Bryan Daniel Fromstein

The appellant sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule following a motor vehicle accident.

The central issue was the correct interpretation of the test for post-104-week IRBs under section 6(2)(b) of the Schedule.

The appellant argued that the test requires consideration of employment in a competitive, real-world setting comparable in nature, status, and remuneration to the insured's former employment.

The respondent insurer argued that the statutory test does not include such requirements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' decisions, holding that while factors such as competitive real-world setting, status, and remuneration are relevant considerations in the evidence-based analysis, they are not stand-alone requirements of the test.

The appellant failed to prove a complete inability to engage in any employment for which she was reasonably suited by education, training, or experience, particularly given evidence that wedding planning remained a viable option.

EF Institute for Cultural Exchange Limited (EF) appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claims against its former president, David Conklin, and WorldStrides Canada, Inc. (WorldStrides).

EF alleged breaches of a Confidential Information clause and a Restrictive Covenant by Conklin, and knowing assistance/inducing breach by WorldStrides, after Conklin joined WorldStrides following his termination from EF.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no actionable breach of confidentiality or non-compete obligations, and that the claims had dwindled to a "corporate grudge match" not warranting further litigation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This decision concerns the determination of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a motion for summary judgment.

The defendants, as the successful party, sought costs of $180,753.95, while the plaintiff had initially outlined costs of $55,053.66 if successful.

The court applied the principle that costs should be fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay, rather than the actual costs incurred by the successful party.

Despite the defendants' complete success and a Rule 49 offer, the court found their claimed costs to be excessive, partly due to the number of lawyers involved and potential overpreparation.

The court awarded the defendants $65,000.00, inclusive of fees, HST, and disbursements.

This case is a continuation of a summary judgment on liability for a private mortgage.

The court conducted a trial to determine the exact amount owing under the charge, specifically addressing disputes over a lender's fee and interest adjustment.

The court found that a lender's fee was not enforceable without an express agreement, reducing the principal.

It also adjusted the interest calculation based on the actual advance date.

The final judgment established the total amount owing and granted an order for possession, while also addressing costs.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal had previously released its decision and invited written submissions on costs.

Considering the appellant's partial success on one issue and the dismissal of the balance of the appeal, the court fixed costs of the appeal at $20,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by the appellant to the respondent.

The Landlord appealed a trial judgment concerning a commercial lease, challenging conclusions regarding rent for a shed area and mezzanine, and the tenant's option to extend the lease, as well as the costs award.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal only to correct the limitation period for arrears of "non-lease-based rent" for the shed area from two to six years, finding it fell under the Real Property Limitations Act.

All other grounds of appeal, including the mezzanine rent, the validity of the lease extension, and the costs award, were dismissed.

The appellant, Joan Holmes, appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondents, Aurelio and Maria Acquaviva, in a mortgage enforcement action.

Holmes had defaulted on a mortgage payment and subsequently alleged an elaborate mortgage fraud against the respondents and others in a separate action.

The motion judge found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that Holmes had not provided evidence to support her fraud claims and that the mortgage claims were severable from her fraud allegations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in his analysis or conclusion that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents on a full indemnity scale.

This decision addresses a motion by the Applicant Tenant to amend previous reasons for judgment regarding the calculation of non-lease-based rent and to determine costs.

The court corrected the non-lease-based rent calculation, reducing the amount owed by the Tenant to the Landlord.

The court also awarded the Applicant Tenant partial indemnity costs, finding them largely successful in the underlying application and trial, and that the costs claimed were reasonable and proportional.

The plaintiffs, Aurelio and Maria Acquaviva, brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a mortgage charge against the defendant, Joan Holmes.

Ms. Holmes had defaulted on the charge and raised several defenses, including an alleged oral agreement to renew, a violation of the Interest Act, and a side deal with a mortgage broker involving fraud.

The court granted summary judgment on liability, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the validity and enforceability of the charge.

However, a trial was ordered to determine the precise amount owing under the charge, including principal and interest, due to mixed funds and unclear accounting.

The court also deferred the decision on possession and costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed its jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order granting vacant possession.

Despite arguments from the parties, the court determined that the order fell under s. 78(1) of the Commercial Tenancies Act, which directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal transferred the appeal to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, declining to hear the merits.

No costs were ordered.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment against the defendants in a failed residential real estate transaction.

The defendants were unable to complete the purchase due to financing issues after an appraisal valued the property significantly lower than the agreed price.

The defendants also brought a third-party claim against their real estate agent, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conflict of interest, as the plaintiff-vendor was also a real estate agent with the same brokerage.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that the issues in the main action were inextricably intertwined with the third-party claim, creating a risk of inconsistent findings if summary judgment were granted partially.

The plaintiff, Chantale Abbott-Keith, appealed a Certificate of Assessment of Costs issued by an Assessment Officer, which significantly reduced her claimed party-and-party costs from two settled motor vehicle accident actions and awarded costs of the assessment against her.

The appeal raised grounds including the Assessment Officer's failure to conduct a line-by-line analysis, breach of natural justice and procedural fairness by not properly considering the plaintiff's objections under Rule 58.10, and errors in applying proportionality and reducing disbursements.

The court found that the Assessment Officer erred in interpreting Rule 58.10(1) regarding the timing of objections and fundamentally misconstrued her role in the reconsideration process, thereby denying the plaintiff a fair hearing.

The appeal was granted, the Certificate of Assessment of Costs was quashed, and the matter was remitted back to the same Assessment Officer for a proper hearing of objections.

The appellant appealed orders dismissing her action and denying her motion to set aside the dismissal.

The lower court judge dismissed the action for failure to file notice of appointment of counsel or intention to act in person within 30 days of an order removing her former lawyer.

The Court of Appeal found the dismissal order deficient because it failed to include the required text of the applicable rules, the appellant had not been properly served with the motion, and no reasons were given for the draconian remedy.

The appeal court set aside both lower court orders and imposed a 14-day deadline for the appellant to file notice of appointment of counsel.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal a dismissal order from the trial court.

The dismissal was granted after the moving party failed to appoint new counsel or file a notice of intention to act in person following her previous counsel's removal from the record.

The moving party had instead attempted to set aside the dismissal order on the basis it was made without notice, which motion was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal considered the applicable principles for extending time to appeal and granted the extension on terms, finding the proposed appeal raised arguable issues and that the justice of the case favoured granting the extension despite the moving party's lack of diligence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing a motor vehicle negligence claim.

The motion judge found that the appellant made a left-hand turn facing a yellow light in front of an oncoming truck driven by the respondent, who did not run a red light as alleged.

The motion judge concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the respondent's responsibility for the accident.

The appellant argued the motion judge reversed the evidentiary burden and erred in granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding the motion judge correctly applied the burden of proof and the appellant failed to meet the onus that shifted to her to demonstrate contributory negligence.

The defendants, Ammar Khan and Brink's Canada Ltd., brought a motion for summary judgment in a motor vehicle negligence claim arising from an accident.

The plaintiff, Victola Mayers, alleged Khan was liable.

The court applied the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin and found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding Khan's liability.

The court rejected both the plaintiff's "advance green light" theory, which was contradicted by an independent witness, and the "contributory negligence" theory, finding no evidence that Khan had a reasonable opportunity to avoid the accident.

The motion was granted, and the action was dismissed with costs.