Anya Weiler

At a preliminary inquiry into Project Neebing, the Crown sought to commit the defendant to stand trial on seven charges including trafficking in cocaine and production of methamphetamine.

The defendant was discharged on the marijuana possession charge but the Crown sought to proceed on two disputed counts.

The court found sufficient evidence that a properly instructed jury could convict on both the trafficking and production charges based on circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, surveillance, and physical evidence of drug production materials and controlled substances seized from two residences associated with the defendant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

The trial judge had refused to exclude evidence of cocaine and cash seized during a vehicle stop for a Highway Traffic Act offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his analysis of whether the appellant's detention became unlawful (s. 9 breach) after the HTA investigation concluded and a groundless criminal investigation commenced.

The court also found a prolonged s. 10(b) breach (right to counsel) lasting over 30 minutes.

Applying the Grant factors for s. 24(2) exclusion analysis, the court determined that the serious Charter breaches and their impact on the appellant's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking offences and firearm-related offences, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the application judge's Charter ruling regarding the sufficiency of the information to obtain for a search warrant and the application of s. 24(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the application judge's analysis.

On the sentence appeal, the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal in part, reducing the sentence for the s. 86(1) firearm offence from two years to one year imprisonment concurrent, as the original sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for a first offender.

The Court upheld the trial judge's characterization of the appellant as a mid-level drug dealer based on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, as well as his 18-month sentence.

He had facilitated a $40 sale of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer.

At trial, he argued he was merely an agent of the purchaser.

The trial judge rejected this defence, finding his actions fell within the definition of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, noting the appellant located the seller, transported and delivered the drugs, and obtained the purchase price.

The sentence was also upheld as fit for a mature recidivist with a lengthy record of trafficking convictions.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic two kilograms of methamphetamine and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

The conviction was based on intercepted communications obtained via a wiretap authorization.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his Garofoli application, refusing leave to cross-examine the affiants, and failing to excise importation references from the affidavit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police had reached an investigative impasse and established investigative necessity for the wiretap.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the seven-year term was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's record and the need for deterrence.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant for his residence and vehicle, alleging that the Information to Obtain contained misleading statements, omissions, and errors that invalidated the authorization.

The court reviewed the ITO, cross‑examination of the affiant officer, and applicable principles governing review of prior authorizations.

Although the court found numerous inaccuracies and overstatements in the ITO, it concluded they resulted from carelessness rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead the issuing justice.

After excising erroneous statements and considering permissible amplification, the remaining information still established reasonable and probable grounds linking the accused to drug trafficking and connecting the residence to evidence of those offences.

The court held the search warrant was properly issued and no breach of s. 8 of the Charter occurred.

The accused was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and possession of cannabis resin following trial.

The sentencing hearing addressed four key issues: whether to impose a parole ineligibility order under section 743.6 of the Criminal Code; the constitutionality of section 719(3.1) limiting pre-sentence custody credit; the appropriate credit for pre-sentence custody; and the admissibility of evidence from an intervening unrelated trial.

The court declined to impose a parole ineligibility order, found section 719(3.1) unconstitutional as applied, granted reduced credit for pre-sentence custody, and excluded evidence from the intervening trial.

The accused was sentenced to five and one-half years imprisonment with 730 days credit for 608 days of pre-sentence custody.

In this drug trafficking trial arising from Project Wanipitee, the court applied the Carter test to determine whether intercepted communications could be admitted under the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found that a joint enterprise existed between the accused and others to traffic cocaine in the Durham Region.

The court identified the accused on intercepted communications through circumstantial evidence including surveillance, text message patterns, and physical movements.

The court convicted the accused of trafficking cocaine on two dates and possession of cocaine for trafficking purposes.

The court acquitted on charges related to marijuana possession and possession of cocaine at a separate location due to insufficient evidence of possession and control.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to invalidate a search warrant and exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter on the basis that the warrant failed to specify the execution date.

The accused argued the omission rendered the warrant unconstitutional and sought exclusion of both the seized evidence and later intercepted statements alleged to flow from the unlawful search.

The court held that the absence of a specified search date was a technical irregularity that did not undermine the validity of the warrant, as the Information to Obtain and execution window clearly implied the intended search date.

No bad faith or negligence by police was found.

Even if a Charter breach had occurred, the court held the evidence would not have been excluded under the Grant framework.

The applicant sought standing to challenge the constitutional validity of a vehicle stop and the subsequent search of cell phones belonging to three other individuals.

The applicant argued he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages he had exchanged with one of the individuals, relying on previous jurisprudence.

The court rejected this argument, applying the Edwards factors to find that the applicant had no indicia of ownership or control over the phones or the text messages once sent.

The court concluded the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages on the third parties' phones and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of his convictions.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant was not a flight risk, but opposed bail on public interest grounds.

The applicant's appeal grounds relate to the trial judge's refusal to order disclosure of police investigations into two key police witnesses, one of whom was subsequently charged with perjury.

The Court of Appeal granted bail, finding sufficient merit in the appeal grounds to temporarily suspend enforcement of the sentence, and ordered the appeal to be case managed for expeditious resolution.

The appellant appealed convictions entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision to decline re-opening the case after the appellant had elected not to call evidence and realized a conviction was imminent.

The court also dismissed an identification issue.

However, the Crown conceded that Count 1 was not an included offence, and the court declined to amend the count, quashing the conviction on Count 1.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed an extradition order, arguing there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the offence set out in the Authority to Proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was at least a scintilla of reliable evidence, particularly from an undercover officer and a co-conspirator, showing the appellant knew the laundered monies were the proceeds of trafficking in a controlled substance.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge improperly restricted the Parks question during jury selection and misdirected the triers on the challenge for cause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the permitted question encompassed both the attitudinal and behavioural components of the Parks inquiry and the triers were not misled.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge erred by failing to give the appellant credit for her cooperation with the police.

The sentence was reduced to six years.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to appeal his convictions for cocaine trafficking, which were entered upon guilty pleas.

He argued that while he knew he would face deportation to the United States, he did not realize he would subsequently face deportation from the United States to Guyana.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, noting the guilty pleas were informed and unequivocal, there was no evidence regarding his lack of knowledge of U.S. immigration law, and he had no defence on the merits.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge crafted a fit sentence at the time, compelling fresh evidence made it not in the interests of justice to re-incarcerate the appellant.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a conditional sentence of two years less one day, followed by two years of probation.

The appellant appealed his sentence for production of marijuana.

The trial judge had more than doubled the custodial sentence originally sought by the Crown because the appellant failed to attend his sentence hearing and was arrested on another drug possession charge in the interim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge overreacted to these post-conviction circumstances and failed to adequately apply the parity principle respecting the sentencing of co-accused.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced to twelve months plus pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his sentence for a vast conspiracy to traffic cocaine and launder money, committed while on bail pending appeal for another drug trafficking offence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was at the high end of the range but not manifestly excessive.

The trial judge's findings of fact were consistent with the jury's verdict, and she did not err in refusing enhanced pre-sentence credit beyond 2:1.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that evidence of his demeanour upon arrest had no value in proving guilt or innocence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the demeanour evidence was reasonably capable of supporting an inference favourable to the accused and should not have been taken away from the jury.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 27 months' imprisonment and probation for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was out of the range given the circumstances of the offence, though a substantial jail sentence was required due to the appellant's record and the fact he was on probation.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence was reduced to 18 months' imprisonment, and the probation order was set aside.