Peter Ketcheson

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal for sexual assault.

The trial judge found the accused not guilty after concluding that the Crown had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the physical contact.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by partitioning the complainant's evidence, treating her as a discreditable witness requiring corroboration, and failing to consider the accused's evidence on consent.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, his consideration of the absence of corroborative evidence, or his ultimate verdict.

The decision concerns a bail application by Gurpreet Singh, who is sought for extradition to the United States on charges related to large-scale cocaine trafficking.

Singh proposed a strict house arrest bail plan with GPS monitoring and multiple sureties.

The court found the plan had strengths but ultimately denied bail due to a high risk of flight, citing Singh’s international connections, travel history, and lack of credible financial disclosure.

The application was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of statements made by the accused, Nathaniel Veltman, who was charged with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder following an incident where he drove his vehicle into a Muslim family.

The defence sought to exclude statements made to a 911 call-taker, spontaneous statements to arresting officers, and two videotaped statements to a police detective, arguing involuntariness and breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found all statements to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

While acknowledging some technical s. 10(b) Charter breaches by arresting officers due to exigent circumstances and delays at the police station, the court determined these were made in good faith and that a "fresh start" was achieved by the detective's thorough re-cautioning.

The court concluded that the accused had an "irresistible desire to speak" and would have made the statements regardless of the breaches, thus rendering them admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The offender was convicted by a jury of four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder after driving his truck into a Muslim family in London, Ontario.

The sentencing judge found that the murders constituted terrorist activity under the Criminal Code, as they were motivated by white nationalist ideology and intended to intimidate the Muslim community.

The offender was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence with no parole eligibility for 25 years for each murder, and a concurrent life sentence for the attempted murder, reflecting the extreme brutality and terrorist nature of the attack.

The accused brought a motion seeking leave to communicate with defence counsel between the completion of the Crown's cross-examination and the commencement of re-examination, contrary to the presumptive Ontario Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court granted the motion, finding that the constitutional rights to a fair trial and full answer and defence, coupled with the gravity and complexity of the charges (four counts of first-degree murder and one of attempted murder) and the extensive nature of the accused's testimony, justified a departure from the rule.

The ruling permits counsel and client to discuss both the decision to re-examine and the proper scope of re-examination.

The Crown sought a permanent publication ban on excerpts from the accused's "A White Awakening" manifesto and video footage depicting the incident, arguing public harm and inspiration for copycat crimes.

The media coalition opposed the ban, emphasizing the open court principle and the importance of public information.

The court dismissed the ban on manifesto excerpts, finding no serious risk from responsible media reporting, but ordered the unredacted manifesto sealed until trial conclusion and limited video access to exclude the moment of impact.

This ruling addresses the challenge for cause process in a high-profile criminal trial.

It outlines principles from R. v. Chouhan regarding screening for bias, balancing fair trial rights with juror privacy.

The court determined how to screen for potential juror bias related to the disturbing nature of the allegations, bias against those holding extremist views, and the impact of pre-trial publicity, including statements by public officials and participation in commemorative events.

The judge proposed specific questions for the challenge for cause.

This ruling addresses the editing of an accused's statements for admissibility at trial.

The court considered jointly proposed edits by the Crown and defence to remove irrelevant and prejudicial content, such as references to abortion clinics, political views, and Covid-19 vaccine opposition.

However, the court denied the defence's requests to excise statements where the accused asserted he would not plead insanity, characterized his actions as terrorism, and stated he was inspired by other mass killers.

The judge found these contentious statements highly probative and relevant to the Crown's case on mental state, intention, motive, planning, and deliberation, emphasizing that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, which could be mitigated by limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused, Nathaniel Veltman, facing charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder with terrorism allegations, brought a pre-trial motion regarding the admissibility of ideological evidence found on his devices and expert testimony from Dr. Barbara Perry on right-wing extremism.

The court ruled that the ideological documents (including 'A White Awakening', Tarrant's manifesto excerpts, Breivik's manifesto cover, and mass shooting video existence) were admissible, subject to careful presentation and limiting instructions to the jury.

However, the expert testimony of Dr. Perry was deemed inadmissible, as it was not necessary to assist the jury and its potential prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, particularly given the accused's own explanations and the general notoriety of some concepts.

The accused, facing charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder, applied for a mental condition assessment under s. 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code to explore a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence.

The defence sought the assessment without disclosing specific grounds to the court or the Crown, and requested that the resulting report not be shared unless and until the defence decided to lead the evidence at trial, citing solicitor-client privilege and fair trial rights.

The Crown opposed on the basis of lack of grounds and security concerns regarding the accused's transfer to Ottawa.

The court granted the assessment, relying on counsel's assertion of grounds and the constitutional imperative of a fair trial, and ordered the report to be prepared but disclosed only to the defence, allowing them to decide whether to use it at trial, thereby protecting solicitor-client privilege.

The court also allowed the assessment to take place at a location of the psychiatrist's choice in Ottawa, balancing efficiency and security.

The appellant, Loujack Café, appealed his convictions for four attempted murders and one aggravated assault, and the concurrent life sentence, stemming from violent random attacks in Hamilton.

The appeal raised three issues: undue delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter (R. v. Jordan), the trial judge's treatment of cross-count similar fact evidence, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's Jordan analysis, similar fact evidence rulings, or the imposed sentence.