Dahlia Shuhaibar

The appellant, a Convention refugee found inadmissible for serious criminality, appealed the dismissal of his application for judicial review of the Minister’s refusal to accede to a United Nations Human Rights Committee request to hold his removal in abeyance pending consideration of his communication.

The court held that the refusal was a pure exercise of Crown prerogative in the sphere of international relations, not a statutory decision under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and was therefore within the Superior Court’s concurrent jurisdiction and was justiciable because it directly affected an individual’s life and safety.

Applying reasonableness review, the court held that no reasons were required because the interim measures request was addressed by an international body to Canada, not to the appellant, and no domestic statute or settled practice imposed a duty to give reasons.

The court further held that the Minister had the relevant factual material before him, including submissions concerning the appellant’s mental health and risks on return, and that the refusal was not unreasonable in light of the domestic-law framework in Suresh governing the non-refoulement exception for dangerous refugees.

The appeal was dismissed, the respondent’s jurisdiction and justiciability arguments failed, no costs were ordered, and the removal order was stayed for 60 days.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 59.06 to vary, set aside, or suspend a previous costs order.

The plaintiff argued that the court failed to adjudicate material costs considerations and that fresh evidence warranted a redetermination.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no accidental slip or omission under Rule 59.06(1), and holding that the fresh evidence would not have changed the result and could have been obtained earlier under Rule 59.06(2)(a).

The court also declined to suspend the order, noting the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct and the prejudice to the defendants.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of Corthorn J. dated January 28, 2026.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal regarding the interpretation of s. 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory because it did not decide the real matter in dispute, such as whether the electronic document should be validated, whether it was sent by the deceased, and whether the deceased had testamentary capacity.

The Court declined to reconstitute as the Divisional Court to consider leave to appeal.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal regarding the interpretation of s. 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory because it did not decide the real matter in dispute, such as whether the electronic document should be validated, whether it was sent by the deceased, and whether the deceased had testamentary capacity.

The Court declined to reconstitute as the Divisional Court to consider leave to appeal.

The deceased sent an email with an attached, unsigned electronic document titled 'Nabute's Will'.

The responding party on the main application brought a motion arguing that s. 21.1(2) of the Succession Law Reform Act and s. 31 of the Electronic Commerce Act prohibit the validation of electronic documents as wills.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that while the functional equivalency rules of the ECA cannot be used to satisfy the formal requirements of a will, there is no statutory prohibition against a court exercising its discretion under s. 21.1 of the SLRA to validate an electronic document as a fully effective testamentary document if the requirements of authenticity and fixed testamentary intention are met.

The applicant sought an interim order to enjoin the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness from deporting him to Somalia pending determination of his motion for leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, his appeal of a Superior Court decision dismissing his application for judicial review.

The applicant challenged the Minister's decision to remove him despite an Interim Measures Request from the United Nations Human Rights Committee requesting that removal be placed in abeyance.

The motion judge granted the interim order, finding that the applicant met all three prongs of the RJR-MacDonald test: a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm if deported before appeal, and a balance of convenience favouring the extension of the injunction.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness' decision to refuse an Interim Measures Request (IMR) from the United Nations Human Rights Committee and proceed with the applicant's removal to Somalia.

The applicant, a permanent resident with serious mental health issues and criminal convictions, had been found inadmissible to Canada and subject to a deportation order.

The court addressed justiciability and jurisdiction, finding concurrent jurisdiction between the Ontario Superior Court and Federal Court over Crown prerogative matters.

The court found the Minister's decision reasonable and not requiring reasons, as it involved an exercise of Crown prerogative regarding international treaty obligations that are not binding on Canada domestically.

The applicants, tow truck drivers with decades of experience, sought judicial review of O. Reg. 167/23 under the Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021.

The regulation disqualified them from obtaining a tow certificate due to mandatory lifetime weapons prohibitions stemming from 20-year-old criminal convictions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the regulation was not ultra vires as it reasonably aligned with the Act's purpose of combating crime in the towing industry.

The Court also dismissed the Charter challenges, holding that the evidentiary record did not establish criminal history as an analogous ground under s. 15, and that the regulatory disqualification constituted neither 'treatment' nor 'punishment' under s. 12.

This was a motion to quash a notice of appeal filed by Edgar Bray.

The underlying litigation involved a commercial lease, where default judgment was granted against Mr. Bray and Triloq Corp. The moving parties argued that no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from a default judgment because it is not a final order under s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court confirmed the interlocutory nature of default judgments, noting that the proper mechanism to challenge such a judgment is a motion to set aside under Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion to quash was granted, and the appellant was ordered to pay substantial indemnity costs.

The applicant, a tow truck driver subject to a mandatory lifetime weapons prohibition, was denied a tow certificate and a tow driver certificate under the Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021.

He brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the enforcement of the certificate requirements against him pending his application for judicial review and a Charter challenge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and the applicant would suffer irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the strong public interest in enforcing legislation designed to protect public safety in the towing industry.