CITATION: Bourque/Chima v. Public Service Alliance Of Canada et al, 2026 ONSC 4761
COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-100475 and CV-25-100222
DATE: 2026/08/17
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Eddy Bourque, Plaintiff
-and-
Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) and Canada Employment and Immigration Union (CEIU), Defendants
-AND-
RE: Sargy Chima, Plaintiff
-and-
Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) and Canada Employment and Immigration Union (CEIU), Defendants
BEFORE: Justice K. Perron
COUNSEL: Andrew Lister and Chantal Beaupré for the Plaintiffs
Eddy Bourque and Sargy ChimaKim Patenaude and Rohoma Zakir for the defendant, Public Service Alliance of Canada (“PSAC”)
Nigel McKechnie for the defendant, Canada Employment and Immigration Union (“CEIU”)
HEARD: July 24, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
PERRON J.
Overview
[1] In September 2023, Eddy Bourque and Sargy Chima were elected as the National President and National Executive Vice-President, respectively, of the CEIU.
[2] The CEIU is a trade union that represents workers at Service Canada, Employment and Social Development Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship and the Immigration and Refugee Board. CEIU is the largest component of PSAC. PSAC is the national “umbrella” union that bargains and negotiates with the Treasury Board.
[3] At the beginning of 2023, internal complaints were made by CEIU members against Mr. Bourque and Ms. Chima in connection with some of their actions during the 2023 PSAC general strike. Following an investigation and disciplinary process, on June 28, 2024 PSAC’s National Board of Directors suspended Mr. Bourque and Ms. Chima.
[4] Mr. Bourque was suspended for one year while Ms. Chima was suspended for two years. The effect of the suspensions was that they were both barred from holding their offices as President and Executive Vice-President and from accessing and participating in the CEIU’s affairs.
[5] Although the term of both suspensions is now over, Mr. Bourque and Ms. Chima have not been reinstated in their previous offices even though their elected terms were for a period of three years which terms expire on or about September 2026.
[6] Mr. Bourque and Ms. Chima each commenced civil actions against PSAC and CEIU in the summer of 2025.
[7] There are two motions before me:
a. PSAC and CEIU move under rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action on the basis that this Court lacks jurisdiction and that the appropriate forum for these disputes is the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board (the “Labour Board”);
b. Mr. Bourque and Ms. Chima submit that this Court has jurisdiction and they move for an interlocutory injunction to immediately reinstate them as President and Executive Vice-President.
[8] Both motions were brought at the outset of 2026 but, for reasons that were not explained to me, the motions could not be heard until today. The motions are now time-sensitive, particularly the plaintiffs’ motion seeking to be reinstated, because CEIU’s national triennial convention starts in mid-September. If reinstated as elected officers, the plaintiffs would be delegates at the convention and have full participation rights, including the right to vote and seek re-election. Therefore, and although it would have been preferable to deal first with the jurisdictional issue as a standalone motion, I heard both motions one after the other.
[9] For reasons that will be explained below, I find that it is clear and obvious that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims.
The Legal Framework that Governs the Jurisdictional Dispute
[10] CEIU and PSAC move to stay or dismiss the actions pursuant to subrule 21.01(3)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the actions.
[11] To succeed on their motion, CEIU and PSAC must establish that it is “clear, or plain and obvious” that the Labour Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action[1].
[12] The parties have provided me with several cases that discuss the analytical framework that this Court and the Court of Appeal for Ontario have considered in determining whether this Court or a specialized tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute including: Fraser v United Steel Workers Union[2], Pileggi v Canadian Union of Postal Workers[3] and Burgess v Ontario (Minister of Health)[4]. These cases extensively discuss the applicable considerations set out in passages from the leading cases including the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions of St. Anne[5], Weber[6] and Gendron[7] therefore it is not necessary for me to repeat those principles herein.
[13] Based on the above cases, one of the issues I must determine is the “essential character” of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Essential Character of the Plaintiffs’ Claims
[14] I agree with the CEIU and PSAC that the essential character of the plaintiffs’ claims is that they are disputes arising from the union’s internal disciplinary process focused on breaches of natural justice and procedural fairness.
[15] To frame my analysis on this issue, I have considered the legislative scheme governing the Labour Board’s jurisdiction. The applicable statute is the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act (the “Labour Relations Act”).
[16] Section 190(1) of the Labour Relations Act provides that the Labour Board “must examine and inquire into any complaint made to it that […] g) the employer, an employee organization or any person has committed an unfair labour practice withing the meaning of section 185” [emphasis added].
[17] In the present case, the potential unfair labour practices that might be triggered are set out in section 188 which provides:
No employee organization and no officer or representative of an employee organization or other person acting on behalf of an employee organization shall
b) expel or suspend an employee from membership in the employee organization or deny an employee membership in the employee organization by applying its membership rules to the employee in a discriminatory manner;
c) take disciplinary action against or impose any form of penalty on an employee by applying the employee organization’s standards of discipline to that employee in a discriminatory manner;
[emphasis added]
[18] The plaintiffs do not take the position that they were suspended or disciplined “in a discriminatory manner” pursuant to section 188 (b) or (c) of the Labour Relations Act. They submit that the Court is the proper forum to determine the disputes pursuant to its inherent and/or residual jurisdiction because there is no other available forum to deal with their claims. To support their position, the plaintiffs have produced several decisions from the Labour Board rejecting — they allege — similar complaints for lack of jurisdiction.
[19] The CEIU and PSAC’s position is the exact opposite. CEIU and PSAC submit that the essential character of the plaintiffs’ claim is captured within the kind of discriminatory conduct that is targeted by section 188 and that the plaintiffs’ definition of “discrimination” is too narrow. CEIU and PSAC also point to board decisions supporting their position and they rely heavily on this Court’s analysis in Pileggi and Fraser which they say involve very similar facts to the present case.
[20] I now turn to the allegations in the statements of claim.
[21] Although there are some differences in the factual matrix of each claim, the relief sought by the plaintiffs in their statements of claim is almost identical. They seek general damages for negligence and defamation. They also seek declarations to be reinstated in their elected positions within the CEIU. They seek special damages for lost wages and benefits as well as aggravated and punitive damages. Mr. Bourque also seeks a declaration that the CEIU and PSAC acted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial. Ms. Chima also seeks special damages for her relocation from Ottawa.
[22] For purposes of my analysis of the “essential character” of their claims, the plaintiffs agree that there are no material differences between the two claims.
[23] In their factum, Mr. Bourque characterizes his claim as alleged political retaliation, procedural unfairness and bias, arbitrariness and excessive discipline and exclusion from internal union life following a leadership dispute. Ms. Chima characterizes her claim as alleged political retaliation and factional conflict, procedural unfairness and investigative defects, arbitrariness and excessive discipline, accommodation failures and internal governance and constitutional disputes. In their factum, both plaintiffs rely heavily if not exclusively on their affidavit evidence to support these characterizations.
[24] In their oral submissions, the plaintiffs submitted that the heart of their complaint was bad faith and that this was a clear power struggle case. They also submitted that the breach of contract element— grounded in breach of the applicable bylaws and constitution—was an essential component of the case.
[25] In their statements of claim, although the plaintiffs allege that the decision-makers were improperly motivated by personal and/or political considerations, very little facts or details are plead regarding these alleged motivations. The statements of claim themselves do not support an essential characterization that this is a power struggle case or one of bad faith in the disciplinary process.
[26] The overwhelming majority of the facts plead to support their tort claims involve alleged breaches of the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness. These include allegations that the decision-makers were biased, that there were delays in the disciplinary proceedings, that there were breaches of confidentiality obligations during the investigation process and that there were a myriad of procedural breaches during the investigation of the complaints which the national board failed to address. The plaintiffs also allege that the national board levied unprecedented sanctions against them and that they were prevented from introducing certain evidence during their appeals of the national board’s decision.
