Helene Robertson

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of residency requirements for election officers under the federal Elections Act, arguing they infringed his s. 7 Charter liberty interest by impacting his choice of residence and employment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that choice of residence does not rise to the profound level of personal decisions protected by the s. 7 liberty interest, which is intended for profoundly intimate and personal choices, not economic interests.

Following a successful motion by the Attorney General of Canada to vary an ex parte order and quash a summons to witness, the court determined the quantum of costs payable by the self-represented plaintiff.

The Attorney General sought $4,000 in costs.

Considering the plaintiff's limited financial means and the court's own role in initially granting the ex parte order, the court reduced the costs award, fixing it at $600 for fees and $317.49 for disbursements.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that varied a prior order by deleting certain paragraphs and quashing a summons to witnesses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the witnesses and their documents had no relevance to the motion or the underlying claim against the bank.

The court directed that discoveries proceed before any further motions seeking to compel evidence or documents from third parties.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants' son, a British soldier, was killed in a helicopter crash in Afghanistan.

The appellants brought a negligence action in the Ontario Superior Court against the federal Crown and others.

The motion judge struck the claim against the federal Crown for lack of jurisdiction under s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, finding the claim arose in Afghanistan.

On appeal, the appellants argued the 'real and substantial connection' test should apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the specific statutory language of s. 21(1) governs and the substance of the claim arose in Afghanistan.

The appellants' personal injury action was dismissed for delay by the registrar due to their counsel's inadvertent failure to request a status hearing.

The motion judge refused to set aside the dismissal order, finding that the respondents were significantly prejudiced by the delay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in her assessment of prejudice, as the prejudice arose from the insolvency of co-defendants and the respondents' own failure to preserve evidence, rather than the appellants' delay.

The appeal was allowed and the action reinstated.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the action arising from a fatal helicopter incident involving a foreign soldier during a NATO mission in Afghanistan.

They argued the claim was barred by the six‑month limitation period in s. 269 of the National Defence Act and that the Ontario Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the claim against the Crown under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The court held that the discoverability principle applied to the statutory limitation period, meaning the action was not statute‑barred.

However, the court found it lacked jurisdiction over the claim against the Crown because the claim arose outside Canada.

The action was therefore dismissed only as against the Attorney General of Canada.

The applicant, an inmate serving a sentence in administrative segregation at a maximum-security penitentiary in Ontario, applied for habeas corpus to prevent his involuntary transfer to the general population of a maximum-security penitentiary in British Columbia.

He argued the transfer would deprive him of his residual liberty by separating him from his family, medical support, and legal counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that a transfer from segregation to the general population within the same security classification does not constitute a deprivation of liberty.

Furthermore, the court held that the transfer decision was reasonable and lawful, as the correctional authorities had properly considered their statutory duties.

The appellant, a former probationary employee of the National Research Council, brought a defamation action against his former employer and colleagues regarding statements made in a 'Release on Probation' document.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding it was barred by the grievance scheme under the Public Service Staff Relations Act, lacked evidence of defamation, and was protected by qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions.