Harvey Stone

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for delay under Rule 48.14(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, alleging historic sexual and physical abuse from 1966-1974, was filed in 2015 but had seen little progress by 2020.

The motion judge found no acceptable explanation for the delay, including an 18-month period where former counsel explored a class action.

The appellants argued the judge failed to contextualize the delay given the absence of limitation periods for their claims and erred in characterizing counsel's decision to suspend the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the contextual approach to delay but finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the delay was egregious and unexplained, despite the nature of the claims.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal.

The underlying appeal concerned the dismissal of an action for delay, specifically involving claims of historical sexual and physical abuse.

OTLA proposed to argue that the Rules of Civil Procedure create an "absurdity" by allowing certain plaintiffs whose actions are dismissed for delay to re-commence their actions, but not those dismissed at a status hearing, particularly for claims not subject to limitation periods.

The motion was dismissed for several reasons, including that the proposed intervention introduced new issues and arguments not raised by the appellants, lacked factual evidence, would significantly expand the scope of the appeal, and was a tardy motion that would likely require an adjournment.

Costs were awarded against OTLA.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) seeking to extend the timeline to set the action down for trial.

The action, involving allegations of historic physical and sexual abuse while in foster care, had been delayed for over five years without examinations for discovery being completed.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay, particularly a 26-month period where the action was held in abeyance while former counsel contemplated a class proceeding.

The motion was dismissed, and the action was dismissed for delay.

The plaintiff moved to extend the timetable for procedural steps in an action alleging historic sexual assault while in foster care.

The defendant Children's Aid Society cross-moved to dismiss the action for delay.

The court found that while the plaintiff's counsel initially caused delay by unilaterally cancelling discoveries, the defendant subsequently engaged in 'scorched earth' tactics that actively obstructed the litigation's progress.

Applying the Reid criteria, the court granted the extension, dismissed the cross-motion, and ordered the action into case management.

The plaintiff requested the appointment of a case management judge for her action.

The court, acting as Civil Team Lead, deemed this request premature because one of the defendants had already brought a motion to transfer the action from the Toronto Region to the Northwest Region (Kenora).

The endorsement clarified that the plaintiff could renew her request if the transfer motion was dismissed.

It also noted that opposed requests for case management must be brought by way of motion, in accordance with the Consolidated Practice Direction for Civil Actions in the Toronto Region.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a contested status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) to prevent the dismissal of her historic sexual abuse action for delay.

The defendants argued for dismissal due to the plaintiff's delay and alleged prejudice.

The court found that the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, attributing significant portions to the defendants' procedural tactics and unusual circumstances like a catastrophic office fire suffered by plaintiff's counsel.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, noting their shared responsibility for delays and lack of urgency.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and a timetable was imposed for the action to proceed to trial.

Following the dismissal of a motion to set aside assignments made by the bankruptcy trustee, the court determined costs.

The bankrupt's request for costs was dismissed as his participation was unnecessary.

The Trustee was awarded costs of $18,500 on a substantial indemnity basis because the moving parties lacked standing as 'aggrieved' persons under the BIA and had impugned the Trustee's integrity.

The moving parties sought an order under section 37 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to set aside the trustee's assignments of certain causes of action to the bankrupt, David Brook, and to direct a tender or auction process for their sale.

The moving parties argued they were aggrieved because the trustee did not market the causes of action to anyone else, the transaction was improvident, and the private sale process unfairly disregarded creditors' rights.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties were not "aggrieved persons" as they were not deprived of a legal right.

Alternatively, the court found the trustee's decision to assign the causes of action to the bankrupt with a sharing arrangement was reasonable, particularly given the unwritten nature of the claims, the need for the bankrupt's active involvement, and the potential for greater upside for the estate compared to a fixed offer.

The defendant, an undischarged bankrupt, sought leave to appeal an order that required him to pay $40,250 in previous costs orders as a condition to set aside a noting of default and allow him to file a statement of defence.

The motion judge had found that the defendant failed to prove impecuniosity, despite his bankruptcy, due to unchallenged evidence suggesting undisclosed assets.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no serious doubt as to the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary order and that the matter did not involve questions of general public importance beyond the immediate parties.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, sought to appeal an order lifting a stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that allowed the respondents to pursue claims for pre-bankruptcy breaches of fiduciary duty.