[27] The plaintiffs plead that their cause of action in defamation arises from statements set out in a media release and in emails to union members regarding their removal from office as a result of the disciplinary process. The claims do not include any particulars of any other alleged defamatory statements.
[28] The pleas for aggravated damages and punitive damages are bald assertions that the defendants are liable for the tort of intention infliction of mental suffering and that the defendants’ conduct amounts to malicious, oppressive and high-handed behaviour.
[29] Based on a review of the statements of claim, I have no hesitation in concluding that the essential character of the dispute is an internal union dispute arising from alleged procedural and natural justice breaches during the disciplinary process.
[30] The CEIU and PSAC submitted that the plaintiffs’ affidavit evidence cannot be considered on the jurisdictional motion. However, evidence is not expressly prohibited by Rule 21.01(3)(a) and the CEIU and PSAC did not provide me with any authorities to support their proposition. The plaintiffs did not refute the defendants’ position or address this evidentiary issue in their factum or their submissions.
[31] The starting point in characterizing the plaintiffs’ claim is undoubtedly the allegations plead in the statements of claim. The Rules contemplate that some evidence would be admissible on a jurisdiction motion under subrule 21.01(3)(a). However, even if I consider the affidavit evidence of the plaintiffs, my conclusion on the essential characterization of the plaintiffs’ claims would not change.
[32] I also agree with CEIU and PSAC that the plaintiffs are attempting to change the characterization of their claims in their affidavits and their oral submissions. In fact, how the plaintiffs characterized the essential nature of their claims was somewhat of a moving target. The “labels” used by the parties in framing the dispute are not determinative of the inquiry into the nature of the dispute[8].
[33] This Court was faced with claims with very similar allegations and circumstances to the ones at issue in the present case in Pileggi [9] and concluded that the essential character of the plaintiff’s action was “an allegation of breach of the rules of natural justice arising out of improper considerations being taken into account in the actions and decisions of the members of the Union executive”[10].
[34] Although each case must be determined on its own facts and circumstances, I have reached the same conclusion as Justice Siegel in Pileggi on the characterization of the plaintiffs’ claims in the case at bar.
Is the “essential character” of the Plaintiffs’ Claims Captured by the Labour Relations Act?
[35] In determining the “essential character” of the plaintiff’s claim in Pileggi, Justice Siegel considered whether the nature of the action was encompassed by the provisions of the applicable statute which was the Canada Labour Code. However, the provisions at issue from the CLC in Pileggi also involved improper discipline in a “discriminatory manner”[11]. The applicable sections of the CLC were subsections 95(f) and (g) which essentially mirror the sections at issue in this case in 188 of the Labour Relations Act.
[36] In Pileggi, Justice Siegel noted that the Canada Industrial Relations Board had found that its duty under the Code to examine “discriminatory” conduct was of a wide ambit and embraced conduct that was abusive, arbitrary or disproportionate to the member’s conduct including the denial of the principles of natural justice[12]. Justice Siegel went on to find that “malice as an improper motive or consideration in the decision-making process would clearly be embraced by the concept of discrimination”[13].
[37] In considering the meaning of “discriminatory” following legislative changes in 2005 that introduced section 188, in several of its decisions the Labour Board found that the provisions of section 188 were identical to those set out in the Canada Labour Code[14]. In commenting on this new section in Veillette, the Labour Board held:
The Board may review the discipline imposed on a member of a bargaining agent to decide whether it was discriminatory, which clearly includes the decision-making process that led to it. In fact, Parliament imposes a duty of transparency on both public-sector bargaining agents and private-section unions since a provision identical to the wording of paragraph 188(c) of the Act appears as paragraph 95(g) of the Canada Labour Code. The wording of paragraph 188(c) suggests that Parliament has left its interpretation to the Board, which must evaluate each case on its own merits.[15]
[38] In Skinner, a decision relied upon by the plaintiffs, the Labour Board adopted jurisprudence from the CLRB (as it was then named) when the Labour Board considered the meaning of “discriminatory” in section 188(c)[16].
