CITATION: Lightfoot v. Lightfoot, 2026 ONSC 64

COURT FILE NO.: FC-21-00000073

DATE: 2026/01/05

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Marcy Lightfoot

Applicant

– and –

David Lightfoot and Evelyn Lightfoot

Respondents

Sean Heeley, counsel for the Applicant

both Respondents appearing in person

HEARD: December 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 2025

A.D. Hilliard

1This Application arises out of the dissolution of the parties’ 20-year marriage.

2The Applicant, Marcy Lightfoot, seeks order for sole decision-making for the two children of the marriage, parenting time for the Respondent, David Lightfoot, in her discretion and in accordance with the wishes of the children, child support – ongoing an retroactive, spousal support, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home for the purpose of effecting its sale, and an order that previous costs awards against Mr. Lightfoot be paid out of his portion of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home. At trial, Ms. Lightfoot abandoned her claim for unequal division and submitted that there should be no order as to equalization.

3Mr. Lightfoot seeks an order for joint decision-making, equal parenting time, and an unequal division of net family property in his favour.

4The Respondent, Evelyn Lightfoot is Mr. Lightfoot’s mother. Mrs. Lightfoot presented no evidence during the trial. She did confirm that her Answer was prepared by Mr. Lightfoot insofar as the claims made which mirror his. Mrs. Lightfoot is not seeking any orders in relation to parenting or support. She has no separate claim regarding an interest in or constructive trust claim against the matrimonial home or any other family property.

Background

The Relationship

5The parties met and started dating in 1998. They moved in together in 1999 and were married on June 24, 2000. The separated permanently December 30, 2020.

6At the time the parties met, Ms. Lightfoot was working at a Tim Horton’s in Hamilton. Her highest level of education was high school.

7Mr. Lightfoot has post-secondary education including a bachelor’s degree in kinesiology from McMaster University and a nursing diploma from Mohawk College.

8There are two (2) children of the marriage: Teagan, born July 12, 2008 (17) and Jacob, born August 15, 2011 (14).

9Teagan is a neurotypical child without any developmental or behavioural issues. Jacob is on the Autism Spectrum and has sensory processing and learning disorders. He also struggles with anxiety. Jacob was diagnosed with scoliosis when he was around the age of six (6).

10Mr. Lightfoot does not dispute that during the marriage Ms. Lightfoot stayed home and took care of the children and the household while he went to work.

11Due to Jacob’s special needs, he had Individualized Education Plans (IEPs) created for him at his elementary school. Jacob was provided additional resources to support him in the classroom. He attended speech therapy in Caledonia during his elementary years.

12Throughout the marriage until 2020, Mr. Lightfoot was employed as a Registered Nurse working for Hamilton Health Sciences. Ms. Lightfoot did not work after Teagan was born.

13Sometime in 2020, Mr. Lightfoot stopped working as a result of an undisclosed medical issue. He did not advise Ms. Lightfoot immediately that he was no longer working and did not advise that he had applied for disability benefits. Ms. Lightfoot only became aware that Mr. Lightfoot was receiving disability benefits after separation.

14The marriage had been slowly deteriorating and after a particularly bad argument on December 30, 2020, Ms. Lightfoot left the matrimonial home with Jacob, went to her parents’ home and never returned. Teagan initially was taken by Mr. Lightfoot to stay with her maternal aunt for approximately one week after the parties separated and then Teagan went to reside primarily with Ms. Lightfoot at the maternal grandparents’ home.

15The home of the maternal grandparents is a 2-bedroom house. Ms. Lightfoot, Teagan and Jacob inhabit one large bedroom, each in their own beds. Since the date of separation, Mr. Lightfoot has had exclusive use of the matrimonial home.

16In 2021, an investment property jointly owned by the parties located in Port Maitland was sold. The proceeds of sale were paid into Court and continue to be held in trust for the benefit of both parties.

Litigation History

17Ms. Lightfoot commenced this Application after Mr. Lightfoot withheld Jacob and refused to advise where he was staying. Mrs. Lightfoot was made a party to the proceeding because it was discovered that what Ms. Lightfoot thought was a simple refinancing prior to separation was actually a transfer of title to the matrimonial home from she and Mr. Lightfoot jointly to Mr. Lightfoot alone. Then Mr. Lightfoot transferred the property to himself and Mrs. Lightfoot as joint tenants.¹

18With her application, Ms. Lightfoot filed a motion without notice for an order returning Jacob to her care. That motion was considered by MacLeod J. who granted the relief being requested by Ms. Lightfoot on a without notice basis and provided for the delivery of both Jacob and Teagan into the care of Ms. Lightfoot with police enforcement if necessary. That order was made in May 2021 and provided for the return of the motion on notice to the Respondent on June 15, 2021.

