).

The court also upheld the sentence, finding that the custodial term and community supervision serve discrete purposes and were not disproportionate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting post-hypnosis identification evidence, failed to properly instruct the jury on eyewitness identification and alibi evidence, and delivered an unbalanced charge that favoured the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the post-hypnosis evidence was properly admitted, the trial judge committed serious errors in his jury instructions regarding the frailties of the identification evidence and the requirements for finding a fabricated alibi.

Furthermore, the jury charge lacked fairness and balance, compromising the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning, his rolled-up charge on intent, his dismissal of a Corbett application, and the length of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions, the Corbett ruling, or the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing of an incident and failed to properly assess the complainant's motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and it was unnecessary to address every defence argument regarding motive.

The court also upheld the DNA order, noting the aggravating circumstances of the appellant being in a position of trust and the complainant being 13 years old.

John Nikitin was convicted of manslaughter after his truck struck and killed a child who was crossing the road to a stopped school bus.

He appealed his conviction on grounds including the admission of police re-enactment evidence, Crown counsel's closing address, and an unreasonable verdict.

The Crown appealed the 22-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the experiment evidence was properly admitted as factual evidence, the trial was fair, and the sentence was entitled to deference given the offender's age, health, and lack of criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after shooting his ex-girlfriend with a sawed-off shotgun.

At trial, the Crown introduced statements made by the victim to friends shortly before her death, indicating that the appellant had threatened her.

The appellant appealed, arguing the statements were inadmissible double hearsay and that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding their reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's alleged threats were admissible as admissions, and the victim's statements to her friends met the threshold for reliability.

The court further held that any error in the jury instructions caused no prejudice, and alternatively applied the curative proviso given the overwhelming evidence of intent.

The appellants, two young persons charged with manslaughter and robbery, appealed orders transferring their proceedings to ordinary court.

The youth court had concluded that the first appellant could not be rehabilitated within the three-year maximum youth disposition, and that while the second appellant could be rehabilitated, the gravity of the offence required transfer.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, finding that the youth court placed undue emphasis on speculative psychological evidence for the first appellant and misapplied the statutory test for the second appellant by relying on general deterrence.

The Court ordered both youths to be tried in youth court.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

The sole issue was whether the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code could be invoked to uphold the conviction.

The Court agreed with the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal that the proviso properly applied and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction arising from the killing of a child, where the central trial issue was his mental state and potential exemption from criminal responsibility.

The Court of Appeal held that statements made by the appellant to a psychiatrist during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment for fitness and criminal responsibility were protected under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code and were inadmissible to prove actus reus or mens rea.

The court found the appellant's consent was limited to assessment for fitness and criminal responsibility and did not authorize substantive use of the statements to prove planning and deliberation.

Because the psychiatrist's evidence was central to the Crown's case on first degree murder, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of attempted murder arising from a gasoline-fuelled attack on his estranged spouse and her partner, and also appealed a lengthy penitentiary sentence.

The court held that expert reply evidence on accidental ignition was admissible because the ignition mechanism was only marginally relevant during the Crown's case and became a live issue after the appellant testified.

The court also rejected the challenge to the attempted murder charge, finding that, read as a whole, the instructions made clear that proof of intent to kill was essential.

Given the planned and deliberate nature of the offences and the catastrophic injuries inflicted, leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

This addendum to a criminal appeal judgment clarified that the court did not intend to preclude the respondent from applying for a discharge.

Relying on prior authority indicating that even a conviction would not necessarily bar a discharge, the court nonetheless amended its earlier reasons for absolute clarity.

The acquittal was set aside and replaced with a finding of guilt for common assault, thereby preserving the respondent's ability to seek a discharge.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction and sentence, relying on fresh recantation evidence from a key civilian witness and an inmate informant, as well as new DNA testing undermining aspects of the Crown's theory.

The court rejected the civilian witness recantation as incredible, but admitted the inmate recantation and the DNA evidence under the Palmer framework.

Although the fresh evidence significantly weakened the Crown case and impaired important inculpatory evidence, the court held it was not so conclusive as to justify an acquittal and the verdict was not shown to be unreasonable under the governing standard.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered on second degree murder.

Leave to appeal the counselling sentence was granted and that sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellants appealed a Court of Appeal order setting aside their acquittals for first degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in excluding a key Crown witness on the basis of taint, because the issue went to weight rather than admissibility.

The Court further held that the subsequently released decision in Carosella did not apply, as there was no finding or evidence of deliberate police failure to create records to avoid production.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissing an appeal from conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Brooke J.A. in the Court of Appeal, finding that the trial judge's extensive interventions and the admission of inadmissible opinion evidence rendered the trial unfair.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred by not leaving manslaughter as an available verdict for the jury.

The Court of Appeal had allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's cross-appeal and dismissed the accused's appeal, restoring the trial conviction.

The majority held that based on the totality of the evidence, the trial judge did not err in refusing to leave manslaughter with the jury.