[39] The fact that the Labour Board has guided itself on decisions made under the Canada Labour Code to determine the meaning of “discrimination” applicable to section 188 further supports the CEIU and PSAC’s position that it is entirely appropriate for me to make analogies to the analysis in Pileggi and Fraser even though those decisions dealt with the statutory scheme under the CLC.
[40] The cases provided to me by both parties also reveal that the Labour Board itself has made it clear that what may be considered conduct of a “discriminatory manner” pursuant to the broad wording of section 188 should not be rigidly defined and that it would be imprudent to do so because the types of complaints that may be targeted by that section will depend on the facts of each case[17].
[41] It is also clear from the Labour Board’s decisions, as was expressly noted in the passage from the Veillette decision above, that the board interprets whether a complaint is well-founded under section 188 —including its jurisdiction thereunder and the meaning of “discriminatory”— based on a full hearing of the merits. None of the parties provided me with cases where the Labour Board determined its jurisdiction on a preliminary hearing.
[42] Turning back to the plaintiffs’ claims in the present case, the Labour Board has assumed jurisdiction over complaints that the disciplinary process breached principles of procedural fairness including allegations that the investigation report was flawed, that the complainant was not given an opportunity to be heard or challenge the findings of the investigative body and/or that the decision was biased. The board found that procedural fairness was not a “rigid concept” and that such breaches were captures under “discriminatory” conduct pursuant to section 188[18].
[43] I also agree with PSAC and CEIU that the definition of discriminatory treatment proposed by the plaintiffs is too narrow. The plaintiffs are also being selective in relying on limited passages within the board decisions that do not capture the full essence of the board’s conclusions.
[44] For example, relying on the board’s decision in Myles, the plaintiffs submit that section 188 does not capture conduct that is “arbitrary” or in “bad faith” because the legislature only included that conduct in section 187 of the Labour Relations Act. However, after considering this very argument, the board in Myles goes on to state that: “This does not mean that an arbitrary action or bad faith by the employee organization cannot amount to discrimination” and that “It is arguable that arbitrary actions or bad faith could be evidence of discrimination”[19]. The board went on to find that Myles’ complaint was not well founded but it did so on a hearing of the full merits of the case.
[45] Another example is the case of Skinner where the board held that “political favouritism, without more, does not constitute an unfair labour practice under the FPSLRA”[20] . This implies that in cases where there are “more” elements to the complaint, political motivations might support allegations of unfair labour practices covered by the statute.
[46] Several cases that the plaintiffs rely upon are also distinguishable because the essential character of the complaints was different than the plaintiffs’ claims at present. For example, I have already found that the essential character of the plaintiffs’ claim is not a “power struggle” case which distinguishes this case from that of Skinner and Gilkinson.
[47] I also note that in many decisions relied upon by the plaintiffs with similar allegations to the case at bar, even though the board ultimately found that the complaints were not well founded, the board expressly noted that it had jurisdiction over the complaints[21].
[48] I therefore find that the “essential character” of the plaintiffs’ claim is encompassed by section 188 of the Labour Relations Act.
Should the Court Adopt the Analysis in Pileggi and Fraser by Analogy?
[49] The defendants submit that if I agree with them on the essential characterization of the plaintiffs’ claims, I should adopt by analogy the analysis of this Court in Pileggi and Fraser finding that this Court has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
[50] The plaintiffs attempt to summarily distinguish the outcome in Pileggi and Fraser by saying that those are old cases dealing with a different statutory regime under the Canada Labour Code.
[51] I do not agree with the plaintiffs that the outcome in Pileggi and Fraser can be summarily distinguished on that basis.
[52] As discussed above, a comparison of the relevant provisions of the Labour Relations Act, in particular sections 188(b) and (c), reveal that those sections are virtually identical to the provisions from the Canada Labour Code (sections 95(f) and 95(g)) that Justice Siegel considered in Pileggi.