19At the return of the motion, Krawchenko J. ordered the Respondent to have parenting time with both children on a temporary without prejudice basis two consecutive weekends in a row leading up to the urgent case conference scheduled for July 8, 2021.

20At the case conference, an order was made on consent for a shared parenting schedule on a week-about basis. That order also provided for a section 30 assessment to be conducted by an assessor to be agreed upon by the parties, the payment of child and spousal support by Mr. Lightfoot and that each party receive $50,000 of the proceeds of sale of the rental property being held in trust. Neither party ever received any money pursuant to that order and an assessment was never completed.

21The week-about parenting schedule continued without the need for court intervention for approximately two (2) years.

22In June 2022, an order was made after argument on a short motion compelling Mr. Lightfoot to transfer title of a 2016 Dodge Grand Caravan into the name of Ms. Lightfoot. The transfer of ownership of that motor vehicle was effected.

23Pursuant to the order of Nightingale J. dated January 26, 2023, Ms. Lightfoot filed an Amended Application.

24Mr. Lightfoot filed an Amended Answer on or about March 8, 2023 adding Richard G. Startek, previously counsel for Ms. Lightfoot, as a party to the proceeding and claiming damages against Mr Startek. An identical Amended Answer was filed on behalf of Mrs. Eveyln Lightfoot.

25In July 2023 Teagan refused to continue attending parenting time with Mr. Lightfoot. Despite there being a court order for shared parenting, Mr. Lightfoot did not move to enforce the order nor did he insist on Teagan attending parenting time in accordance with the order. There has been no parenting time or contact between Teagan and Mr. Lightfoot since.

26In August 2023, Ms. Lightfoot brought a motion regarding parenting time after Mr. Lightfoot again overheld Jacob beyond his alternate week parenting time. Breithaupt Smith J. ordered that Teagan would reside primarily with Ms. Lightfoot with parenting time arranged directly between Teagan and Mr. Lightfoot. The order with respect to Jacob provided for specific dates and times for each parent to have Jacob in their care during the month of August leading up to school, after which the week-about parenting schedule was to resume. Breithaupt Smith J.’s order included a police enforcement clause and a provision for counselling to be arranged for both children.

27On September 28, 2023, Mr. Startek brought a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of all claims against him in this proceeding. By order dated October 30, 2023, Hassan J. granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Amended Answers of Mr. and Mrs. Lightfoot in relation to claims made against Mr. Startek. Costs of the motion were awarded on December 20, 2023 in the amount of $19,690.14.

28Mr. Lightfoot did not comply with the terms of the August 15, 2023 order of Breithaupt Smith J. relating to parenting time for Jacob and so Ms. Lightfoot brought another motion which returned before me on November 24, 2023. By the time of the motion in November 2023, Jacob had not had any parenting time with Ms. Lightfoot in several weeks and had been withdrawn from school by Mr. Lightfoot without the consent of Ms. Lightfoot. I ordered a temporary suspension of parenting time for Mr. Lightfoot and the immediate return of Jacob to Ms. Lightfoot’s care.

29My November 2023 order included a provision for the completion of a section 30 assessment by Stephanie Peachy. That assessment was never completed.

30After the November 2023 motion, a request was made that the Office of the Children’s Lawyer complete a Voice of the Child Report (VOCR) to determine Jacob’s views and preferences. That referral was accepted and the VOCR was completed in January 2025. Despite the VOCR indicating that Jacob wished to have parenting time with his father, Mr. Lightfoot never brought a motion to vary my order of November 2024. Consequently, Mr. Lightfoot has had no parenting time or contact with Jacob since.

31As a result of another argued motion, Gibson J. issued an order on May 30, 2024 providing for spousal support to be paid by Mr. Lightfoot on an interim without prejudice basis commencing June 1, 2024. It was also ordered that the matrimonial home was to be immediately listed for sale and the consent of Mr. Lightfoot for all matters pertaining to the listing and sale of the matrimonial home was dispensed with. Gibson J. ordered that Mr Lightfoot continue to be responsible for all mortgage payments, taxes, utilities other carrying costs of the matrimonial home pending completion of the sale. Costs of that motion were awarded against Mr. Lightfoot and Mrs. Lightfoot in the amount of $29,000 by order of Gibson J. dated July 3, 2024.

