R. v. Rouse, 2024 ONCA 653

Court of Appeal for Ontario

Citation: R. v. Rouse, 2024 ONCA 653 Date: 2024-08-30 Docket: C70369

Before: Huscroft, George and Copeland JJ.A.

Between:

His Majesty the King Respondent

and

Gregory Rouse Appellant

Counsel: Nate Jackson, for the appellant Rick Visca and Sabina Burdo, for the respondent

Heard: August 27, 2024

On appeal from the conviction entered on April 30, 2021, with reasons reported at 2021 ONSC 3166, and the sentence imposed on January 13, 2022, by Justice Jennifer Woollcombe of the Superior Court of Justice.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1The appellant was charged with possessing the proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000, possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possessing cocaine, and resisting arrest. The trial judge convicted the appellant of possessing the proceeds of crime and resisting arrest, acquitted him of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and, at the invitation of the Crown, acquitted him of possessing cocaine. For possessing the proceeds of crime, the appellant received a 26-month jail sentence. For resisting arrest, the appellant received a concurrent 60-day sentence.

2The appellant does not appeal his conviction for resisting arrest. He does appeal his conviction for possessing the proceeds of crime. He argues that the trial judge 1) reached an inconsistent verdict by convicting him on the proceeds of crime count while acquitting him of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and 2) erred by inferring guilt when there were other reasonable inferences consistent with his innocence, contrary to R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000. The appellant also seeks leave to appeal his sentence on the basis that the trial judge failed to apply the appropriate legal principles and failed to account for substantial collateral immigration consequences.

3We do not accept the appellant’s submission that the verdicts are inconsistent. When assessing whether one verdict is inconsistent with another, our task is to consider whether the verdicts are irreconcilable, such that no reasonable trier of fact, properly instructed, could possibly have rendered them on the evidence. What at first blush may appear to be inconsistent verdicts can be reconciled on the basis that the offences themselves are “temporally distinct, or are qualitatively different, or dependent on the credibility of different complainants or witnesses”: R. v. Pittiman, 2006 SCC 9, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 381, at paras. 8-10; R. v. R.V., 2021 SCC 10, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 131, at paras. 29-30.

4Here, the evidence of the appellant’s knowledge of and control over the proceeds of crime was compelling. The $44,500 in cash seized by the police was located in a black duffel bag in the front passenger footwell of the vehicle that the appellant occupied; the appellant was observed by a police officer exiting the front passenger seat of that vehicle and repeatedly ringing the doorbell and knocking at the door of a residence where, it was agreed, he was unknown to the occupants; the trial judge found that there was no reasonable explanation for this conduct other than he was urgently trying to flee from police; and, when detained by the officer, $4,025 cash was found in the appellant’s pants pocket.

5With respect to the drug count, the evidence of the appellant’s knowledge and control was indisputably weaker. Unlike the cash, which was in plain view in the front passenger side footwell of the vehicle, the trial judge had no direct evidence about the location of the cocaine before the appellant’s co-accused retrieved it and threw it out the window. The only affirmative evidence on this point came from the co-accused, whose evidence was rejected by the trial judge. As such, and unlike with the cash, the appellant’s joint possession of the cocaine was not the only reasonable inference available on the evidence. The verdicts are not inconsistent.

6With respect to the second ground of appeal, the alleged “Villaroman error”, an appellate court can interfere only if the trial judge’s conclusion that the evidence excluded any reasonable alternative to guilt was itself unreasonable: R. v. Youssef, 2018 ONCA 16, 428 D.L.R. (4th) 612, at para. 4, aff’d 2018 SCC 49, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 259. In our view, the trial judge reasonably concluded that the circumstantial evidence excluded any reasonable alternative to the appellant’s guilt on the possessing proceeds of crime count.

7We also reject the appellant’s arguments on his sentence appeal. The trial judge expressly considered the collateral immigration consequences, referencing both the relevant provision of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, and the governing jurisprudence. She recognized that, as a permanent resident, the appellant would be inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality and that he could only appeal his removal from Canada if he received a sentence under six months or a conditional sentence. However, she concluded that neither would adequately address the gravity of the offence and the applicable sentencing principles. The sentence imposed was well within the acceptable range for this offence.

8For these reasons, the conviction appeal is dismissed. While we grant the appellant leave to appeal his sentence, the sentence appeal is dismissed.