ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
ROBERT PEPIN-JUNG
Before Justice Robert S. Gee
Heard on February 24, 25 and 26, and March 10 and 11, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on April 16, 2026
Aisa Saho counsel for the Crown
Jessica Read for the accused
INTRODUCTION
1Mr. Pepin-Jung is charged with criminal harassment contrary to s. 264 of the Criminal Code. The complainant, Tina Dang and Mr. Pepin-Jung met through Tinder in February 2024 and began an intimate relationship that continued, in an on-and-off fashion, for approximately seven months. The evidence at trial portrayed a relationship marked by frequent conflict, repeated break-ups and reconciliations, and significant emotional and financial tension. In particular, the relationship deteriorated over time, and by the fall of 2024 Ms. Dang was taking steps to end contact and disengage from Mr. Pepin-Jung.
2The criminal charge arises from Mr. Pepin-Jung’s conduct following what was characterized as the final end of the relationship, which occurred on or about October 11, 2024. The Crown alleges that, after that point, Mr. Pepin-Jung engaged in persistent and unwanted communications and other conduct directed toward Ms. Dang that caused her to fear for her safety, and that her fear was reasonable in all the circumstances. The alleged course of conduct includes repeated email communications, fourteen emails in less than 24 hours, followed by an additional email two days later, as well as threats to distribute intimate videos of her.
3The timeframe most directly relevant to the charge is the period following the final break-up in mid-October 2024 through to early November 2024, with the most acute cluster of communications occurring between November 2 and November 5, 2024. The Crown also relies on certain contextual events occurring earlier in the relationship and in particular in late September and October 2024 to assist in assessing the nature of the communications, the accused’s state of mind, and the reasonableness of Ms. Dang’s fear.
FACTS
4The Crown called two witnesses, Officer Rachel Hartley of the Hamilton Police Service, and the complainant, Ms. Tina Dang. Mr. Pepin-Jung did not testify and called no evidence. In addition, the parties filed an agreed statement of facts establishing, among other things, that Ms. Dang called 9-1-1 on November 3, 2024 at about 3:50 p.m. to report an allegation of extortion, that there was no record of any call back from her between November 3 and November 5, 2024, and that after unsuccessful attempts by police to reach her on the morning of November 6, 2024, she contacted them and later provided an audio statement that day. Officer Hartley testified that she was dispatched on November 6, 2024, to Ms. Dang’s residence, where she conducted the investigation, took Ms. Dang’s audio statement, reviewed videos from Ms. Dang’s home security system and the email communications provided, and based on those materials, formed grounds to charge Mr. Pepin‑Jung with criminal harassment.
5Ms. Dang described the relationship as beginning in February 2024 after she and Mr. Pepin‑Jung met online, and quickly becoming involved in the sense of frequent contact and a rapid escalation of intimacy. She testified that, from early on, they communicated constantly, by text and, at times, by lengthy emails, and that the relationship developed at a pace that, in hindsight, felt accelerated instead of progressing in a more measured manner. She also described early “red flags,” including discussions initiated by the accused about a committed future, such as moving in together and having children, at a point when she said she was not seeking such a serious relationship.
6A central feature of Ms. Dang’s description of the relationship was its volatility and on‑again/off‑again nature. She testified that the parties argued frequently, and that disagreements often started in person and continued through messaging, and that there were periods of breaking up and reconciling, sometimes quickly, creating a cyclical pattern in which she would leave and then return. In Ms. Dang’s account, this cycle was intertwined with communication patterns that she experienced as emotionally exhausting and difficult to disengage from, particularly because the accused’s messages could be extremely lengthy and persistent.
7Ms. Dang characterized the accused’s manner of communication as what she called “stream of consciousness,” meaning very long, and continuous messages that she found overwhelming and, in her perception, not merely verbose but directed toward steering the narrative. She testified that these communications could feel like a “kitchen sink” approach to communicating. They were repetitive, expansive, and sometimes containing striking or over-the-top assertions embedded within a larger mass of writing, such that she experienced them as confusing and draining, and at times manipulative. Although she acknowledged that she sometimes interpreted such lengthy messages as signs of care or vulnerability, she described that the combination of frequent conflict, intense messaging, and recurring reconciliations contributed to an unstable relationship dynamic.
8Ms. Dang testified that she and Mr. Pepin‑Jung travelled to Italy in August 2024. She said that, before the trip, she told him she was not in a financial position to take an expensive vacation, and that he told her the trip would be on him, which contributed to her agreement to go.