32Mr. Lightfoot failed to comply with the terms of the Gibson J. order requiring him to maintain the mortgage and municipal tax payments for the matrimonial home. The mortgage went into default and the bank moved to take the property power of sale.

33In order to prevent the matrimonial home from being sold power of sale, further motions dealing with the matrimonial home were brought. Those motions were decided by the order of MacNeil J. dated September 13, 2024. Mr. and Mrs. Lightfoot were ordered to cooperate in allowing the real estate agent access to the matrimonial home for the purpose of listing and selling the property. The order further provided for the payout of the mortgage registered against the matrimonial home and municipal tax arrears owing out of the funds being held in trust with the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice The amount of $50,000 was to be paid out to Mr. Lightfoot from the funds being held in trust with the Court.

34To date, Mr. Lightfoot has failed or refused to comply with the order that he cooperate in the sale of the matrimonial home. At the time of trial, the matrimonial home was still not listed for sale. Mr. Lightfoot never took steps to have the $50,000 provided for in the MacNeil J order paid out to him. He also has not complied with the provisions of the July 3, 2024 Gibson J. order requiring him to pay the municipal property taxes and those taxes are once again in arrears.

35Jacob was scheduled for surgery to correct his scoliosis. When the surgeon reached out to Mr. Lightfoot to obtain his consent to Jacob having the corrective surgery, Mr. Lightfoot failed to respond to the surgeon’s office. In March 2025, Ms. Lightfoot was forced to bring a motion seeking that Mr. Lightfoot’s consent to Jacob’s surgery be dispensed with as there was no order for decision-making authority. That motion was argued before me and on March 26, 2025. I ordered that Mr. Lightfoot’s consent to Jacob’s surgery for scoliosis scheduled on April 1, 2025 be dispensed with. I also made an order prohibiting Mr. Lightfoot from attending McMaster Children’s Hospital the day of Jacob’s surgery or any other days when Jacob would be attending the hospital for treatment.

36The matter was finally called for trial in December 2025. At the commencement of trial, Mr. Lightfoot made an oral motion objecting to my presiding over the trial. Mr. Lightfoot alleged that I have a conflict due to hearing prior motions in this proceeding and because of a personal conflict with the lawyer who acted on a real estate transaction completed prior to the parties separating. I dismissed Mr Lightfoot’s objection to me hearing the trial for oral reasons given.

Analysis

Decision-making

37Ms. Lightfoot is asking that I grant her sole decision-making authority. Mr. Lightfoot seeks an order for joint decision-making.

38An Order for joint decision-making requires that I be satisfied that the parties have at least some ability to communicate. There is no evidence that these parties can communicate. All of the evidence is to the contrary.

39Just one example of the parties being unable to jointly make decisions in their children’s best interests is Jacob’s surgery. Despite his evidence at trial being that he knew that Jacob needed surgery, Mr. Lightfoot provided no reasonable explanation as to why he failed to contact the surgeon’s office to provide his consent.

40The parties have not had any direct communication since the commencement of this litigation. There is no evidence that they will be able to communicate in the future. I am mindful that joint decision-making orders should not be made in the hopes that the parties will be able to effectively communicate at some point down the road.

41Ms. Lightfoot has demonstrated that she has been and will continue to make decisions for the children in their best interests. I am satisfied that there should be an order granting Ms. Lightfoot sole decision-making authority for both children.

Parenting time

42Mr. Lightfoot seeks an order for shared parenting time. Ms. Lightfoot seeks an order that parenting time be in her discretion taking into account the views and preference of the children.

43The two children must be considered separately given the history of parenting time since separation.

44The determination as to what parenting order is in the best interests of the children should not, in my view, be delegated to a parent. If I am going to make an order for parenting time, it is my responsibility to determine what parenting schedule, if any, is in the children’s best interests.

Teagan

45Mr. Lightfoot’s own evidence was that Teagan made a choice not to see him and he respects that choice. It is notable, however, that Mr. Lightfoot did not provide any evidence as to why, even from his perspective, Teagan chose to cut off contact. Mr. Lightfoot took no responsibility for his role in Teagan deciding to end the relationship with him. Instead, Mr. Lightfoot used Teagan’s decision to terminate parenting time as a justification for overholding Jacob at times throughout 2023 and 2024.

