Benotto S.J.

The applicants sought costs of $120,000 on a partial indemnity basis following a successful judicial review application.

The respondents argued that $30,000 was appropriate.

Applying the overriding principle of reasonableness from Boucher, the Divisional Court considered factors including the length of the hearing, the complexity of the issues, the voluminous record, and duplication of effort by applicants' counsel.

The court fixed costs at $60,000.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) sought judicial review of an order by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring it to disclose an electronic database containing the personal information of over 10 million Ontario residents to a collection agency.

The Commissioner had found that disclosure was expressly authorized by the Assessment Act, relying on previous case law regarding municipal election records.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decision, finding that the Assessment Act did not expressly authorize disclosure of the electronic records and that the Commissioner failed to properly consider the differing statutory contexts and privacy interests.

The Court also held that MPAC was entitled to refuse disclosure under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act because the information was already available to the public in paper form.

The applicants, parents of children with severe disabilities, applied for additional special needs funding from the Ministry of Community, Family and Children's Services.

They submitted detailed proposals but were awarded only a fraction of their requests without any explanation, criteria, or opportunity to respond.

The applicants sought judicial review of these decisions.

The Divisional Court held that the Minister's funding decisions under the Child and Family Services Act are statutory and subject to judicial review.

The court found that the Ministry breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide criteria, reasons, or an opportunity to be heard.

The decisions were quashed and referred back to the Minister for reconsideration.

The Law Society swore a complaint against the appellant solicitor containing eight counts of alleged misconduct.

A panel of the Discipline Committee dismissed two counts under the old Law Society Act, which did not allow for costs unless proceedings were unwarranted.

A second panel later stayed the remaining counts.

By then, a new Act was in effect, allowing the hearing panel to award costs.

The second panel and the Appeal Panel held that the old Act applied because a hearing had commenced.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that 'hearing' refers to the substantive hearing on the merits, which had not commenced for the remaining counts.

The matter was remitted for a determination of costs under the new Act.

The applicants, former foster parents of the child, sought judicial review of a Director's decision confirming the Society's rejection of their application to adopt the child.

The Society had rejected the applicants due to misrepresentations during the home study, undisclosed mental health issues, and a history of abuse in the family.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Director's decision was reasonable and that he had properly weighed the evidence, including the child's attachment to the applicants against the risks posed by their misrepresentations and family history.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Town Council resolution that required a property owner's consent as a pre-condition to any heritage designation under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The applicants, a group of parishioners, had requested the designation of a local church to prevent its demolition by the Diocese.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the Town's resolution was patently unreasonable.

By imposing a condition not found in the Act, the Town fettered its own discretion and aborted the statutory decision-making process.

The appellant appealed an order for retroactive child support in the amount of $42,917.88 to the Divisional Court, characterizing it as an interlocutory order.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of its own jurisdiction and determined that the order was final, as it finally determined the issue of retroactivity for the years 1998 to 2001.

Because the order was final and for a single payment of more than $25,000, the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction under section 19 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was adjourned and transferred to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which confirmed a Complaints Committee decision requiring him to attend for a Caution regarding an alleged improper breast examination.

The Divisional Court quashed the Board's decision, finding that the entire process fell below the required standard of procedural fairness.

The Committee and Board improperly made credibility findings based on uncorroborated hearsay, relied on an undisclosed expert opinion, and engaged in an unconscionable delay of 1,350 days.

The appellants appealed an order clarifying a previous judgment regarding interest payable to a dissenting shareholder under s. 185 of the Business Corporations Act.

The motion judge initially ordered interest 'in accordance with section 185' and later clarified that only postjudgment interest would be awarded from the date of judgment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge retained jurisdiction to specify both the rate and the time period for interest, and properly exercised his discretion.

The applicant, a former public service employee, sought judicial review of an order of the Crown Employees Grievance Settlement Board that incorporated a settlement reached between his union and his employer regarding his termination.

The applicant argued the termination was a nullity due to lack of delegated authority.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the applicant lacked standing to pursue the judicial review, as only the union, as the bargaining agent, had the authority to process and settle the grievance under the collective agreement.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision refusing a proposed amendment to pleadings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Master that it was plain and obvious the facts could not support a finding of fiduciary duty, as the hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship were not present.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondents.