Rameez Sewani

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences based primarily on eyewitness identification by the complainant, who recognized the appellant as a former hotel guest.

The trial judge found the identification was corroborated by the appellant's possession of stolen sunglasses and the presence of a co-conspirator during his arrest.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the corroborative evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge did misapprehend the evidence regarding the co-conspirator's presence, this error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The remaining corroborative evidence—the appellant's possession of the stolen sunglasses two days after the robbery—strongly supported the identification.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, Courtney Dennis, applied for state-funded counsel under section 684 of the Criminal Code after being convicted of importing cocaine and resisting arrest.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application, finding that the grounds of appeal were not arguable, particularly in light of Supreme Court authority on the obligation of an accused who testifies to answer all questions.

The court also found no arguable error in sentencing.

The decision reviews the legal framework for appointing appellate counsel and the standards for determining whether an appeal is arguable.

The appellant, Jomal Brown, appealed his convictions for possession of various illicit drugs for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of trafficking, and several firearm offences.

The appeal also challenged the application judge’s dismissal of his Charter application, which was denied on the basis that Brown had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the unit where the items were seized.

During appeal preparation, Crown counsel identified a trial fairness issue: the Crown had taken inconsistent positions regarding Brown’s residence in the unit at different stages of the proceedings.

With the consent of both parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and Charter ruling, and ordered a new trial on all issues.

Liwayway Miranda brought a motion to quash certain charges under the Employment Standards Act and Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act, arguing they were laid outside the limitation period.

The motion was brought late in the trial process, after a finding of guilt but before sentencing.

The core issue was whether the offences were "continuous" or "non-continuous" for limitation period purposes.

The court, applying the principles from Hamilton Health Sciences, found the offences to be continuous, emphasizing compliance with orders over timeliness, and dismissed the motion.

Cory Crockatt appealed his convictions for breaking and entering, possession of stolen property, and failing to comply with release conditions.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of identification evidence, the scope of alternative possibilities considered in the circumstantial case for the break-in, and the reasonableness of the stolen car possession verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning regarding identification evidence or the circumstantial case, and concluding that the verdict for possession of stolen property was reasonable based on the cumulative evidence.

The Ministry of Labour charged A & L Hammer Workforce Management Inc. and its sole director, Liwayway Coluna Miranda, with failing to comply with orders to pay employee wages and recruitment fees under the Employment Standards Act and Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act.

The defendants pleaded not guilty, with the corporation's trial proceeding ex-parte.

Ms. Miranda raised a due diligence defence, claiming her business was destroyed and accounts frozen due to a CBSA raid and subsequent criminal charges (later withdrawn).

The court found that Ms. Miranda failed to demonstrate due diligence, as she continued to recruit foreign nationals despite financial difficulties and did not make reasonable efforts to secure funds or engage with the Ministry.

Both the corporation and Ms. Miranda were found guilty on all counts.

The applicants, charged with drug trafficking and firearms offences, brought a Charter application alleging that warrantless police entries into the common areas of their condominium building to conduct surveillance violated their section 8 rights.

The police used observations from this surveillance to obtain a search warrant for the applicants' unit.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the first entry to ascertain the applicants' address did not violate section 8, the second entry to confirm drug trafficking activities in the hallway did, as the applicants had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Applying the Grant test under section 24(2), the court excluded the evidence found in the unit, concluding that the police showed reckless disregard for Charter standards and the impact on the applicants' privacy was significant.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought pretrial rulings on the admissibility of two pieces of evidence: photos of gas cans found on the respondent's phone and in his residence, and a text exchange between the respondent and an unidentified individual.

The respondent admitted to driving the vehicle involved in the shooting and the presence of his DNA on a glove near the later-burned vehicle.

The court ruled the gas can evidence moot for admissibility purposes after the respondent testified at trial that he urged the alleged shooter to destroy the vehicle.