46The only evidence before me regarding what led up to Mr. Lightfoot’s parenting time with Teagan terminating is that of Ms. Lightfoot. Her evidence was that Teagan was upset with her father for turning off the internet at his home when she was staying with him because she had homework that she needed to complete, which required use of the internet. In refusing to reattend her father’s home, Ms. Lightfoot’s uncontroverted evidence is that Teagan told her she was “done” with going to her dad’s.

47I accept that Teagan does not want to have any contact with Mr. Lightfoot. Given Teagan’s age, in my view, her views and preferences regarding parenting time should be given significant weight. I have also considered the significant amount of time that has past since Teagan had any contact with her father combined with the total lack of effort by Mr. Lightfoot to reach out to Tegan in over two (2) years.

48I find that it is not in Teagan’s best interests for there to be any order for parenting time with Mr. Lightfoot.

Jacob

49The VOCR is now almost two (2) years old. It was completed not long after a significant period of overholding by Mr. Lightfoot. Although I am prepared to accept that at the time the report was prepared, the views and preferences accurately reflected what Jacob had told the clinician, I am not satisfied that I can continue to ascribe those same views to Jacob today. For the purpose of assessing what parenting order is in Jacob’s best interests, the VOCR cannot provide any assistance in determining Jacob’s present views and preferences.

50Jacob has not had any parenting time or contact with Mr. Lightfoot in over a year. Mr. Lightfoot has not provided any evidence as to how he proposes to be and reintegrated into Jacob’s life.

51Mr. Lightfoot’s evidence with respect to the decisions he made when he did have parenting time leave me with no confidence that Mr. Lightfoot is willing to comply with court orders regarding parenting time. He routinely overheld Jacob. His evidence at trial took no responsibility for his actions, refused to acknowledge that by failing to return Jacob he was contravening a court order, and demonstrated no recognition or understanding of how his actions impacted Jacob.

52It is not in Jacob’s best interests to return to spending every other week in the care of Mr. Lightfoot after not seeing him for over a year. Any parenting order after such a long hiatus would need to provide for a graduated schedule commencing with short day visits.

53However, there is no evidence before me to satisfy me that there is any parenting order that Mr. Lightfoot would comply with, even an order that granted him exactly what he was seeking. Previous court orders providing Mr. Lightfoot with parenting time every other week were not complied with. I have no confidence that Mr. Lightfoot will comply with any order that I make regarding parenting time.

54It is not in Jacob’s best interests to be ordered to have parenting time with Mr. Lightfoot given the history of breaches of court orders. Jacob’s special needs require that he have predictability, consistency, and stability. Any order for parenting time would disrupt the consist and predictable routine he currently has in the care of his mother.

Child support

55Ms. Lightfoot seeks an order for ongoing and retroactive child support. She also seeks an order that a portion of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home be held as security for future child support.

56Since separation, Mr. Lightfoot has not voluntarily paid any support.

57Although it was somewhat difficult to ascertain, overall, I understand Mr. Lightfoot’s position to be that he does not dispute that he has an obligation to pay child support. His issue is the quantum of support to be paid.

Ongoing

58Prior to trial, Mr. Lightfoot had not provided disclosure on his income for 2022 or his Notices of Assessment for 2021 or 2024. At my request, Mr. Lightfoot did provide disclosure during the trial as to the current status of his disability income. He was approved for CPP Disability Benefits in 2025, and his income is now a combination of CPP Disability and long-term disability insurance benefits through Desjardin Insurance. The evidence is he has been in receipt of disability benefits since the date of separation.

59I am satisfied that child support should be calculated based on Mr. Lightfoot’s current income. Given his approval for long term disability benefits prior to separation and for CPP Disability benefits in 2025, I am satisfied that Mr Lightfoot is unable to work. Despite the lack of disclosure of the medical basis for his disability, I am satisfied that imputing income to Mr. Lightfoot as if he were able to work is inappropriate.

60The evidence provided by Mr. Lightfoot confirms that his disability benefits are taxable. I am therefore satisfied that there is no gross-up required as the evidence is that Mr. Lightfoot is required to pay tax on the gross amount of disability benefits he receives.

61Service Canada correspondence dated September 23, 2025 confirms Mr. Lightfoot receives CPP Disability benefits of $1,364.79 monthly. A letter from Desjardins dated November 3, 2025 confirms that Mr. Lightfoot is being paid income replacement benefits monthly in the amount of $3,657.80. His total monthly income is therefore $5,022.59 which averages out to an annual income of $60,271.08. That is the income on which child support for the two children shall be payable in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines.

