William H. Corbett

The appellant, facing a Canadian drug charge, was subsequently indicted in the United States for similar offences carrying a ten-year minimum sentence.

On the morning of his Canadian trial, the Crown stayed the proceedings and the appellant was arrested on an extradition warrant.

The appellant argued that the Crown's earlier offer to stay extradition in exchange for a guilty plea to the Canadian charge constituted egregious misconduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no lack of good faith or abuse of process by the Crown.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal from an extradition judge's order committing him for surrender and dismissing his application for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the court below, finding that the surrender did not infringe the appellant's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal from an extradition judge's order committing him for surrender, and dismissing his application for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal, finding that the surrender did not infringe the appellant's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Minister of Justice appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding the surrender of a fugitive to a foreign state.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge in the court below.

The Court held that the Minister's surrender decision did not infringe the fugitive's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and restored the Superior Court's decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent for his role in a conspiracy to import cocaine, despite the respondent never having been in the United States during the relevant times.

The extradition judge dismissed the application for committal, finding that the United States had no jurisdiction to prosecute the offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an extradition judge's role is limited to determining whether the evidence would justify committal for trial under Canadian law if the crime had been committed in Canada.

The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the requesting state is a matter for the executive, not the extradition judge, and that in any event, there was a real and substantial link to the United States.

The appellants, masters of two Spanish fishing vessels, were acquitted at trial of illegally entering and fishing in Canadian fisheries waters, and one appellant was acquitted of obstructing a fisheries protection officer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that under s. 605(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, the Court of Appeal only had jurisdiction to interfere if the trial judge erred on a question of law alone.

The trial judge's reasonable doubt and findings of fact regarding intent to obstruct were not errors of law alone.

The State of Washington sought the extradition of the respondent, who had been convicted of theft in the second degree in Washington and subsequently escaped to Canada.

The extradition judge committed the respondent for extradition, inferring fraudulent intent from his failure to return a consigned organ.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal quashed the committal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the double criminality rule is conduct-based.

The Court found that the appellant failed to establish that the respondent's conduct would constitute theft in Canada, as the Washington offence did not require fraudulent intent on its face, and such intent could not be inferred solely from the non-return of goods.