Jonathan Dawe

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in connection with a home invasion robbery in which the victim was shot and killed.

The Crown's case relied heavily on hearsay statements made by two associates of the appellant to police, in which they implicated him in planning and executing the robbery.

The trial judge admitted these statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay statements and in dismissing a Charter application based on unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's admission of the hearsay statements did not meet the more restrictive test established by the Supreme Court in R. v. Bradshaw.

The court also clarified the proper approach to calculating delay under the Jordan framework when extraordinary remedies are pursued.

The appellant appealed a trial conviction, raising three issues regarding the trial judge's reasons.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence of a prior consistent statement to corroborate the complainant's evidence, failed to adequately explain why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies, and that the complainant's evidence regarding the appellant's statement about getting "his boys to come down" was insufficient to constitute a threat.

The Court of Appeal rejected all three submissions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that there were no objective grounds for his arrest and that the gun found in his possession should not have been admitted into evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that there were both subjective and objective grounds for arrest based on a constellation of factors observed by the officers.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his 15-year-old cousin.

The Crown relied on the complainant's pregnancy as corroborating evidence of the assault.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's section 276 application seeking to cross-examine the complainant about other sexual activity that could account for her pregnancy.

The trial judge, who took over after the application judge became unable to continue, held that he was bound by the application judge's ruling.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in refusing the cross-examination and that the trial judge erred in holding himself bound by the prior ruling.

The court ordered a new trial.

Five appellants were convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery.

The Crown's case alleged a planned robbery with violence, while the defence maintained the incident arose from a drug transaction that escalated when the victim produced a firearm.

The appellants appealed on grounds that the trial judge's conduct rendered the trial unfair, that jury selection instructions were inadequate, and that prior consistent statement instructions were deficient.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's questioning of defence witnesses and extemporaneous comments during jury instructions created a cumulative appearance of bias toward the prosecution, seriously compromising the fairness of the trial.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and breach of probation.

The central issue was whether police lawfully detained the appellant and his luggage for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes pending the arrival of a drug-sniffer dog, based on a confidential informant's tip.

The trial judge found the detention reasonable; the Court of Appeal found it violated the appellant's Charter rights under section 9 but declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant also appealed his 12-month sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in treating him as a repeat offender and failing to apply sentencing principles for first-time offenders.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made an error but upheld the sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking offences and firearm-related offences, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the application judge's Charter ruling regarding the sufficiency of the information to obtain for a search warrant and the application of s. 24(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the application judge's analysis.

On the sentence appeal, the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal in part, reducing the sentence for the s. 86(1) firearm offence from two years to one year imprisonment concurrent, as the original sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for a first offender.

The Court upheld the trial judge's characterization of the appellant as a mid-level drug dealer based on the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, using an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, unlawful confinement, and wearing a disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in admitting his second statement to police.

The appellant had requested counsel after arrest but was questioned by the first officer, resulting in a first statement.

After consulting with duty counsel for four to five minutes, he was interviewed by a different officer and gave a substantially similar second statement.

The trial judge admitted the second statement, finding it was not tainted by the first.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the wrong legal test and that the second statement was tainted by the first statement obtained in breach of the appellant's right to counsel.

The court excluded both statements under section 24(2) of the Charter and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appellant challenged the warrantless search of the vehicle as a breach of his section 8 Charter rights.

The trial judge rejected the Charter claim, though he erred in stating the onus of proof was on the appellant.

The appellate court found this error harmless based on the trial judge's credibility findings.

The court upheld the conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking but set aside the conviction for possession of proceeds of crime, finding the evidence insufficient to support that finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant challenged an order for a new trial after exclusion of a co-accused’s prior inconsistent Agreed Statement of Facts tendered for its truth in a murder prosecution.

The majority held threshold reliability was not established because available safeguards did not adequately permit testing of truth and accuracy, particularly given curtailed cross-examination following assertions of solicitor-client privilege.

The Court emphasized deference to trial-level reliability determinations absent error in principle and rejected a request for a new trial based on how the prosecution conducted the voir dire.

It concluded the statement’s surrounding circumstances did not provide sufficient substantive reliability where the declarant had incentives to shift blame during plea negotiations.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored, with dissenting reasons favouring a new trial.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt on two counts of indecent act.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly reversed the burden of proof by failing to require the Crown to disprove the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt, and improperly drew an adverse inference from the rejected alibi.

The appeal judge found no error regarding the burden of proof, but held that the trial judge erred by treating disbelief of the alibi as evidence of guilt without proof of deliberate fabrication.

Because the counts were factually intertwined and the adverse inference undermined the assessment of credibility, the error tainted both verdicts.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.