[53] With respect to the exercise of the board’s powers, section 190(1) of the Labour Relations Act states that the board “must examine and inquire” complaints that fall within its purview. Similarly, the applicable provisions of the Canada Labour Code state that the board “shall exercise” the powers and perform the duties that were imposed to it under the legislation. In addition, as the Labour Board noted in Veillette, in both statutes parliament has directed that the boards are required to consider complaints that fall within their purview.
[54] The privative clauses applicable to the Labour Board’s and the Canada Industrial Relations Board’s decision are identical. The privative clause has also been described as a clause that is “strongly-worded” which “underscores the considerable deference to be accorded to the Board in respect of decisions of this nature”[22].
[55] The plaintiffs did not address the above similarities between the two statutory regimes at all in their submissions.
[56] Turning now to the remedies available to the plaintiffs under the statutory regime, I find that the provisions of the Labour Relations Act provide an adequate remedy for the plaintiffs’ claims.
[57] Pursuant to section 192(1) of the Labour Relations Act, if the Labour Board determines that a complaint is well founded, the Labour Board may “make any order that it considers necessary in the circumstances” including:
e) if an employee organization has failed to comply with paragraph 188(b) or (d), an order requiring the employee organization to reinstate or admit an employee as one of its members; and
f) if an employee organization has failed to comply with paragraph 188 (c), (d) or (e), an order requiring the employee organization to rescind any disciplinary action taken in respect of any employee affected by the failure and pay compensation in an amount that is not more than, in the Board’s opinion, any financial or other penalty imposed on the employee by the employee organization.
[emphasis added]
[58] It is not clear if the Labour Board can award punitive damages and the parties debated whether the board could grant injunctive-type relief. However, this Court has already found that the absence of authority in the legislation to award some of the remedies sought does not mean that the plaintiffs’ claims should be permitted to continue before the Court pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction in the absence of a “real deprivation of ultimate remedy”[23].
[59] Pursuant to the provisions of the Labour Relations Act above, the board can reinstate the plaintiffs in their elected positions and rescind their suspensions and also order that damages be paid to compensate the plaintiffs for any financial loss. The Labour Board has awarded these exact remedies previously[24]. The Labour Board can order an expedited hearing. The Labour Board can also make “any order that it considers necessary in the circumstances”.
[60] There are adequate remedies for the plaintiffs within the governing statutory scheme.
[61] To summarize, I have reached virtually identical conclusions in this matter as Justice Siegel reached in Pileggi on: a) the “essential character” of the plaintiffs’ claims which is an internal dispute concerning breaches of the rules of natural justice; b) that the “essential character” of the plaintiffs’ claims invokes the provisions of the governing statute, in this case the Labour Relations Act; and, c) that the Labour Relations Act provides an adequate remedy for the plaintiffs’ claims. In addition, the applicable provisions of two statutory schemes are very similar if not identical, including the presence of strong privative clauses. Furthermore, the Labour Board itself has recognized the similarities between the two statutes and adopted the CLRB’s analysis on the very issues that are involved in the present case.
[62] The plaintiffs rely on several cases, including Burgess[25] and Carr[26] as examples where the Court has exercised its inherent jurisdiction with respect to the claims of other plaintiffs in purportedly similar positions as they find themselves in the present case. Those cases are distinguishable on several basis including their subject-matter or essential characterization of the claims (Burgess was a wrongful dismissal case and Carr was an oppression remedy case). In addition, in Burgess there was no privative clause in the applicable statute. Furthermore, Carr did not address, or have any analysis of, the Court’s jurisdiction.
[63] In the circumstances, I fully adopt the balance of the analysis of Justice Siegel in Pileggi[27] and Justice Gareau in Fraser[28] and conclude that this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the plaintiffs’ actions.