The text exchange was deemed inadmissible as it was speculative and lacked sufficient context to establish that the ultimate victim was targeted.

All contentious evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The appellant, Shane Williamson, appealed his convictions for multiple firearms offences, including possession and discharging a firearm, stemming from a shooting incident where the sole issue at trial was the identity of the male shooter.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to properly consider the exculpatory aspects of his statements to police (that he was a bystander/victim) under the framework of R. v. W.(D.), and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, particularly regarding eyewitness evidence frailties and other shortcomings in the Crown's circumstantial case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had applied the substance of W.(D.) by considering and rejecting the defence's "alternative explanation" through the Villaroman framework for circumstantial evidence.

The Court also found the reasons sufficient, explaining the path of reasoning and addressing the key issues in context, noting that the case was based on circumstantial evidence rather than direct eyewitness identification.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained by police during a murder investigation, alleging breaches of various Charter rights, including those related to search and seizure and rights upon detention.

The court analyzed the validity of production orders for banking records, warrantless review of surveillance video, the lawfulness of detention and seizure of electronic devices, and the validity and execution of a search warrant for cellphones.

The decision outlines specific findings on each alleged breach, determining some police actions were lawful while others violated the accused's Charter rights.

The appellant, convicted of serious drug and firearm offences and sentenced to 20 years, sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous but argued against release due to flight risk and public interest concerns.

The court found the appellant was not a flight risk given his strong release plan and compliance history, and that detention was not necessary in the public interest, balancing enforceability and reviewability interests.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The appellant, Marvin Smith, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, imposed after pleading guilty to aggravated assault, intimidation of a justice system participant, and weapon possession.

The central issue was whether the sentencing judge erred in interpreting "pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour" under s. 753(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, specifically regarding a six-year gap in his criminal history and the admission of hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge correctly concluded the appellant exhibited a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour, notwithstanding the gap, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the high risk of reoffending and intractability.

This decision from the Court of Appeal for Ontario serves as a notice regarding a non-publication order imposed under s. 517 of the Criminal Code.

The order prohibits the publication of evidence, information, representations, and reasons from the underlying bail hearing.

Consequently, the full decision on the application to set aside a detention order will not be publicly available on the court's website until the non-publication order expires.

A physical copy is available at the Court Registry in the interim.

The appellant, Ahmad Durani, appealed his convictions for criminal negligence causing death while street racing and failing to remain, and his global sentence of 5 years' imprisonment.

The convictions stemmed from a street race that resulted in a fatal collision.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in analyzing the actus reus and mens rea of criminal negligence and in applying the presumption for failing to remain.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's conclusions were rooted in evidence and that the appellant's conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the norm.

The court also found the trial judge correctly rejected the appellant's statements as "evidence to the contrary" for the failing to remain charge.

The appellant, J.R., appealed convictions for sexual offences against his two young daughters.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury against cross-count reasoning and propensity reasoning, and by instructing them that cross-count reasoning was permissible.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, finding these errors required the convictions to be set aside.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondent on charges including pointing a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for the acquittals, specifically by not addressing credibility and reliability issues related to the officers' testimony and not explaining how the evidence led to reasonable doubt despite compelling forensic evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on the disputed counts.

The Crown applied pursuant to section 117.05 of the Criminal Code for an order disposing of weapons seized by police and prohibiting the respondent from possessing weapons for five years.

The respondent had voluntarily surrendered firearms and edged weapons to police during a domestic assault investigation.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction to make the requested order because the application was brought approximately seven months after the seizure, far exceeding the 30-day statutory requirement under section 117.05(1).

Additionally, the court found that the preconditions for a lawful seizure under section 117.04 had not been met, as there was no evidence of the seizing officer's subjective belief that seizure was necessary for safety reasons.

On a hypothetical basis addressing the merits, the court found no legitimate concerns that the respondent lacked the responsibility and discipline required of a gun owner, noting the respondent's responsible storage practices and voluntary surrender of the weapons.