9In her examination‑in‑chief she testified that expensive glass purchases were made while in Italy and that, when payment was required, his credit card did not work, and he asked her to put the purchases on hers, with a promise to repay her. In cross‑examination, the financial details were explored extensively, including evidence that she later attended a TD branch with him on September 24, 2024 and received a bank draft payable to her in the amount of $24,000, which she understood to be reimbursement relating to amounts she had paid on her credit card, which he had not repaid as of that date, notwithstanding prior assurances that he would do so. Ms. Dang’s evidence was that these financial issues and what she perceived as shifting positions about who would pay contributed to her increasing concern as the relationship deteriorated.
10Ms. Dang also testified about the existence of intimate videos taken during the relationship. She described that intimate videos of the two of them were created, that the accused primarily used his phone to make them, and that she was not always aware at the time a recording was being made. She estimated there were many such videos. In describing her “exit plan” as she called it in late September 2024, Ms. Dang testified that one of her priorities shortly before the final break-up was to have the accused delete these videos. She stated that he appeared to delete them on his phone while she was present, but she nonetheless remained worried that he had retained other copies or could still access them, believing that they may have been stored on other devices or media, not just on his phone.
11She testified the definitive end of the relationship was October 11, 2024. After this date, Ms. Dang described a series of events that when the subsequent unwanted emails were received, caused her to feel harassed and fear for her safety.
12In particular, she testified to uninvited attendances by Mr. Pepin‑Jung at her home after the break-up. One of these was an occasion in mid‑October when she opened the door believing it to be a delivery, and was startled when it was the accused, who requested to speak with her. She was taken aback, immediately said “no” or words to that effect and quickly closed the door.
13Ms. Dang testified that, while she was away from home attending an out‑of‑town wedding, her home security system generated a motion notification and captured footage of Mr. Pepin‑Jung attending at her residence. The video indicated he attended on October 20, 2024, at approximately 9:34 a.m. and showed him arriving and walking toward her home uninvited. Ms. Dang’s evidence was that she had not asked or expected Mr. Pepin‑Jung to attend at her home that day. She further testified that the accused had been aware she would be away that weekend because before the break-up, he had been invited to the wedding and that this formed part of the context for why she found the attendance concerning. Importantly, Ms. Dang testified that during that attendance, the accused tried to gain entry to her garage. Her evidence was that she had changed the garage door code and had not provided the new code to him.
14She also described encountering him at a Shoppers Drug Mart in October. This she said left her “creeped out and scared” as she felt it was not the result of coincidence or mere happenstance. She had attended the Shoppers for a pre-arranged vaccine appointment which had been arranged in the accused’s presence, before the break-up.
15Ms. Dang stated these encounters heightened her vigilance and contributed to her fear when the subsequent emails arrived in early November.
16The emails began arriving on November 2, 2024. This day, Mr. Pepin‑Jung sent Ms. Dang three emails over the course of the evening, beginning at 6:53 p.m. with the subject line “Please read. I need some closure.” The second followed at 8:31 p.m. with the subject line “Last one for the day and week.” The third was sent at 11:05 p.m. with the subject line “I lied. This is very short. Sorry.” These messages appeared to be part of an effort to compel engagement and “closure,” while also signalling awareness that Ms. Dang might have blocked him and that further emails would follow.
17On November 3, 2024, the accused sent a total of 11 emails. These emails increased sharply in both volume and hostility, with 10 emails sent in short succession beginning at 10:57 a.m. and continuing through to 11:58 am, followed by another at 5:01 p.m. The subject lines illustrate the progression, starting at 10:57 a.m., “Guess this is goodbye con artist”; at 10:58 a.m., “What about my other things?”; at 11:04 a.m., “Let me take a guess, karma”; at 11:07 a.m., “Missing Venini Lamp”; at 11:13 a.m., “Biopsy info, please”; at 11:16 a.m., “Why not...Videos LOL”; at 11:25 a.m., “You completely fucked me”; at 11:30 a.m., “Videos are going for sure if you don’t man up and find your balls”; at 11:35 a.m., “You want to call somebody?”; and at 11:58 a.m., “Nutcracker tickets.” Later that day, at 5:01 p.m., the accused sent “I want all my shit.” In her evidence, Ms. Dang described these communications as one‑sided, increasingly aggressive, and frightening, particularly as they combined insults and accusations with references to the intimate videos and threats about what would occur if she did not respond.
18Of note, the first email received at 10:57 am and the second, received at 10:58 am are identical in content, except for a different subject line. The second though, was sent to Ms. Dang from a different email address than the first. This second email address was one she had never seen before or had as associated to the accused.
19The most explicit threatening content concerned the accused’s references to the intimate videos. These references start in the email sent at 11:13 am where the accused states he still had all the videos she had asked him to delete and that maybe they would make an appearance. The accused mentions them again in the 11:16 am email where he says the videos could go viral. Then in the 11:30 am email he states that “the videos will go up in the future unless u actually face me u cold bitch.” Ms. Dang testified that the prospect of the videos being shared contributed directly to her decision to call 9-1-1. She regarded the dissemination of intimate images as professionally and personally devastating and that she did not trust the accused to refrain from acting on what he was threatening.
20Finally, on November 5, 2024, at 9:45 p.m., Mr. Pepin‑Jung sent a final email with the subject line “I am sorry...No videos...” In that message, he purported to retract the earlier threat, characterizing the reference to videos as a “bluff” made while “angry and emotional,” while also acknowledging his continued access to the videos, which he described as being on WhatsApp, a messaging platform they had used, and assuring Ms. Dang he would not do anything with them.
THE LAW
21There are five essential elements the Crown must prove for a successful prosecution of a criminal harassment charge. These elements were set out by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Kosikar, 1999 3775 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 3569 at paragraph 19 as follows:
It must be established that the accused has engaged in the conduct set out in s. 264(2)(a), (b), (c), or (d) of the Criminal Code.
It must be established that the complainant was harassed;
It must be established that the accused who engaged in such conduct knew that the complainant was harassed or was reckless or wilfully blind as to whether the complainant was harassed;
It must be established that the conduct caused the complainant to fear for her safety or the safety of anyone known to her; and
It must be established that the complainant's fear was, in all of the circumstances, reasonable.
22As well, the Court of Appeal also confirmed in R. v. Szostak 2012 ONCA 503 at par 43, that the fear for safety element does not depend on a complainant uttering formulaic or any particular words such as “I was afraid.” The Court of Appeal upheld a conviction where the element of fear was established through circumstantial evidence, notwithstanding the absence of an express statement by the complainant that she feared for her safety. In practical terms, Szostak supports the proposition that fear can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances proved at trial, what occurred, how the complainant responded, what steps were taken, and the overall context, so long as the inference is supported beyond a reasonable doubt.
ANALYSIS
23In analyzing whether the Crown has proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, I will address in order, each of the five elements the Crown need prove.
24The first element is that the Crown must prove the accused engaged in one or more of the types of conduct set out in s. 264(2)(a) to (d). In this case, the Information particularized the criminal harassing conduct to having occurred on or about November 5, 2024. The way that conduct occurred was not particularized but was prosecuted and defended on the theory it was s. 264(2)(b), repeated communications, relating primarily to the series of emails sent by the accused to the complainant from November 2 to 5, 2024.
25I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proven the first element of the offence, namely that the accused engaged in prohibited conduct under s. 264(2)(b) by repeatedly communicating with Ms. Dang. The evidence establishes a sustained onslaught of emails over a short, concentrated period. Beginning on the evening of November 2, 2024, Mr. Pepin‑Jung sent Ms. Dang three lengthy emails, and on November 3, 2024, he sent a further series of emails, many within minutes of one another, followed by an additional email later that day. He then sent a final email on November 5, 2024. In total, the Crown proved that Mr. Pepin‑Jung sent Ms. Dang fourteen emails in less than twenty‑four hours, followed by a fifteenth email two days later, all of which were one‑sided and went unanswered. Taken together, the volume, frequency, and compressed timing of these emails plainly meet the statutory requirement of repeatedly communicating with the complainant and therefore satisfy the first element of criminal harassment.
26The second element is whether Ms. Dang was harassed by Mr. Pepin-Jung’s repeated communications. The defence has argued the Crown has failed to establish this element of the offence in two ways. First, I should either disbelieve or harbour a doubt about Ms. Dang’s testimony when she says she felt harassed. The second way the defence argues the Crown has failed to establish harassment, is that in the context of this case, Mr. Pepin-Jung’s acts fail to pass the legal threshold for harassment.
