John C. Murray

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal regarding whether a workplace injury caused her to suffer a traumatic brain injury.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal failed to explain its rejection of unchallenged sworn evidence from a co-worker regarding a second blow to the head.

The Court quashed the Tribunal's decision as patently unreasonable and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal to resolve the conflicting medical opinions.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court order dismissing her application for judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision.

The appellant argued the Tribunal failed to consider a doctor's letter in its refusal to reconsider her application regarding her carpal tunnel disorder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the failure to refer to the letter did not mean it was not considered, and the Tribunal's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, which denied its request to be reclassified to the manufacturing rate applicable to a company that owned 50% of its shares.

The Divisional Court held that the tribunal, as a specialized body protected by a privative clause, was entitled to curial deference.

The court found that the tribunal's conclusion that the companies were not 'associated' under the Act was not patently unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision granting a certification application by OPSEU for newly hired paramedics.

The applicant argued the paramedics were already bound by its existing collective agreement with the municipality.

The OLRB relied on extrinsic evidence to find the collective agreement's scope clause did not automatically include the paramedics.

The Divisional Court quashed the OLRB's decision, holding that the scope clause was unambiguous and the OLRB's reliance on extrinsic evidence to interpret it was patently unreasonable.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant was awarded costs in the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal.

The court received written submissions on the quantum of costs.

The court fixed costs at $2,500 for the Divisional Court application, $1,500 for the motion for leave to appeal, and $12,500 for the appeal, plus disbursements and GST.

The employer and union agreed to reduce work hours for certain employees without loss of income, but the drafted collective agreement contained an error in the pay scales.

The employer corrected the error when calculating retroactive pay, prompting a union grievance.

The arbitrator rectified the collective agreement to reflect the true agreement, but the Divisional Court quashed the award, holding that arbitrators lack jurisdiction to apply rectification.

The Court of Appeal allowed the employer's appeal, holding that developments in labour law have expanded arbitrators' remedial powers, giving them exclusive jurisdiction to apply the law of the land, including the equitable remedy of rectification, despite a 'no alteration' clause in the agreement.

A supplementary endorsement was issued to clarify the disposition of costs in the Divisional Court.

The court amended its previous reasons to provide the appellants with the option to have the costs assessed on a party and party basis within thirty days.

If the option is not exercised, the respondent is entitled to recover the $20,000 in costs fixed by the Divisional Court.

Appeal from dismissal of an application for judicial review challenging a university board resolution authorizing closure and sale of two downtown colleges as part of a capital development and financial restructuring strategy.

The majority held that the impugned decision concerned management, property, revenues, expenditures, and facilities within the Board's authority under the Trent University Act, and did not amount to educational policy requiring Senate concurrence.

The majority also held the faculty-member appellants lacked standing to seek judicial review, rejecting both personal and public interest standing arguments.

The appeal on the merits was dismissed, but the costs order below was varied to permit assessment of the party-and-party costs awarded by the Divisional Court if the appellants elected that course.

A dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding the closure decision engaged educational policy and required Senate approval.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash a resolution by the Trent University Board of Governors authorizing a capital development project that could involve closing or relocating two colleges.

The applicants argued the Board lacked jurisdiction without a concurring motion from the University Senate, which had passed a resolution opposing any change of location.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that under the Trent University Act, the Board has plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over the university's property, revenues, and expenditures, while the Senate's jurisdiction is limited to educational policy.

In an unfair labour practice complaint alleging termination for union activities, the respondent sought to introduce polygraph evidence to prove his lack of anti-union animus.

The complainant union objected, citing the Employment Standards Act's prohibition on lie detector tests in employment.

The Board ruled the polygraph evidence inadmissible, finding that its introduction would put employees at a tactical disadvantage and undermine the legislative intent protecting employees from such tests.

A dissenting member would have allowed the evidence to be considered for its relevance.

The plaintiff, a highly educated woman of East Indian origin, repeatedly applied for teaching positions at the defendant college but was never interviewed or hired.

She brought a civil action claiming damages for discrimination based on race and national origin, arguing both a common law tort of discrimination and a breach of The Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that no common law tort of discrimination exists.

The Court found that the comprehensive administrative and adjudicative scheme established by the Code forecloses any civil action based directly on a breach of the Code or on an invocation of the public policy expressed within it.