Megan Ward

The accused, L.S., was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a 15-year-old victim.

This decision outlines the sentencing.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the gravity of the offence and the victim's severe impact, alongside mitigating factors, including the offender's lack of criminal record, intellectual disability, and family circumstances.

The Crown sought 3-5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 30-month penitentiary sentence, reduced to 26 months after credit for house arrest bail, and ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a 15-year-old complainant.

The accused raised the defences of mistake of age and consent.

The court applied the three-step framework from Carbone to assess the mistake of age defence, finding that the accused took virtually no steps to ascertain the complainant's age, thereby negating the defence.

The court also found that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity and that there was no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused, L.S., facing charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, sought to admit new defence expert evidence from Brandie Stevenson regarding his intellectual deficits and their impact on his decision-making, specifically his ability to ascertain age.

This voir dire followed an earlier ruling that deemed a previous expert inadmissible.

The Crown challenged the new expert's impartiality.

The court, applying the two-step test for expert evidence admissibility from White Burgess and Mohan, found Ms. Stevenson to be aware of her duty and capable of providing fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence.

The court admitted the expert evidence, noting that concerns about the foundation of her opinions, particularly regarding information from the accused's mother, would go to weight, not admissibility.

During a judge-alone trial for sexual assault and sexual interference, the defence sought an adjournment to retain a new expert witness regarding the accused's cognitive functioning, after their initial proposed expert was rejected.

The Crown opposed the adjournment.

The court granted the application, finding it prudent to reserve determination on the admissibility of the new expert's evidence until a voir dire could be held, as the evidence could potentially be relevant to the mens rea component of the offences.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a pretrial application to subpoena a psychotherapist to impeach the complainant's credibility.

At the preliminary inquiry, the complainant volunteered that she had disclosed the assault to the therapist during a joint counselling session.

The defence sought to introduce the therapist's evidence to prove no such disclosure occurred.

The court dismissed the application, ruling that the complainant's initial statement at the preliminary inquiry was inadmissible as improper oath-helping, hearsay, and irrelevant.

Consequently, there was no valid evidence upon which to impeach the complainant.

The Crown brought an omnibus application in an in-person criminal trial seeking orders to permit two civilian witnesses to testify remotely under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code and for the prosecutor to participate remotely under section 715.25(2) of the Code.

The court granted the applications, finding that the Crown had met its onus, considering the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the witnesses' health and fear of the accused, and the capacity for remote testimony to ensure a fair and efficient proceeding.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug (marijuana/cannabis) in Halton Hills on March 20, 2015.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging the police stop violated his s. 9 rights through racial profiling.

The trial judge found the accused's allegations of racial profiling to be baseless and lacking credibility.

The police officer's observations of erratic driving (vehicle swaying within lane and crossing centre line three times) provided reasonable grounds for the stop.

Following the stop, an outstanding warrant was discovered, leading to arrest.

Subsequent observations by the drug recognition expert, including dilated pupils, balance issues, and poor performance on sobriety tests, combined with the accused's admission of marijuana use that evening, established impairment.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by marijuana.

The accused was charged with multiple offences arising from two separate incidents involving his wife: assault, unlawful confinement, choking, threatening death, and mischief on September 1, 2013, and three counts of mischief on November 3, 2013.

The accused pleaded guilty to some mischief charges but not guilty to the remaining charges.

The trial proceeded with testimony from the complainant and a corroborating witness, followed by the accused's testimony.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, while rejecting the accused's denials.

The court convicted the accused on all remaining charges based on the evidence that he was highly intoxicated and engaged in violent and threatening behaviour toward the complainant.

The applicant challenged the validity of two search warrants executed at his residence on Charter section 8 grounds.

The applicant was originally convicted of possession of child pornography following a nine-day trial.

Upon reopening the trial, the court examined whether the police exceeded the scope of the first warrant by seizing CDs and DVDs that the issuing justice had expressly prohibited.

The court found that the issuing justice's oral directions limiting the search to digital cameras and memory cards were binding on the police, and that the seizure of the Montreal CD and other storage devices constituted over-seizure in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The court further found that the second warrant could not have been issued without the information derived from the unlawfully seized Montreal CD.

The court excluded the evidence and dismissed the charge.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of assault against the same victim.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with two years probation, while defence counsel sought a conditional discharge with six months or less probation.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with two years probation, considering the accused's acquired brain injury, his youth, lack of prior criminal record, and compliance with bail conditions.

The court also imposed a firearms prohibition order and authorized a DNA order.

The sentencing emphasized the importance of medication compliance in managing the accused's condition.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in blood.

The sole issue at trial was whether the Crown had proven that the accused was driving his vehicle on October 4, 2013, in Burlington.

