Gib van Ert

The appellant, a Convention refugee found inadmissible for serious criminality, appealed the dismissal of his application for judicial review of the Minister’s refusal to accede to a United Nations Human Rights Committee request to hold his removal in abeyance pending consideration of his communication.

The court held that the refusal was a pure exercise of Crown prerogative in the sphere of international relations, not a statutory decision under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and was therefore within the Superior Court’s concurrent jurisdiction and was justiciable because it directly affected an individual’s life and safety.

Applying reasonableness review, the court held that no reasons were required because the interim measures request was addressed by an international body to Canada, not to the appellant, and no domestic statute or settled practice imposed a duty to give reasons.

The court further held that the Minister had the relevant factual material before him, including submissions concerning the appellant’s mental health and risks on return, and that the refusal was not unreasonable in light of the domestic-law framework in Suresh governing the non-refoulement exception for dangerous refugees.

The appeal was dismissed, the respondent’s jurisdiction and justiciability arguments failed, no costs were ordered, and the removal order was stayed for 60 days.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of Corthorn J. dated January 28, 2026.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The deceased sent an email with an attached, unsigned electronic document titled 'Nabute's Will'.

The responding party on the main application brought a motion arguing that s. 21.1(2) of the Succession Law Reform Act and s. 31 of the Electronic Commerce Act prohibit the validation of electronic documents as wills.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that while the functional equivalency rules of the ECA cannot be used to satisfy the formal requirements of a will, there is no statutory prohibition against a court exercising its discretion under s. 21.1 of the SLRA to validate an electronic document as a fully effective testamentary document if the requirements of authenticity and fixed testamentary intention are met.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness' decision to refuse an Interim Measures Request (IMR) from the United Nations Human Rights Committee and proceed with the applicant's removal to Somalia.

The applicant, a permanent resident with serious mental health issues and criminal convictions, had been found inadmissible to Canada and subject to a deportation order.

The court addressed justiciability and jurisdiction, finding concurrent jurisdiction between the Ontario Superior Court and Federal Court over Crown prerogative matters.

The court found the Minister's decision reasonable and not requiring reasons, as it involved an exercise of Crown prerogative regarding international treaty obligations that are not binding on Canada domestically.

The applicants, tow truck drivers with decades of experience, sought judicial review of O. Reg. 167/23 under the Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021.

The regulation disqualified them from obtaining a tow certificate due to mandatory lifetime weapons prohibitions stemming from 20-year-old criminal convictions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the regulation was not ultra vires as it reasonably aligned with the Act's purpose of combating crime in the towing industry.

The Court also dismissed the Charter challenges, holding that the evidentiary record did not establish criminal history as an analogous ground under s. 15, and that the regulatory disqualification constituted neither 'treatment' nor 'punishment' under s. 12.

The applicant, a tow truck driver subject to a mandatory lifetime weapons prohibition, was denied a tow certificate and a tow driver certificate under the Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021.

He brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the enforcement of the certificate requirements against him pending his application for judicial review and a Charter challenge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and the applicant would suffer irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the strong public interest in enforcing legislation designed to protect public safety in the towing industry.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated August 16, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondents in the fixed amount of $3,500.

The defendants brought a motion to withdraw an admission made in their Statement of Defence regarding the plaintiff's entitlement to common law reasonable notice.

The plaintiff opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to strike portions of the defendants' motion record.

The court applied the three-part test for withdrawing an admission and found that there was a triable issue regarding the enforceability of the termination provision, the admission was made in error, and the withdrawal would not cause non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff.

The motion to withdraw the admission was granted.

The plaintiff was entitled to costs for the cross-motion, but the court offset these against the defendants' costs for the main motion, ordering each party to bear their own costs.

The applicant brought an application challenging the allegedly unauthorized transfer of an interest in his residential property to his former fiancé, creating a joint tenancy.

The applicant also sought a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

Following the applicant's death, his estate brought a motion for an Order to Continue the proceeding.

The court granted the Order to Continue and, on consent of the respondent, issued the CPL to preserve the property pending litigation.

This costs endorsement followed a successful motion by the plaintiffs in a landlord-tenant dispute.

The plaintiffs sought approximately $8,200.00 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued for a reduction based on the plaintiffs' pre-motion conduct and their request for post-decision costs.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles from *Boucher*, the court found the plaintiffs' requested costs reasonable, noting comparable billing rates and hours between the parties' counsel.

The court dismissed the defendants' arguments for reduction and ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs $8,200.00 in all-inclusive costs.

The court also confirmed that costs were payable by both corporate and individual defendants.

The plaintiff commercial tenant brought an urgent motion after being locked out of its business premises by the defendant landlord.

The lease required the landlord to provide 30 days' notice before terminating the lease and re-entering the premises.

The court found that a spreadsheet allegedly provided to the tenant did not constitute proper notice under the lease.

The court held that the landlord unlawfully terminated the lease and granted the tenant's motion, ordering the return of items taken from the premises.

The applicant and respondents, who are brothers, are involved in a dispute over the management of their mother's property and competing powers of attorney.

A fourth brother, who is not a party to the application, brought a motion for intervenor status and interim financial assistance, arguing he relied on his mother for financial support and housing.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the proposed intervenor had no legal interest in the subject matter of the application, would not be adversely affected by its outcome, and shared no common questions of law or fact.

Furthermore, adding him as a party two weeks before the scheduled hearing would cause undue delay and prejudice.

The request for interim financial assistance was also dismissed, with costs awarded against the proposed intervenor but deferred against his potential inheritance.