Pierre Ranger

The appellants challenged the validity of a clause in the will of Jeanne Dagenais Gravelle that granted her daughter Jocelyne Gravelle an option to purchase the family home for the amount of the remaining mortgage.

The appellants argued the clause was unenforceable because the mortgage had been fully paid at the time of the testator's death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding the option clause valid and enforceable.

The court determined that the testator's intention was to allow Jocelyne to purchase the home even if the mortgage balance was zero, and that Jocelyne would be responsible for mortgage discharge fees as consideration for the purchase.

The Applicant Father brought a motion to adjust the parenting schedule for the youngest child, Lucas, following the Respondent Mother's relocation to Orleans and changes in school enrollment for all three children.

The court had previously granted the Mother permission to move the children and change schools for Max and Lucas.

This endorsement addresses the subsequent dispute over parenting time and transportation arrangements.

The court considered proposals from both parents and the Office of the Children's Lawyer, aiming to establish a schedule in Lucas's best interests that minimized disruption and parental conflict, while acknowledging the Mother's increased driving responsibilities due to the move.

The Father brought a motion seeking to prevent the Mother from unilaterally changing the children's schools and relocating them from Barrhaven to Orleans, or alternatively, to vary parenting time if the move was permitted.

The Mother opposed, citing financial necessity for the move.

The court, applying the "best interests of the child" test from *Gordon v. Goertz*, found a material change in circumstances justifying the Mother's relocation to Orleans with the children.

The court permitted the Mother to move Max and Lucas to Orleans and to enroll Lucas in Convent Glen Catholic School, while Max was to remain at his current high school unless accepted into a special program.

The Father's parenting time was to be modestly increased to account for the relocation.

The Applicant and Respondent brought cross-motions concerning various issues arising from their cohabitation.

The Respondent sought to strike the Applicant's claim due to his undischarged bankrupt status or, alternatively, security for costs.

The Applicant sought security for costs, disclosure of property documents, recovery of property, a timetable, and orders regarding communication with his son and the Respondent's address.

The court dismissed the Respondent's motion to strike, finding the Trustee in Bankruptcy had authorized the Applicant to pursue his constructive trust claim.

Both parties' requests for security for costs were dismissed, as the Applicant's claim was not deemed a waste of time or nuisance and the Respondent did not meet the criteria.

The Applicant was granted disclosure of property sale documents, while motions regarding communication with his son and the Respondent's address were dismissed due to lack of evidence.

A timetable for the proceedings was established, and costs were reserved to the trial judge.

The applicant's pleadings were struck, and the matter proceeded as an uncontested trial.

The respondent sought to sever the joint tenancy of the matrimonial home, vest the applicant's interest in her name, obtain reimbursement for a $35,000 advance on equalization, and vacate a charging order registered by the applicant's solicitor against the home.

The court granted the vesting order, finding the applicant had already withdrawn his equity.

The court dismissed the claim for reimbursement of the $35,000 advance due to lack of evidence regarding repayment terms.

The court vacated the charging order, finding it was obtained without full disclosure of the parties' financial circumstances and in breach of a prior non-encumbrance order.

This endorsement determines costs following a prior decision where the applicant's pleadings were struck.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs, arguing the applicant's conduct, including wilful failure to pay costs and comply with disclosure orders, and filing misleading financial statements, warranted such an award.

The court found the applicant's behaviour unreasonable, justifying a higher costs award, but not rising to the level of bad faith requiring full indemnity.

The respondent's legal fees were adjusted for reasonableness and proportionality, and the applicant was ordered to pay fixed costs of $9,250, inclusive of HST and disbursements, representing approximately 80% of the respondent's reasonable costs.

The Respondent brought a motion to strike the Applicant's pleadings, for security for trial costs, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The court found the Applicant had wilfully and egregiously failed to comply with three previous court orders, including two cost orders totaling $15,000 and a detailed disclosure order.

The Applicant's financial statements were found to be misleading and untrue, failing to disclose significant debts.

Applying a three-pronged test for striking pleadings, the court determined that there was a triggering event, striking the pleadings was appropriate given the exceptional circumstances and wilful non-compliance, and no other remedies would suffice.

The Applicant's pleadings were struck, the Respondent was granted interim exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and was permitted to proceed to an uncontested trial.

A conditional order was made allowing the Applicant to seek reinstatement of his pleadings if he fully complied with outstanding cost and disclosure orders by a specified date.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision staying his motion to change a final family law order due to his egregious and exceptional non-compliance with prior court orders.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's exercise of discretion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, finding the appellant had willfully ignored numerous obligations, including support, tuition, life insurance, and costs.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to specify the exact conditions the appellant must satisfy to lift the stay and proceed with his motion to change.

The Court also confirmed that a prior $10,000 costs award was a debt under a support order not released by the appellant's bankruptcy.

The applicant, Madeleine Robert, as testamentary trustee for the Estate of Stella Barbeau, sought full indemnity costs following a motion for directions resolved by consent order.

She argued the motion was necessitated by the unreasonable position of respondents Jean Barbeau and André Barbeau, and the unreasonable delay by Richard Séguin.

The court, applying principles from the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found that Jean and André Barbeau were the losing parties due to their abandoned position on property title.

Richard Séguin was found to have acted unreasonably by delaying his response and requiring a motion for validated service.

The court rejected the applicant's claim for full indemnity costs, noting the offer to settle did not trigger Rule 49 consequences and that the estate's approach to the motion and costs was aggressive.

The court also criticized the applicant's refusal to provide account statements.

Costs were fixed at 80% of the substantial indemnity scale for Jean and André Barbeau, and a fixed amount for Richard Séguin, after reductions for work done prior to the motion and non-motion related disbursements.

The respondent father brought an urgent motion seeking an order for equal time sharing of the child, preventing the applicant mother from removing the child from the jurisdiction, and the appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL).

The applicant mother opposed the urgency of the motion, except for the OCL appointment.

The court dismissed the father's request for an urgent motion regarding the parenting schedule and daycare, finding these issues were not urgent enough to bypass a case conference.

However, the court found the potential flight risk and abduction concerning the mother's stated intention to move to Halifax with the child to be urgent, and ordered that the child not be moved from Ottawa's jurisdiction without the father's consent or further court order.

The OCL involvement was reserved for the case conference.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent brought a contempt motion alleging the applicant failed to permit questioning and sought costs relating to unsuccessful attempts to conduct examinations and a failed trial management conference.

The court found that both parties contributed to delays in disclosure and scheduling questioning, and that the contempt motion was not properly pursued in accordance with prior court directions.

The motion was dismissed when the respondent elected not to proceed with it at the scheduled hearing.

The court issued procedural orders compelling document disclosure, scheduled examination dates for both parties, and addressed outstanding financial obligations including section 7 expenses and life insurance required under minutes of settlement.

Given the shared responsibility for delay and inefficient litigation conduct, both parties’ requests for costs were dismissed.

The respondent father sought to vary a custody order to permit the 14-year-old child to reside with him in Gatineau, Quebec, rather than with the applicant mother in Capreol, Ontario.

The child, represented by counsel from the Office of the Children's Lawyer, expressed a strong and consistent wish to live with her father.

The court found that the child had attained sufficient maturity for her age to make this decision independently, without undue influence from either parent.

The court determined that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that it was in the child's best interests to reside with her father, effective January 1, 2013, subject to resolution of outstanding issues regarding child support and access.