62Ongoing child support shall therefore be set at $916 per month.

Retroactive

63Attached to his financial statement filed in 2022 is Mr. Lightfoot’s 2020 Notice of Assessment and a letter from Desjardin Insurance dated March 31, 2021 confirming the details of his disability benefits payments. His Line 150 Income for the tax year 2020 was $86,320. However, the letter from Desjardin confirms that disability benefits started on June 3, 2020.

64In calculating retroactive support, I am not satisfied that Mr. Lightfoot’s 2020 income should be used for the years 2021, 2022 and 2023 as argued by Ms. Lightfoot. The uncontroverted evidence of Mr Lightfoot is that he stopped working in June 2020 and has not worked since. Mr. Lightfoot’s 2020 income included employment income and gross rental income. There is no evidence that he has had either of these sources of income since 2020.

65Although there is a lack of evidence as to Mr. Lightfoot’s actual income in 2021 and 2022, in reviewing the evidence as to his current income, his approval date for disability benefits and his 2023 income, I can draw a reasonable inference as to what his 2021 and 2022 income likely was for the purposes of calculating retroactive support.

66Mr. Lightfoot did provide a summary of all T slips received for the tax year 2021. Based on that evidence, I find that Mr. Lightfoot’s income for support purposes for 2021 was $62,480.53.

67For the year 2022, the evidence is that Mr. Lightfoot was receiving disability benefits from Desjardin. Based on the information contained in the two letters tendered into evidence from Desjardin, I have concluded that Mr. Lightfoot received $4,988 per month in taxable disability benefits throughout 2022. I therefore find that his income for support purposes for that year was $59,856.

68A copy of Mr. Lightfoot’s 2023 Notice of Assessment was provided. His Line 150 income for that year was $60,378. Child support for 2023 should therefore be based upon his actual income in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines.

69Mr. Lightfoot did not provide a copy of his 2024 Notice of Assessment during the trial. However, based on the evidence as to the approval of CPP Disability benefits effective June 2024, it is possible to determine what Mr. Lightfoot’s income was for 2024. For the entire year Mr. Lightfoot received $4,988 monthly from Desjardins. However, there was a retroactive readjustment when Mr. Lightfoot was approved for CPP Disability in 2025. His income for the months of June to December in 2024 was readjusted from $4,988 per month from Desjardin to a combination of CPP Disability benefits in the amount of $1,330.20 monthly and Desjardin benefits in the amount of $3,657.80. The end result is a total annual income for 2024 of $59,856.

70Similarly in 2025, for the majority of the year until the approval of CPP Disability, Mr. Lightfoot was receiving $4,988 per month from Desjardin. The letter sent by Desjardin confirms that after adjustments were made for overpayments and reimbursement by CPP Disability, Mr Lightfoot had an overpayment of $1,018.89. His income for 2025 is therefore $58,837.11.

71Although there was a shared parenting schedule in place for two years post-separation, during that entire period of time Ms. Lightfoot was unemployed. I am of the view that no income should be imputed to Ms. Lightfoot for that period of time. Even though the children were in Mr. Lightfoot’s care half the time, I am satisfied that Ms. Lightfoot bore the majority of the responsibility of ensuring that Jacob was taken to his medical appointments. I am satisfied that her childcare responsibilities, combined with her complete lack of employment history for over a decade, created barriers to re-entry into the workforce such that imputing income would not be appropriate.

72Retroactive support is therefore calculated based on Mr. Lightfoot owing the full table amount of child support even for the period of time when there was a shared parenting arrangement.

73I find that the following amounts are owing for retroactive child support:

2021 – 12 months x $952 = $11,424

2022 – 12 months x 912 = $10,944

2023 – 12 months x $920 = $11,040

2024 – 12 months x 912 – payments made of $6,000 = $4,944

2025² – 9 months x 896 + 3 months x $899 = $10,761

Total payable = $49,113

74Mr. Lightfoot has not voluntarily paid any child support since the date of separation. I am satisfied that retroactive child support ordered should be made payable out of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

Security for future child support

75Although I accept that there is discretion not to enforce support orders against disability benefits, there was no evidence led that the interim child support order was not being enforced because Mr. Lightfoot is in receipt of disability benefits. Rather the evidence was that enforcement had been withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) voluntarily to facilitate direct payments being made by way of withdrawals from a joint bank account. I heard no evidence that Ms. Lightfoot has re-filed with the FRO since she stopped being able to directly access funds to satisfy support payments.

