Rick Visca

The appellant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking arising from a reverse sting operation conducted by the RCMP in August 1997.

The appellant was initially acquitted in 2000, but the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

At the retrial in 2014, the appellant sought a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, alleging that the lead investigator deliberately misled his superiors and withheld disclosure.

The trial judge rejected these allegations and convicted the appellant.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 10 years 10 months imprisonment and delayed parole eligibility were fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the rule in Browne v. Dunn was violated when he was not confronted with an alleged motive to fabricate, and that the trial judge erred by failing to give an Oliver instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant testified after his co-accused and had ample opportunity to respond to the evidence.

Furthermore, an Oliver instruction was not requested at trial, and its absence did not amount to misdirection.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug trafficking charges, which followed the trial judge's exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a finding of arbitrary detention under s. 9.

The trial judge had concluded that police lacked objectively reasonable grounds to arrest the respondent based on confidential informant tips and surveillance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by considering the informant information and police observations in isolation.

When viewed in totality, the informant information was sufficiently compelling and corroborated by police surveillance of multiple brief meetings in vehicles outside the respondent's residence to establish reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The appellant was pulled over for driving with a suspended license.

The police officer called a tow truck and conducted an 'inventory search' of the vehicle, discovering marijuana in the trunk.

The trial judge found the search reasonable and admitted the evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the officer had no statutory or common law authority to conduct the inventory search, resulting in a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) due to the seriousness of the state misconduct and the significant impact on the appellant's Charter rights.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

Sentencing for a mid-level participant in a large-scale marijuana grow operation who was convicted of production, possession for the purpose of trafficking, conspiracy to produce marijuana, and forgery.

The court rejected the Crown's characterization of the offender as the operating mind and found he acted primarily as a broker, though with significant moral culpability.

Mitigating factors included the absence of a criminal record, lack of profit, inability to pay a fine, and the court's finding that the undercover operation stimulated the enterprise, though not amounting to entrapment.

A reformatory sentence of two years less one day, reduced by 45 days' pre-trial custody credit to 22 ½ months, was imposed concurrently, with no fine and ancillary DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The offender was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to export 208,000 ecstasy pills to the United States, possession of ecstasy for the purpose of exporting, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The offender acted as a delivery person in an undercover operation directed by a co-conspirator.

The court sentenced the offender to 5 years for the drug offences and 6 months consecutive for the weapon offence, less 6 months credit for strict bail compliance, resulting in a net sentence of 5 years.

The appellants were arrested in an undercover drug trafficking operation and experienced a delay of nearly two and a half years before trial.

They applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, which was dismissed by the application judge.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge erred in allocating periods of delay and failing to penalize the Crown for tactical decisions.

The Court of Appeal adjusted the delay calculations but found the total delay still fell within the Morin guidelines.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on wilful blindness.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding there was no air of reality to wilful blindness and the trial judge failed to refer to any evidence supporting it.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime.

The Crown alleged the appellant was the supplier to a co-conspirator who dealt directly with an undercover officer.

The trial judge found the appellant and the co-conspirator were engaged in a conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and concluding that the conviction for possession of proceeds of crime flowed directly from the trafficking conviction.

The offender was sentenced following convictions for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

Evidence established that the offender had operated a large-scale marijuana trafficking enterprise for approximately fourteen years, distributing significant quantities and accumulating substantial illicit proceeds.

The sentencing court treated the offender’s admissions of long-term trafficking as aggravating circumstances under s.725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the scale and organized nature of the operation.

Charter breaches identified during pre‑trial proceedings were found to be technical and did not justify sentence reduction.

The court imposed a penitentiary sentence, consecutive terms for the offences, a substantial fine to strip illicit gains, and a victim surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's Charter ruling regarding the timing of his detention by police.

The appellant argued he was detained and handcuffed before verbally identifying himself under a false name, contrary to the trial judge's finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's factual finding that the detention occurred after the false identification.

The appellant was convicted of firearms and drug trafficking offences after police found him in an apartment with drugs and a loaded handgun.

At trial, the judge refused to allow the defence to call a third-party witness who was expected to testify that the drugs and gun belonged to him, ruling there was an insufficient nexus between the witness and the offences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misapplied the test for alternate suspect evidence.

Where the defence proposes to call direct evidence from another person taking responsibility for the crimes charged, that proposed evidence itself constitutes a sufficient nexus.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his residence and located 505 grams of cocaine hidden in a Kleenex tissue box.

The Crown relied primarily on circumstantial evidence to establish knowledge and control, including the accused’s admitted involvement in marijuana trafficking, drug paraphernalia found in the residence, and his association with a known cocaine trafficker.

The accused testified that he had no knowledge of the cocaine and suggested that a third party with access to the residence may have hidden it there shortly before the search.

The court rejected aspects of the accused’s credibility regarding the extent of his drug trafficking but found that the possibility that the third party concealed the cocaine in the residence raised a reasonable doubt about the accused’s knowledge.

As knowledge was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential element of possession was not established.

The accused brought a s. 8 Charter application challenging the manner in which police executed a search warrant at his residence using a dynamic entry.

The accused argued that the failure to comply with the knock notice rule and the alleged ransacking of the home rendered the search unreasonable and required exclusion of cocaine discovered during the search.

The court reviewed the governing principles from recent jurisprudence concerning dynamic entries and exigent circumstances.

It held that police had reasonable grounds to conduct a dynamic entry based on risks of destruction of cocaine and the possible presence of firearms connected to the drug investigation.

The court further found insufficient evidence that the search itself was conducted in an unreasonably destructive or disorderly manner.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, sought leave to adduce third party suspect evidence suggesting another individual was responsible for the drugs discovered during execution of a search warrant.

The proposed evidence connected the third party to cocaine trafficking and placed him at the residence shortly before police located the drugs, along with evidence of suspicious driving, possession of a large sum of cash, and cocaine discovered at his own residence.

Applying the governing test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held that the accused met the evidentiary burden of demonstrating a sufficient connection between the third party and the offence.

The evidence was capable of supporting a reasonable inference that the third party deposited the cocaine at the residence to avoid police detection.

Concerns about the strength of the inference or competing explanations were matters for the trier of fact rather than the threshold admissibility stage.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession and trafficking related to a marijuana grow operation found in her basement.

She argued her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise her of her right to testify, blaming an allegedly incompetent interpreter, and by advising her not to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to establish the material facts of her claim and that trial counsel's advice not to testify was reasonable given the significant risks she would have faced in cross-examination, including questions about mortgage fraud and unexplained income.

The appellant was driving a rented SUV when he was pulled over by a police officer who mistakenly believed the vehicle required a front licence plate.

Despite realizing his error, the officer continued the detention, discovered the appellant's licence was suspended, arrested him, and searched the vehicle, finding 35 kg of cocaine.

The trial judge found breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying the revised s. 24(2) framework from R. v. Grant.

The Court held that the police conduct was a brazen and flagrant disregard for Charter rights, aggravated by misleading testimony, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a failure to adequately investigate and the loss of video tapes violated his section 7 Charter rights, and that the jury charge was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to show actual prejudice from the missing evidence, as required by R. v. La.

The court also held that the jury charge was adequate, noting the speculative nature of the missing evidence and the trial judge's use of the standard Lifchus charge.

The appeal concerned an accused’s attempt to obtain police disciplinary records and criminal investigation files relating to the Crown’s principal police witness after conviction on drug charges.

The Court held that the common law O’Connor regime is the general mechanism for production of third party records and is not confined to cases involving a proven reasonable expectation of privacy.

It further held that privacy in criminal investigation files and police disciplinary records is contextual, not categorical.

The Court clarified that the investigating police force stands on the same first party footing as the Crown for disclosure purposes and must provide records of serious police misconduct where the misconduct is related to the investigation or could reasonably affect the case against the accused.

Because the underlying application had become moot, the appeal was allowed, the order below was set aside, and no further order was made.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of ecstasy.

During a vehicle stop, police found cocaine under the passenger seat where the appellant was sitting, and further drugs during a pat-down and subsequent strip search.

The trial judge found Charter breaches and excluded the drugs found during the strip search under s. 24(2), but admitted the other drugs.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly weigh an officer's untruthful testimony in the s. 24(2) analysis and erred in applying the rule in Brown v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis was entitled to deference and her credibility findings were reasonable.