The respondents brought a motion declaring the appellant had no right of appeal under s. 193(b), while the appellant sought leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had no appeal as of right because the order was not likely to affect other cases in the bankruptcy proceeding.

The court also denied leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal did not raise an issue of general importance and lacked prima facie merit, as settled law does not require a court to scrutinize the merits of an action when lifting a bankruptcy stay.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act seeking declarations regarding the scope of the statutory stay following the bankruptcy of one defendant and requesting that the stay be lifted for certain claims.

The court held that claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and claims for monetary damages arising after the bankruptcy were not claims provable in bankruptcy and therefore were not subject to the stay under s. 69.3.

With respect to claims for pre-bankruptcy monetary damages, the court found that the test for lifting the stay was met because the allegations involved fraud and fiduciary breaches potentially falling within s. 178 and the action involved complex, multi-party claims requiring full civil procedure.

The bankrupt defendant was a central participant whose involvement was necessary for a complete adjudication.

The stay was lifted for pre-bankruptcy claims, although enforcement of any resulting monetary award remained stayed.

The defendant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an infringement of her right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The charge was for Red Light-Fail to Stop under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was charged on November 2, 2010, and the matter proceeded through multiple trial dates, a conviction in absentia, a reopening of the conviction, and subsequent adjournments.

The court found that the total delay of 24 months and one week, with institutional delay of 10 months and 9 days, exceeded the guideline of 8 months established in R. v. Morin.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision regarding an offence for which a stay of proceedings had been entered, leaving an impaired driving conviction untouched.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding no legal issue of sufficient importance to warrant granting leave under section 839(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that set aside a trial stay entered under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant argued the Crown failed to perfect its appeal, the appeal judge improperly raised a new ground of appeal, and the appeal judge erred in the s. 11(b) analysis.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the appeal judge's procedural decisions were discretionary and caused no prejudice.

The Court also agreed with the s. 11(b) analysis, noting that delay was an integral part of the defence tactics.

The respondent sold goods to 'Promised Land' and sued the appellant numbered company for unpaid invoices.

The trial judge granted judgment for the respondent.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge decided the case on an unpleaded basis and improperly pierced the corporate veil, as the goods were allegedly purchased by a related entity, Promised Land Inc. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the pleadings squarely raised the issue of the proper defendant, and the appellant and its related entity dealt interchangeably with the respondent, making both proper defendants.

The appellants, environmental consultants, appealed a declaration that their insurers had no duty to defend them in an action alleging deceit, secret commissions, bid rigging, conspiracy, breach of contract, and negligence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that claims relating to certain properties were excluded by the Design/Build exclusion, as the policy did not cover actual remediation work.

The Court also agreed that the negligence claims were derivative of the intentional torts and thus excluded by the Fraudulent Act exclusion.

The appeal was dismissed, with a minor variation to the wording of the declaration.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeals, the respondents sought costs of $44,648.23 for the appeal, a fresh evidence application, and two motions.

The Court of Appeal found the requested amount excessive, noting the issues involved and that respondents' counsel had acted throughout the Superior Court proceedings.

The Court fixed total costs at $21,500 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed two orders of the motions judge.

The first order dismissed their action and struck their defences to the counterclaim due to their failure to post security and pay outstanding costs awards.

The second order granted judgment to the respondents on their counterclaim, declaring them owners of personal property left in a building.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's exercise of discretion to strike the pleadings, and agreeing that the appellants had intentionally abandoned the property pursuant to an agreement.

The appellant challenged convictions and sentence on the basis of Crown non-disclosure relating to information contained in witness-preparation notes.

The court held that while an accused is entitled to relevant information disclosable under the governing disclosure principles, the notes themselves are not automatically producible.

Applying the trial fairness analysis for non-disclosure, the court found that the Crown's failure to provide additional relevant information may reasonably have affected the fairness of a trial that turned fundamentally on credibility.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought certiorari during an ongoing summary conviction trial after the trial judge refused to quash an information on the basis that there were allegedly no reasonable and probable grounds for one of the charges when the information was sworn.

The Court of Appeal held that interlocutory review in criminal proceedings is not routinely available and that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a prohibited interlocutory appeal absent compelling interests of justice.

Applying the governing framework, the court found no reason for immediate superior court intervention and held that the trial should have proceeded to completion within the ordinary criminal process.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted to the trial judge.