76I also have some difficulty with the argument that whatever the remainder of the proceeds of sale from the matrimonial home, if any, should be held as security. There is nothing to provide me with any indication as to what amount of money that might be and whether such an amount would be appropriate given the Teagan is 17 and in her last year of high school and Jacob is already 14. Teagan becoming independent is foreseeable in the near future and Jacob may be eligible for Ontario Disability Support Program benefits when he turns 18 years old.

77I am therefore not satisfied that an order for security for future child support payments is necessary on the facts before me.

Spousal support

78Ms. Lightfoot seeks an order for lump sum spousal support.

79Mr. Lightfoot did not dispute that Ms. Lightfoot did not work throughout the marriage. He took issue with the suggestion that it was at his insistence that Ms. Lightfoot stay home to raise the children, instead indicating that it was a joint decision that she be responsible for the children while he went to work. His evidence was that at some point during the relationship he asked her to go back to work but she refused.

80At no point was it put to Ms. Lightfoot that a source of tension in the marriage was her refusal to return to the workforce, nor was Ms. Lightfoot given the opportunity to respond to Mr. Lightfoot’s claim that he asked her to get a job. However, I am mindful that Mr. Lightfoot represented himself during the trial and cannot be expected to understand the intricacies of the rule in Browne v Dunn. The issue is a red herring in any event.

81Whether or not Mr. Lightfoot asked or suggested that Ms. Lightfoot return to work, Ms. Lightfoot has no formal education beyond high school. She has had no work experience for over 15 years. I find that the combination of her education and work experience significantly limit Ms. Lightfoot’s employment options.

82The parties had a traditional marriage, and I find that Ms. Lightfoot is entitled to compensatory support. Ms. Lightfoot’s employment opportunities have been directly impacted by the marriage and her role as the children’s primary caregiver, which continues to the present.

83Ms. Lightfoot has been unable to return to work since separation due to her child-care responsibilities, in particular in relation to Jacob. For over a year now, both children have been in her care on a full-time basis as Mr. Lightfoot has not had any parenting time. She has therefore been entirely responsible for getting both children to school, all of their extracurricular activities and medical, dental and other appointments. As she has been living with her parents in Caistor Centre, Ms. Lightfoot spends almost an hour every day just driving Teagan and Jacob back and forth to school in Dunnville.

84I find that it would have been extremely difficult for Ms. Lightfoot to maintain regular employment post-separation given her childcare responsibilities limiting her availability during the workday.

85I am also of the view that entitlement is available on a non-compensatory basis. Ms. Lightfoot has had no employment income since Teagan was born. Her income is nil. Ms. Lightfoot is existing on government benefits alone as Mr. Lightfoot is not even paying child support. The significant disparity in their respective incomes supports a needs-based finding.

86Given Mr. Lightfoot’s history of failing to obey court orders and failing to meet his obligations to support his children I have no confidence that he will comply with any order to pay periodic spousal support. He was previously ordered to pay spousal support and made no effort to do so. In my view, the only way to ensure that Ms. Lightfoot gets the spousal support she is entitled to is to order a lump sum amount payable from the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

87The lump sum spousal support amount sought by Ms. Lightfoot is based upon a calculation that assumes Mr. Lightfoot’s income is $86,320 and Ms. Lightfoot’s is $12,483. Based upon my findings of Mr. Lightfoot’s income post-separation for the purposes of child support, it would not be appropriate to use a different income amount in determining spousal support.

88A spousal support calculation was provided based upon Mr. Lightfoot having an income of $60,378 and Ms. Lightfoot having no income. At that income, based on the updated 2025 CSG, Mr. Lightfoot would be paying child support monthly in the amount of $917, only $1 more than what I have ordered. The mid-range amount for lump-sum support is $112,774.

89Spousal support calculations are not an exact science. The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines are not mandatory but meant to be used as a tool to assist judges in determining what amount of spousal support to order. Residual discretion remains with the trial judge in calculating spousal support. I am satisfied that the mid-range amount in the calculation provided is based on assumptions that are close enough to my findings as to the parties’ respective incomes that any difference is negligible.

