Emily McKernan

The plaintiff appealed an order of a Master dismissing a motion seeking to compel a hospital to produce a specific individual as its corporate representative for examination for discovery.

The proposed representative was no longer an officer, director, or employee of the corporate defendant but acted as an independent contractor.

The court held that Rule 31.03(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure limits corporate representatives on discovery to officers, directors, or employees, and the court lacks discretion to compel other individuals.

The judge found the rule’s language clear and rejected attempts to expand its scope through case law.

The appeal was dismissed and the Master’s order upheld.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 31.03(2)(a) to compel the defendant hospital to produce an independent contractor physician as its representative for examination for discovery.

The plaintiff argued the physician was the primary actor in his constructive dismissal claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the definition of 'officer, director, or employee' can be expanded in limited circumstances, the hospital's proposed representative (the Director of Medical Affairs) had sufficient knowledge of the internal matters at issue, including the hospital's response to complaints, workplace investigations, and a Ministry audit.

In a medical negligence trial arising from a compromised birth, the plaintiffs alleged that labour and delivery nurses failed to meet obstetrical monitoring standards before a severe bradycardic event.

The court found that active labour had begun by at least 18:00, requiring half-hourly auscultation, and held the nursing care fell below the standard by failing to monitor appropriately, verify concerning findings, and escalate monitoring.

On causation, the court preferred expert evidence that a prolonged partial hypoxic-ischemic process likely developed before 21:00 and would probably have been detected with proper surveillance.

The court concluded earlier intervention would likely have prevented or substantially reduced the neurological injury.

The hospital was found liable, with damages previously admitted subject to approval.

Following a jury verdict in a medical negligence action, the court had issued written reasons on costs addressing the plaintiffs’ bill of costs and disbursements.

After the release of those reasons, counsel for the plaintiffs sent correspondence directly to the court seeking a further attendance and advancing additional arguments concerning expert disbursements that had been disallowed for lack of supporting information.

The court held that the correspondence constituted improper ex parte communication and an attempt to re‑argue the costs decision after final reasons had been issued.

The judge emphasized that the burden lies on the party claiming disbursements to demonstrate that they are reasonable and necessary and criticized counsel’s failure to provide sufficient supporting detail in the original materials.

The court refused to consider the contents of the letter and reaffirmed that the earlier costs decision was final.

The plaintiffs brought a pre-discovery motion in a medical malpractice action seeking further and better affidavits of documents from the defendants, specifically requesting production of documents relating to allegations of prior similar facts involving Dr. Perkin.

The court ordered Dr. Perkin to produce records of complaints not subject to CPS proceedings, and ordered the defendants to produce medical reports and discovery transcripts from three other lawsuits involving similar facts.

Requests for hospital records from the other lawsuits, CPS complaint records, and an order for a discovery plan were dismissed.