[64] The CEIU and PSAC’s motion seeking a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to rule 21.01(3)(a) is granted and the actions are hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
[65] Having found that this Court lacks jurisdiction, it is not necessary and would be inappropriate for me to consider the plaintiffs’ motion seeking injunctive relief.
[66] If the parties do not reach agreement on costs, the defendants shall deliver costs submissions not to exceed five pages double-spaced, excluding their costs outline or bill of costs and any offers to settle, within 20 days of the date of these reasons. The plaintiffs shall deliver their costs submissions not to exceed five pages double-spaced, excluding their costs outline or bill of costs and any offers to settle, within 15 days of receipt of the defendants’ submissions. The defendants shall deliver any reply not to exceed two pages double-spaced within 5 days of receiving the plaintiffs’ responding materials.
Justice K. Perron
Date: August 17, 2026
CITATION: Bourque/Chima v. Public Service Alliance Of Canada et al, 2026 ONSC 4761
COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-100475 and CV-25-100222
DATE: 2026/08/17
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: Eddy Bourque, Plaintiff
-and-
Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) and Canada Employment and Immigration Union (CEIU), Defendants
-AND-
RE: Sargy Chima, Plaintiff
-and-
Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) and Canada Employment and Immigration Union (CEIU), Defendants
COUNSEL: Andrew Lister and Chantal Beaupré for the Plaintiffs
Eddy Bourque and Sargy ChimaKim Patenaude and Rohoma Zakir for the defendant, Public Service Alliance of Canada (“PSAC”)
Nigel McKechnie for the defendant, Canada Employment and Immigration Union (“CEIU”)
ENDORSEMENT
PERRON J.
Released: August 17, 2026
1Fraser v United Steel Workers Union, 2018 ONSC 3462, at para 8; Raylene Pileggi v Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2005 CanLII 14323 (ON SC) at para 40. Although not a matter brought pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, see also Iris Technologies Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 SCC 24 at para 26.
22018 ONSC 3462 and upheld by the Court of Appeal at 2019 ONCA 200.
42001 CanLII 24073 (ON CA), [2001] O.J. No. 1190 (ON CA).
51986 CanLII 71 (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R.704 (1986 CanLII 71)
61995 CanLII 108 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929 (1995 CanLII 108)
71990 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1298 (1990 CanLII 110)
92005 CanLII 14323 (ON SC) at paras 17 and 36.
102005 CanLII 14323 (ON SC) at para 49.
12Pileggi at paras 28 and 49. See also Pilette c. Syndicat des postiers du Canada [1991] R.J.Q. 1015.
14Skinner v Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, [2021] FPSLREB 18, 2021 CarswellNat 3004 at para 751.
15Veillette v Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, 2009 PSLRB 58 at para 27 (CanLII).
16Skinner [2021] FPSLREB 18, 2021 CarswellNat 3004 at paras 749 to 753.
17See for example Skinner at para 753. See also Strike v P.S.A.C. 2010 PSLRB 22, 2010 CarswellNat 1714 at para 23.
18Veillette, 2009 PSLRB 58 at paras 2 and 28-30.
19Myles v Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, 2017 FPSLREB 30, 2017 CarswellNat 5933 at paras 108-109.
20Skinner at para 755.
[21]See for example Pronovost c Institut professionnel de la fonction publique du Canada 2020 FPSLREB 24, 2020 CarswellNat 1532 at para 39; see also Bremsak v P.I.P.S.C., 2009 PSLRB 103, 2009 CarswellNat 2891 at para 140.
22See International Longshore and Warehouse Union – Canada and British Columbia Maritime Employers Association, 2024 FCA 142 at paras 96-97. See also Pileggi at para 58 adopting the Supreme Court of Canada’s analysis in Gendron.
24See Veillette at paras 55-57.
252001 CanLII 24073 (ON CA), 55 O.R. (3d) 507, 2001 CarswellOnt 1054.
262024 ONSC 4412, 2024 CarswellOnt 11777.
27See paras 41-60.
28See paras 17-32.