Catherine A. Cooper

The appellant appealed his murder conviction and sentence, relying on fresh recantation evidence from a key civilian witness and an inmate informant, as well as new DNA testing undermining aspects of the Crown's theory.

The court rejected the civilian witness recantation as incredible, but admitted the inmate recantation and the DNA evidence under the Palmer framework.

Although the fresh evidence significantly weakened the Crown case and impaired important inculpatory evidence, the court held it was not so conclusive as to justify an acquittal and the verdict was not shown to be unreasonable under the governing standard.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered on second degree murder.

Leave to appeal the counselling sentence was granted and that sentence was reduced to time served.

The accused was convicted of fraud relating to a mortgage document.

At trial, the Crown was permitted to call reply evidence concerning the accused's conduct regarding a later mortgage and whether he held himself out as a chartered accountant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons from the Court of Appeal that the Crown was erroneously permitted to call reply evidence in breach of the collateral fact rule.

The accused, a 43-year-old stranger, took an 8-year-old boy from a school yard in his car to take photographs of him, without the parents' knowledge or consent.

The trial judge granted a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of abduction of a person under 14 years of age (s. 281 of the Criminal Code), finding no evidence of an 'unlawful' taking or intent to deprive the parents of possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that 'unlawfully' in s. 281 does not require an additional unlawful act, and that the mens rea is satisfied if the accused foresaw that his actions were certain or substantially certain to deprive the parents of possession of the child.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault for allegedly burning her 3½-year-old granddaughter's face on a stove.

At trial, the unsworn child testified against the appellant, and both sides called expert witnesses regarding the burns, the child's memory, and child abuse.

The Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial, finding that while the child was properly permitted to testify, the trial judge erred by allowing an expert witness to testify that the child's behaviour indicated long-term abuse and to improperly comment on the child's credibility.

The Court also found errors in the Crown's cross-examination of a defence expert using unproven learned treatises.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered by the provincial appellate court after a trial judge had convicted the accused of sexual offences against three young girls.

The Supreme Court held that under s. 686(1)(a)(i) an appellate court may re-examine and to some extent reweigh the evidence, including credibility-based findings, but must show substantial deference to the trial judge's assessment.

The Court further held that children's evidence is not inherently unreliable and should not be assessed through rigid adult credibility stereotypes or assumptions about how victims of sexual abuse ought to behave.

The appellate court erred by overstating inconsistencies, discounting supporting evidence, and relying on outdated views about corroboration and complaint.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were restored.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of sexual assault against a fifteen-year-old complainant based on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered a conviction, finding no evidentiary basis for the defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the evidence relied upon by the trial judge was incapable of lending an 'air of reality' to the defence, and affirmed that substituting a conviction was appropriate as a new trial would serve no purpose.