The Crown called witnesses who observed the accused driving his car away from a strip club in the early morning hours.

The accused testified that a stranger who resembled him drove the vehicle instead.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on credible eyewitness identification and rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable and fantastical.

A one-year driving prohibition was imposed.

The accused was convicted after trial of three counts of assault against his common-law spouse.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 60 to 90 days, while defence counsel sought time served and/or a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of imprisonment of four months to be served in the community, with the first 60 days subject to house arrest, followed by three years of probation.

A firearms prohibition under section 110 of the Criminal Code was also imposed for five years.

The court found that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the offender's lack of prior criminal record, good prospects for rehabilitation, and the circumstances of the offences, which occurred during a period of significant personal stress.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving his step-daughter over a 38-month period prior to her 16th birthday, and with two forms of sexual exploitation during periods following her 16th birthday.

The Crown proceeded by indictment; the accused elected trial in Ontario Court of Justice and pleaded not guilty to all charges.

The case turned on credibility in a classic "she said/he said" scenario.

The court found the complainant credible and the accused's evidence riddled with material inconsistencies and implausibilities.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to provide a suitable breath sample following a roadside stop for speeding.

The Crown alleged the defendant refused to comply with a valid screening demand.

The defendant challenged both the validity of the screening demand and alleged a violation of his right to counsel.

The court found the screening demand was valid and made "forthwith" as required by the Criminal Code.

The court also found no violation of the defendant's right to counsel prior to arrest, and any post-arrest delay in providing rights to counsel was minor and did not warrant exclusion of evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The case involved approximately 23 months from the swearing of the information to conviction, including adjournments related to the absence of a police officer whom the defence wished to call as a witness on a Charter application.

The court held that the officer was a defence witness and that his absence did not constitute Crown delay, and most of the disputed periods were either neutral delay or defence-related.

Although the trial judge erred in suggesting prejudice need not be examined where institutional delay fell below guideline thresholds, the appellate court found that any prejudice was limited and insufficient to render the delay unreasonable.

The conviction and dismissal of the Charter application were upheld.

The accused was charged with two counts of uttering threats contrary to section 264.1 of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from a telephone call made to a caseworker at the Ontario Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) on June 19, 2012, in which the accused made references to parking a fertilizer bomb in front of a police division and discussed the law of provocation in the context of his long-standing dispute with Peel Regional Police Services.

The Crown argued that the utterances constituted threats made with criminal intent.

The accused admitted making the utterances but contended they were expressions of frustration and hyperbole, not genuine threats.

The trial judge found that while the words were objectively threatening, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused uttered them with the requisite criminal intent.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a motor vehicle accident at a construction site intersection.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the driver.

The Crown relied on eyewitness testimony identifying the accused as the driver based on distinctive thick black-framed glasses.

The defence argued the accused's friend was the driver.

The court found conflicting evidence between the eyewitness account and the consistent testimony of both the accused and his friend, resulting in reasonable doubt as to identity.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with eight counts including attempted break and enter, break and enter with theft, breach of probation, and possession of break-in tools.

The accused pleaded guilty to counts 2, 3, and 4 (mischief, breach of probation).

On count 1 (attempted break and enter), the court found the accused guilty based on video evidence showing him disabling and stealing a glass break sensor from a medical building, which constituted more than mere preparation.

On counts 5-8 (break and enter, theft, breach of probation, and possession of break-in tools), the court acquitted the accused due to insufficient evidence of identity and possession, noting the Crown's failure to bring a similar act application that would have permitted the court to draw inferences between the two incidents.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of his running vehicle during rush hour traffic.

He admitted to smoking a substance he believed to be marijuana approximately 30 minutes before being found.

The Crown could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was marijuana, but argued the charge was proven as the accused consumed an unidentified drug.

The court found the accused guilty, holding that the accused voluntarily consumed a substance he knew to be a drug with intoxicating effects, and his subsequent decision to drive constituted recklessness sufficient to establish the requisite mens rea, regardless of whether the substance was the specific drug he believed he was consuming.

Sentencing following jury convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault arising from historical sexual abuse of a child by an adult babysitter in a position of trust.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the abuse involved repeated vaginal intercourse over approximately two years, grooming, intimidation, and egregious breach of trust, while declining to treat the secretly arranged abortion as an aggravating factor because paternity was not proven.

Applying the governing sentencing principles for sexual offences against children, the court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society predominated and that a conditional sentence was wholly unfit.

A six-year penitentiary sentence was imposed on the sexual interference count, the sexual assault count was conditionally stayed, and ancillary DNA, SOIRA, weapons, and no-contact orders were made, but a s. 161 prohibition order was refused.