90I therefore find that the appropriate amount of lump sum spousal support to be awarded to Ms. Lightfoot is $112,774. That amount will be ordered payable out of Mr. Lightfoot’s half of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

Exclusive Possession of the Matrimonial Home

91Ms. Lightfoot asks that she be granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. The basis for her request is two-fold: 1) to permit her and the children to reside more comfortably than they are now and 2) to facilitate the sale of the matrimonial home.

92Mr. Lightfoot’s position that the children have always been welcome to return to the matrimonial home is disingenuous at best. There has been significant conflict between the parties dating since separation. Mr. Lightfoot’s refusal to vacate the matrimonial home has prevented Ms. Lightfoot from returning with the children. It would not be in the children’s best interests to reside with both of their parents in the same home given the ongoing conflict. I accept that it was not truly an option for Ms. Lightfoot to resume cohabitation with Mr. Lightfoot given the circumstances.

93In his evidence at trial, Mr. Lightfoot acknowledged that in the 30 days prior to the trial, he spent every night staying at the home of his girlfriend. The matrimonial home was therefore vacant for most of if not all day in the month leading up to the trial while Ms. Lightfoot and the children were residing in a small home occupying a single bedroom.

94Mr. Lightfoot also testified that his mother resides in her own 3 bedroom home alone. Although Mrs. Lightfoot resides in Hamilton, Mr. Lightfoot is not working nor exercising any parenting time. Therefore, there is no need for him to live in any specific municipality or locale.

95I find that between his girlfriend and his mother’s residence, Mr. Lightfoot has suitable and affordable alternate accommodations available.

96Mr. Lightfoot has his disability income to use to support himself. He is not currently paying Ms. Lightfoot any child or spousal support. Conversely, Ms. Lightfoot is relying solely on government child tax benefits and loans from her parents to support herself and the children. She is therefore in a much more difficult financial position than Mr. Lightfoot and does not have comparable resources to find suitable alternate accommodations.

97I am satisfied that it is necessary and in the children’s best interests that Ms. Lightfoot be granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. Teagan and Jacob continue to attend school in Dunnville. The drive from Caistor Centre, where they are currently living, is approximately 20 – 30 minutes one-way depending on the weather. If they were able to return to reside at the matrimonial home, transportation time to school would be significantly reduced.

98Teagan and Jacob are both teenagers. They are entitled to have their own private space to sleep. If they were able to return to residing in the matrimonial home, Teagan and Jacob would once again have their own rooms.

99Mr. Lightfoot has failed or refused to comply with the order that he cooperate in the sale of the matrimonial home. Based on his evidence and his confrontational attitude towards the chosen real estate agent, I am satisfied that no other order, short of an order excluding Mr. Lightfoot from residing in the matrimonial home, will facilitate the sale of that residence.

100I therefore find that Ms. Lightfoot should be granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

Equalization

101I am not satisfied that there is sufficient evidence before me to make an order for equalization.

102Neither Mr. Lightfoot nor Mrs. Lightfoot by way of their pleadings provided Ms. Lightfoot with any notice that a constructive trust claim was being asserted against the matrimonial home or any other martial assets. There was no disclosure of any verbal agreement between Mr. Lightfoot and his parents regarding alleged loans and there is no evidence as to any repayment of loans owing during the marriage or after separation.

103Mr. Lightfoot’s last-minute disclosure of a trust agreement he and Mrs. Lightfoot signed in November 2025 does not assist me in determining whether Mr. Lightfoot was holding property in trust for his parents. There is no evidence as to the specific amounts of money Mr. Lightfoot claims his parents loan him. There is no evidence of any agreement about a loan prior to the trust agreement signed after the death of Mr. Lightfoot’s father.

104There is no evidence to support Mr. Lightfoot’s claim for unequal division of net family property.

105There is no evidence about the value of Mr. Lightfoot’s assets or debts. Mr. Lightfoot has provided no evidence as to the debts he testified he was left paying after separation. There is not even any evidence that Mr. Lightfoot made any payments towards the parties’ joint debts. All of the evidence is to the contrary.

106There is evidence that Mr. Lightfoot failed to make mortgage payments resulting in the mortgage going into default. There is evidence that Mr. Lightfoot failed to pay property taxes owing resulting in significant arrears accruing. Mr. Lightfoot’s failure to pay these debts as they were owing was also in breach of a court order requiring him to pay the mortgage and property taxes.

107All of the evidence that was presented at trial supports a conclusion that Mr. Lightfoot was not paying anything towards the parties’ joint debts after separation, despite also not making any effort to pay child or spousal support. Therefore, there is no basis for an unequal division of net family property in Mr. Lightfoot’s favour.

