Rick Visca

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada and multiple counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to a scheme involving sham vehicle sales to exploit aboriginal tax exemptions and fraudulently claim GST refunds.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made conclusory findings of guilt without identifying the specific evidence establishing the appellants' participation in the illegitimate transactions or addressing the individual fraud counts.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of tax evasion and making false statements in his tax returns.

The trial judge found that all essential elements of the offences were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but acquitted the respondent because she could not calculate the exact amount of unpaid tax due to an allegedly understated opening net worth statement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown is not required to negate every possibility regarding the amounts put forward, especially when the taxpayer failed to keep proper records and the matters are peculiarly within their knowledge.

The acquittals were set aside, convictions were entered, and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The appellant was driving a rented vehicle from Vancouver to Toronto when he was stopped by a police officer without reasonable grounds.

The officer discovered the appellant's license was suspended, arrested him, and searched the vehicle, finding 77 pounds of cocaine.

The trial judge found the officer's conduct violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter and described the breaches as flagrant, but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the offence and the reliability of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant sought to admit fresh evidence on appeal regarding the arresting officer's misconduct and cocaine habit.

The Crown conceded that the fresh evidence met the Palmer test and could reasonably have affected the verdict by impacting the trial judge's assessment of the officer's credibility and motive.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of marijuana production, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity after police executed a search warrant at her residence.

The police breached the front door without knocking and announcing their presence, which the trial judge found violated s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the police acted in good faith and exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the evidence, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis.

The 15-month sentence was also upheld as fit for a large-scale grow operation.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

The police officer asked the accused for identification, ran a CPIC check, and discovered an outstanding bail curfew condition.

The accused was arrested and searched, revealing cocaine.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that while the request for identification violated s. 8, there were no breaches of ss. 9 or 10(b).

The Court concluded the evidence should not have been excluded under s. 24(2) because the officer could have lawfully obtained the identification by ticketing the accused for a seatbelt violation.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant and his companies were convicted of wilfully obtaining and attempting to obtain GST refunds by submitting false invoices for condominium development work.

He was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment and fined over $700,000.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the Crown failed to prove the exact fraud amounts, raised the defence of officially induced error, and sought to introduce fresh evidence of undisclosed CRA documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the exact amount was not an essential element, the officially induced error defence was inapplicable, and the undisclosed documents would not have affected the trial's outcome.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the substantial fraud justified the penalty.

The appellant, a former Revenue Canada auditor, was convicted of 249 counts of fraudulently obtaining over $1.5 million in GST refunds.

He appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce fresh evidence to support an alibi defence and arguing the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the Crown's duty to preserve evidence.

The Crown appealed the 18-month sentence, seeking a four-year term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer criteria and the lack of a jury instruction was a tactical decision by the defence that would not have altered the verdict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's role was entitled to deference.

The appellant, convicted of drug-related offences, brought a motion for production of records relating to pending criminal and disciplinary charges against the arresting officer.

The appellant sought these records to develop a fresh evidence application on appeal, arguing the officer had an ulterior motive for the arrest and challenging his credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that on a motion for production of third-party records on appeal, the applicant must first satisfy the Trotta relevancy threshold before the O'Connor test for privacy interests is engaged.

The Court found that certain records relating to the officer's alleged drug use and related misconduct met the threshold.

The Court ordered the Provincial Crown to disclose relevant portions of its criminal investigation records, finding they were not employment records subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, but requested further submissions regarding records held by the Barrie Police Service.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of the proceeds of crime on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Crown conceded that the absence of mutual communication and confidence between the appellant and his trial counsel led to an inadequate and unfair defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the verdict unreliable, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug possession, arguing that the police violated his section 8 Charter rights during a vehicle stop.

At trial, the Crown abandoned its position that there were reasonable grounds for arrest and instead argued the stop was a valid investigative detention.

The trial judge accepted this but failed to consider the duration or manner of the detention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, noting the trial judge did not have the benefit of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on investigative detention and the record was insufficient to resolve the issue.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug-related offences, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, reversed the burden of proof, and reached an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions regarding the appellant's occupancy of the bedroom and control over the drugs were well-supported by the evidence, including drug paraphernalia in plain view and the appellant's personal identification found in the bedroom.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that he was unlawfully detained prior to a consent search that revealed crack cocaine, and that he was prejudiced by improper cross-examination and jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings precluded a finding of detention, and that any potential prejudice from the Crown's improper cross-examination was sufficiently offset by the jury charge.

The respondent was charged with possession of marijuana in April 2002.

He successfully moved to dismiss the charges on the basis that the prohibition in section 4 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act was of no force or effect at the time, following the Court of Appeal's earlier decision in R. v. Parker.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations did not create a constitutionally valid medical exemption (as determined in the companion case Hitzig v. R.), the criminal prohibition against possession of marijuana remained of no force and effect when the respondent was charged.

The Crown applied for a stay of a summary conviction appeal court judgment that affirmed the dismissal of marijuana possession charges on the basis that the offence was unknown to law in Ontario.

The Crown also sought to expedite the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for a stay, finding no jurisdiction to stay the reasons underlying a dismissal of a charge or to suspend the doctrine of stare decisis.

However, the request to expedite the appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for selling cocaine, arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because he represented himself at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that ineffective assistance claims do not apply to self-represented accused.

The Court found that the appellant, though unfamiliar with criminal procedure, intelligently advanced his defence of mistaken identity and received a fair trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not unfit.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by treating the offence similarly to importing cocaine.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by using importing cases as a benchmark.

The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to six years, noting the appellant's age and criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after two bottles of rum containing the drug were found in her possession at airport customs.

She appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to appreciate that her fingerprints were not on the bottles containing cocaine.

She also sought leave to appeal her three-year sentence, requesting a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the totality of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year term was within the recognized range for first-time drug couriers and was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant and a co-accused were jointly tried for trafficking crack cocaine.

Their defences were antagonistic.

At trial, the judge permitted the co-accused's counsel to cross-examine the appellant on the facts underlying past drug-related charges that had been withdrawn or resulted in acquittals, in order to show propensity and attack credibility.

The appellant was convicted and appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an acquittal is a declaration of innocence for all purposes.

The highly prejudicial effect of cross-examining the appellant on the underlying facts of charges for which he was acquitted outweighed its probative value and compromised his right to a fair trial.

The appellant was convicted of importing narcotics after arriving at Pearson International Airport with cannabis resin strapped to her body.

She appealed her conviction and 18-month conditional sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting her defence of duress, failing to find she knew the packs contained narcotics, and illegally modifying her conditional sentence conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed her credibility regarding the duress defence, the inference of knowledge was available on the evidence, and the condition to remain in Ontario was permitted under s. 742.3(2)(f) of the Criminal Code.