Dr. Spence

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against a general practitioner and a specialist surgeon following complications from bowel surgery that resulted in a severe necrotizing soft tissue infection.

The plaintiffs alleged the specialist failed to follow up on PET scan results and the general practitioner failed to accurately communicate those results.

The court found that while the specialist breached the standard of care by failing to follow up, the plaintiffs failed to establish causation, as the patient's history of seeking alternative treatments and rejecting medical advice indicated he would not have complied with the recommended treatment plan.

The court found the general practitioner met the standard of care.

The action was dismissed.

During a medical malpractice trial, the defendants brought a motion under s. 12 of the Ontario Evidence Act seeking leave to call more than three expert witnesses.

The case involved allegations that an emergency room physician negligently failed to recognize stroke symptoms and delayed transfer for specialized care, allegedly resulting in quadriplegia.

The court considered factors relating to duplication, fairness between parties, necessity of additional expert evidence, and litigation cost.

Finding that the issues concerned only standard of care and causation and that three experts were sufficient to address them, the court concluded that allowing additional experts would create unnecessary duplication and disadvantage the plaintiffs.

Leave to call more than three medical experts was therefore refused.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his wife, which was initially investigated as a horse riding accident.

Fifteen years later, the police re-opened the investigation and the appellant confessed during a polygraph interview.

On appeal, the appellant argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated, the trial judge erred in not leaving manslaughter to the jury, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting an accidental death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breach, no air of reality to manslaughter, and that the fresh evidence failed the Mohan and Palmer tests.

The sentence appeal regarding the 14-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The respondent was assaulted at work and claimed benefits for traumatic vertebrobasilar ischemia (TVBI).

The Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal denied the claim, preferring medical evidence that the assault did not cause TVBI.

The Tribunal later upheld its decision on reconsideration after reviewing new evidence from a co-worker.

The Divisional Court quashed the reconsideration decision as patently unreasonable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the Tribunal's decision, finding that the Tribunal had properly considered the evidence, resolved the conflicting medical opinions, and reached a reasonable conclusion.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal regarding whether a workplace injury caused her to suffer a traumatic brain injury.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal failed to explain its rejection of unchallenged sworn evidence from a co-worker regarding a second blow to the head.

The Court quashed the Tribunal's decision as patently unreasonable and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal to resolve the conflicting medical opinions.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for battery and breach of good faith against their insurer and an independent chiropractor.

The appellant alleged she suffered a vertebrobasilar artery injury due to an unconsented procedure during an independent chiropractic examination arranged by her insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant failed to prove the chiropractor performed the alleged procedure.

The Court also found that the appellant had impliedly consented to the examination by attending without objection, and that the insurer's failure to inform her she could refuse attendance did not vitiate this consent or constitute a breach of good faith.

Jehovah's Witness parents challenged Ontario child protection legislation after their premature infant was made a temporary ward of a children's aid society so that doctors could administer a blood transfusion deemed medically necessary.

The appeal raised whether the statutory scheme infringed parental liberty under s. 7 and freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

A majority held that any s. 7 deprivation was either not established or was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, and that the infringement of freedom of religion was justified under s. 1 in light of the pressing objective of protecting children at risk.

The Court also dismissed the cross-appeal concerning the unusual costs award made against the Attorney General of Ontario.