Costs

108Ms. Lightfoot was entirely successful and is therefore presumptively entitled to her costs.

109I am of the view that any further submissions on costs by Mr. Lightfoot would not be of assistance to me and would create further unnecessary costs to Ms. Lightfoot.

110Mr. Lightfoot has acted unreasonably throughout this litigation. He has flagrantly disobeyed court orders, failed or refused to meet his support obligations, and failed to provide basic financial disclosure. Mr. Lightfoot has done all of this unapologetically.

111He claimed to be ignorant of the court process, but it is notable that he had a lawyer at the commencement of this Application and testified as to multiple other court proceedings that he is a party to. It became clear through the conduct of the trial that Mr. Lightfoot is not a novice litigant.

112I am satisfied that Mr. Lightfoot’s conduct has unnecessarily complicated and lengthened these proceedings. Despite multiple previous costs awards, all of which remain unpaid, Mr. Lightfoot has not been deterred from his obstinate behaviour. Substantial indemnity costs are appropriate in the circumstances.

113Given the failure to pay previous costs orders, the costs of awarded on the trial, as well as all previous costs awards shall be paid out of Mr. Lightfoot’s half of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

114A Bill of Costs shall be served and filed by Ms. Lightfoot within 7 days of receipt of this Judgment, after which I will release an endorsement addressing the amount of costs awarded.

Order

115For all of these reasons, a final order shall issue as follows:

The Applicant, Marcy Lightfoot, shall be granted sole decision-making authority for the two children of the marriage, Teagan and Jacob.
The Respondent, David Lightfoot, shall be entitled to information about the children directly from third party service providers, including but not limited to the children’s doctor, dentist, and school(s). This provision shall be good and sufficient authority for the release of information directly to the Respondent, unless the children themselves refuse the release of their private medical information to their father.
The Applicant shall have the sole right to obtain and renew any important identification documents for the children, including but not limited to their passports and health cards.
The Respondent’s consent for the Applicant to travel outside of Canada with the children is dispensed with.
The Respondent’s claim for parenting time with the children is dismissed.
The Respondent shall pay child support to the Applicant monthly in the Child Support Guideline amount of $916 commencing January 1, 2026.
Retroactive child support is fixed in the amount of $49,113, which shall be paid out of the Respondent’s proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.
Commencing January 1, 2026, the parties shall proportionately share all special and extraordinary expenses for the children, with the Respondent being responsible for 75% and the Applicant being responsible for 25%.
The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant lump sum spousal support in the amount of $112,774 which shall be paid out of the Respondent’s proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.
The Respondent shall designate the children as his dependents and beneficiaries of any extended medical, dental, or other disability benefits available to him.
The Applicant shall have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home located at 8408 and 8410 Highway #3 Dunnville, Ontario. The Respondent shall vacate the residence and property of the matrimonial home within 14 days of receipt of this judgment.
The Applicant shall have the sole authority to deal with all matters pertaining to the tenancy of the rental home located on the property of the matrimonial home and the tenant therein.
The Applicant shall have the sole authority to deal with all matters pertaining to the sale of the matrimonial home, including but not limited to signing any listing agreement and closing documents. The Respondent’s consent to the listing and sale of the matrimonial home and all matters pertaining thereto is hereby dispensed with.
The monies being held in trust by the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice shall be disbursed as follows:

a) The Applicant’s one-half shall be paid out to her.

b) The Respondent’s one-half shall be paid to the Applicant in partial satisfaction of the monies owing pursuant to this Order.

The monies being held in trust by Sean D. Heeley Professional Corporation shall be disbursed as follows:

a) The Applicant’s one-half shall be paid out to her.

b) The Respondent’s one-half shall be paid to the Applicant in partial satisfaction of the monies owing pursuant to this Order.

The proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home shall be disbursed as follows:

a) any amounts paid for real-estate commission(s), legal fees, closing costs and municipal tax arrears;

b) to the Applicant – one half of the remaining balance;

c) from the remaining half owed to the Respondent:

i. the balance of all monies owing pursuant to this order, including costs awarded;

ii. all monies owing from the costs orders of January 25, 2024, July 3, 2024, and March 26, 2025;

iii. any money remaining after all of the foregoing is paid, the balance shall be paid out to the Respondent.

There shall be no order as to equalization.
SDO to issue.
Costs of this application reserved pending receipt of the Applicant’s Bill of Costs.