Lisa Matthews

The Director of Public Prosecutions sought leave to intervene in an appeal by the provincial Crown of an Ontario Review Board decision granting an absolute discharge to the respondent, who was previously found NCR for a national security offence.

The motion judge dismissed the intervention application, finding the DPP's proposed factum argued the factual merits rather than confining itself to legal issues, and that allowing the intervention would prejudice the respondent.

The appellant, convicted of serious drug and firearm offences and sentenced to 20 years, sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous but argued against release due to flight risk and public interest concerns.

The court found the appellant was not a flight risk given his strong release plan and compliance history, and that detention was not necessary in the public interest, balancing enforceability and reviewability interests.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

This ruling addresses the challenge for cause process in a high-profile criminal trial.

It outlines principles from R. v. Chouhan regarding screening for bias, balancing fair trial rights with juror privacy.

The court determined how to screen for potential juror bias related to the disturbing nature of the allegations, bias against those holding extremist views, and the impact of pre-trial publicity, including statements by public officials and participation in commemorative events.

The judge proposed specific questions for the challenge for cause.

This ruling addresses the editing of an accused's statements for admissibility at trial.

The court considered jointly proposed edits by the Crown and defence to remove irrelevant and prejudicial content, such as references to abortion clinics, political views, and Covid-19 vaccine opposition.

However, the court denied the defence's requests to excise statements where the accused asserted he would not plead insanity, characterized his actions as terrorism, and stated he was inspired by other mass killers.

The judge found these contentious statements highly probative and relevant to the Crown's case on mental state, intention, motive, planning, and deliberation, emphasizing that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, which could be mitigated by limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused, Nathaniel Veltman, facing charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder with terrorism allegations, brought a pre-trial motion regarding the admissibility of ideological evidence found on his devices and expert testimony from Dr. Barbara Perry on right-wing extremism.

The court ruled that the ideological documents (including 'A White Awakening', Tarrant's manifesto excerpts, Breivik's manifesto cover, and mass shooting video existence) were admissible, subject to careful presentation and limiting instructions to the jury.

However, the expert testimony of Dr. Perry was deemed inadmissible, as it was not necessary to assist the jury and its potential prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, particularly given the accused's own explanations and the general notoriety of some concepts.

The appellant telecommunications company challenged a general warrant and related assistance order requiring it to produce stored text messages of two subscribers on a prospective, daily basis over a two-week period.

The majority held the general warrant invalid, with two concurring opinions reaching that result by different routes.

One plurality held that the prospective daily production of future text messages constituted an interception of private communications requiring authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code, making the general warrant unavailable under s. 487.01(1)(c).

The other concurring opinion held that even if not strictly an interception, the technique was substantively equivalent to one, precluding resort to the general warrant.

The dissent would have upheld the general warrant, finding the technique was disclosure of previously intercepted communications rather than an interception itself.

The police accepted an invitation from a high school principal to bring sniffer dogs into the school to search for drugs.

The police had no specific knowledge of drugs present and conducted a random search while students were confined to classrooms.

A sniffer dog reacted to the respondent's unattended backpack in the gymnasium.

The police opened the backpack without a warrant and found illicit drugs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dog sniff constituted a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court found that while police possess a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on reasonable suspicion, the search in this case was random and lacked reasonable suspicion, thus violating s. 8.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the acquittal was upheld.

The appellant was stopped by an RCMP officer at a bus terminal based on suspicious behaviour.

The officer called for a sniffer dog, which indicated the presence of drugs in the appellant's bag.

The appellant was arrested and a search of the bag revealed cocaine and heroin.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a dog sniff constitutes a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

While the police have a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on a standard of reasonable suspicion, the officer in this case did not have sufficient grounds to meet that standard.

The search was therefore unreasonable, and the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the appeal being allowed and the conviction set aside.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) brought a motion to intervene in a Crown appeal concerning the exclusion of evidence obtained during a dog-assisted search of a high school.

The CCLA also sought permission to adduce fresh evidence, including newspaper articles and a letter from the Ontario Principal's Council.

The court granted the CCLA leave to intervene, file a factum, and participate in oral argument, recognizing its experience and expertise.

However, the court denied the request to adduce fresh evidence, finding the proposed materials lacked probative value and would unfairly widen the scope of the appeal.