Kenneth J. Yule

The appellant was stopped by an RCMP officer at a bus terminal based on suspicious behaviour.

The officer called for a sniffer dog, which indicated the presence of drugs in the appellant's bag.

The appellant was arrested and a search of the bag revealed cocaine and heroin.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a dog sniff constitutes a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

While the police have a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on a standard of reasonable suspicion, the officer in this case did not have sufficient grounds to meet that standard.

The search was therefore unreasonable, and the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the appeal being allowed and the conviction set aside.

The police accepted an invitation from a high school principal to bring sniffer dogs into the school to search for drugs.

The police had no specific knowledge of drugs present and conducted a random search while students were confined to classrooms.

A sniffer dog reacted to the respondent's unattended backpack in the gymnasium.

The police opened the backpack without a warrant and found illicit drugs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dog sniff constituted a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court found that while police possess a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on reasonable suspicion, the search in this case was random and lacked reasonable suspicion, thus violating s. 8.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the acquittal was upheld.

The appellant pleaded guilty to producing cannabis and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory firearms prohibition order under s. 109(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the mandatory order constituted cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the prohibition has a legitimate connection to drug offences and relates to the recognized sentencing goal of protecting the public.

The Court found that the loss of the privilege to possess firearms is not grossly disproportionate, especially given the ameliorative provision in s. 113 of the Criminal Code.