Dr. Ben-Aron

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his wife, which was initially investigated as a horse riding accident.

Fifteen years later, the police re-opened the investigation and the appellant confessed during a polygraph interview.

On appeal, the appellant argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated, the trial judge erred in not leaving manslaughter to the jury, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting an accidental death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breach, no air of reality to manslaughter, and that the fresh evidence failed the Mohan and Palmer tests.

The sentence appeal regarding the 14-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation, arguing that post-sentence psychiatric evidence suggested he might now be a candidate for long-term offender status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the original dangerous offender order was conceded to be correct at the time it was made.

The court held that the parole board, exercising its jurisdiction under section 761 of the Criminal Code, was in a better position than a trial court to assess the appellant's progress and potential for release into the community.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder for killing her two young sons.

At trial, she instructed her counsel not to raise the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) and refused to testify.

On appeal, she sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence that she was suffering from severe paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the offences and was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of her acts.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the Palmer criteria and that her decision at trial was a product of her untreated mental illness.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and substituted a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and other offences following a shooting at his high school.

At trial, he was found fit to stand trial and did not raise a defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

On appeal, fresh psychiatric evidence established that the appellant suffered from severe paranoid schizophrenia and was NCRMD at the time of the offences.

However, the appellant was too mentally ill to participate in his appeal or instruct counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal despite the appellant's incompetence, as the Criminal Code does not require an appellant to be fit to prosecute an appeal, provided procedural fairness is ensured.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted a verdict of NCRMD, finding that a new trial was unnecessary given the conclusive fresh evidence.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an escape plot and relying on it for psychiatric assessments.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of his progress in prison to be designated a long-term offender instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the escape plot evidence was admissible and relevant to the experts' risk assessments.

Furthermore, the fresh evidence did not establish a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, precluding a long-term offender designation.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from the killing of a close friend, arguing the jury charge inadequately addressed the alternative defence theory that mental disorder negated the mens rea for murder and manslaughter, and misstated the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly instructed the jury under the Hilton approach that evidence of mental disorder remained relevant to intent even if the not criminally responsible defence failed.

It further held that, read as a whole, the charge clearly distinguished the balance of probabilities burden applicable to the mental disorder defence from the Crown’s burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.