Rick Visca

The appellant was convicted of importing a narcotic after customs officers discovered marihuana hidden inside coconuts in her luggage.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge's jury instructions on the meaning of reasonable doubt were deficient.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury charge, which was given before the Supreme Court's decision in Lifchus, failed to clarify that more than a probability of guilt was required and improperly linked the standard to an ordinary everyday meaning.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a senior airport customs inspector, was convicted of importing cannabis and breach of trust after escorting two individuals carrying drugs through customs.

She appealed her convictions, arguing that the trial judge's jury instructions on the meaning of reasonable doubt were defective in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in R. v. Lifchus and R. v. Starr.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury charge, considered as a whole, did not give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the standard of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed jury convictions on two counts of trafficking in a narcotic, arguing loss of identification evidence, inadequate jury instructions on in-dock identification, inconsistent verdicts, and unreasonable verdicts.

The court held that the lost identification card relating to an acquitted count caused no prejudice to the defence on the remaining count.

It further found the jury was thoroughly instructed on the frailties and unfairness of in-dock identification.

Considering the surveillance, close-range observations, self-identification to police, and other objective features of identification, the court concluded the verdicts were reasonably supported by the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed conviction and sentence arising from substantially the same factual matrix as that of his wife, whose conviction had previously been found unreasonable by the same court.

The court held that the two features relied on by the trial judge to distinguish the appellant's case — the scale of monies connected to him and an alleged retreat when police entered — were not valid distinguishing factors.

The alleged retreat did not reasonably support an inference of consciousness of guilt.

The verdict was therefore unreasonable, the appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and acquittals were entered.

The appellant challenged his conviction on two grounds: the admission of expert evidence from a police detective and an alleged misapprehension of another police officer's evidence.

The court declined to articulate a general rule on admissibility, holding that such determinations must be made case by case under the governing appellate framework.

Because defence counsel had not objected at trial, there was no record to assess relevance or necessity, and the expert evidence did not appear to have unduly influenced the result.

The court also found no misapprehension of the officer's evidence and dismissed the appeal.