Renee A. Kopp

In a medical negligence action arising from an infant’s diagnosis and treatment of meningococcal meningitis, the court was asked to determine whether correspondence between counsel created a binding settlement dismissing the claim against a hospital and several nurses without costs.

The plaintiffs argued the settlement was conditional on undertakings from co-defendants not to allege negligence against the hospital parties.

The court held that the October 12, 2012 letter was implicitly contingent on that condition precedent but found that the co-defendants’ later correspondence satisfied the required undertaking.

Accordingly, a binding settlement had been reached between the plaintiffs and the hospital defendants.

Because one plaintiff was a minor, the settlement remained subject to court approval under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action against two paramedics and an ambulance service.

The motion judge had found that while the standard of care was a genuine issue for trial, causation was not, relying on the defendants' expert opinion that the patient's survival rate was only 2.4 percent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in relying on the defendants' expert opinion because it did not address the plaintiffs' theory of the case, which posited that the patient would have survived had she been transported to the hospital immediately while she still had a heartbeat.

The Court concluded that both standard of care and causation were genuine issues requiring a trial.

Following a jury verdict in a medical negligence action, the court had issued written reasons on costs addressing the plaintiffs’ bill of costs and disbursements.

After the release of those reasons, counsel for the plaintiffs sent correspondence directly to the court seeking a further attendance and advancing additional arguments concerning expert disbursements that had been disallowed for lack of supporting information.

The court held that the correspondence constituted improper ex parte communication and an attempt to re‑argue the costs decision after final reasons had been issued.

The judge emphasized that the burden lies on the party claiming disbursements to demonstrate that they are reasonable and necessary and criticized counsel’s failure to provide sufficient supporting detail in the original materials.

The court refused to consider the contents of the letter and reaffirmed that the earlier costs decision was final.

The self-represented appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim against the respondent hospital and the estate of a doctor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to establish a claim and failed to commence his action within the relevant limitation periods.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to strike out his claims against the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario and the Crown defendants.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the claim against the Association was properly struck out.

The Court also found that the claim against the Crown defendants did not make out a cause of action outside the reach of s. 7(1) of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, operators of a group home, appealed a civil jury verdict that found them 80% liable and the Children's Aid Society 20% liable for severe frostbite injuries suffered by a developmentally challenged student who went absent without leave from his high school.

The jury found the school board 0% liable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury's finding of no negligence by the school board was supported by the evidence, particularly the appellants' failure to communicate prior runaway incidents to the school.

The court found no palpable and overriding error to justify interfering with the jury's apportionment of liability.