27The defence points out the Court of Appeal in R. v. Kosikar at paragraph 25 establishes for the conduct to amount to harassment the Crown must prove the complainant was in a state of feeling harassed in that they felt "tormented, troubled, worried continually or chronically, plagued, bedeviled and badgered". This, the defence argues, imports a minimum temporal aspect to this element of the offence. They argue this feeling of harassment must persist in the complainant for some length of time before a finding of harassment is made out.
28In the context of this case, the defence argue that the harassment was not of sufficient length to meet this minimum timeframe. They note that the emails started November 2 and the threats to release the intimate videos were not made until 11:13 am November 3. Notwithstanding he made several threats to release them over the next hour, he did not and on November 5 at 9:45 pm, he apologized for making the threats and assured Ms. Dang he would not release them.
29When asked in submissions how long the clock had to run before time ran out, counsel would not commit, but argued that the timeframe here, approximately 58 hours from when the threat to release the videos was made on November 3, to when the clock was stopped by his apology on November 5 was not enough. This apology and his assurances he wouldn't release them, so to speak, purged Mr. Pepin-Jung’s harassment. It is for this reason, the defence argues the Crown has failed to prove this second element of the offence.
30Dealing with this second argument first, I find that this interpretation of this element of the offence is wrong. The words "tormented, troubled, worried continually or chronically, plagued, bedeviled and badgered" are adjectives or synonyms describing “harass”. This is not an exhaustive list, there are any number of synonyms that could be used, limited only by our imagination. From a quick google search one could add “pester”, “disturb’ or “vex” to the list.
31As well, these words do not import a minimum period of time in which a victim must experience a sense of harassment before this element of the offence is made out. To read in such a requirement would undermine the protective purpose of the offence.
32The Court of Appeal in the case of R. v. Verdon, 2014 ONCA 807 confronted a similar scenario. In that case, the accused became angry and verbally aggressive toward the complainant. He then blocked her attempts to leave an apartment and when she did manage to leave, he followed her and grabbed by the shoulder. The complainant told the accused to let her go. He did and apologized to her.
33The Court of Appeal in upholding the accused’s conviction based on these facts, noted that criminal harassment can be made out based on a single incident like this. About the apology, which it should be noted in R. v. Verdon was delivered much more swiftly, in fact almost contemporaneously with the harassing act, the court said it “was delivered after the fact and does not cure his conduct”. See: para. 10.
34For these reasons I find the defence’s argument about this element of the offence is not correct and the accused’s apology cannot unscramble the egg he created.
35The primary reason the defence alleges that I should find the Crown has failed to prove Ms. Dang was harassed, was because they allege, she was a deceitful, and wholly incredible witness whose evidence ought not be accepted at any level. Ms. Dang was cross examined extensively and thoroughly over three days. Certain aspects of her testimony were returned to on several occasions and forcefully attacked. Given this, it is important for a careful review and consideration of her evidence.
36In assessing Ms. Dang’s credibility and reliability, I have considered her evidence as a whole, the internal coherence of her testimony, the extent to which it was supported, or contradicted by other evidence, and the specific challenges advanced by the defence. The defence alleged that Ms. Dang exaggerated aspects of her fear, that her memory was selective and at times shifting, and that she had a motive to fabricate or embellish because she was only after the accused’s money or was attempting to insulate herself from being perceived as a “con artist.” The defence also emphasized that she refined parts of her financial evidence about the trip to Italy over the course of the proceedings and urged me to treat those refinements as deliberate dishonesty rather than ordinary fallibility.
37Having watched and heard Ms. Dang testify, I do not accept that her evidence should be rejected on these grounds. I found her demeanour and manner of giving evidence to be careful and, at times, guarded in a way that suggested a genuine effort to be accurate rather than an effort to persuade at all costs. She was frequently attentive to the risk of being misunderstood and would seek clarification of questions, explain the limits of her recollection, and importantly, she corrected herself where she believed she had misstated something or where she worried her answer could be misinterpreted. In my view, a witness’s willingness to qualify, clarify, and correct is not necessarily a badge of deceit. Depending on context it may be a marker of reliability, particularly where the witness does not simply hold the line or double down on an inaccurate detail but instead acknowledges uncertainty or revises evidence when confronted with records. That is what occurred here. While her recollection of certain collateral details, especially dates, sequences, and some amounts, was imperfect, I did not find those imperfections to be strategic. Rather, they were consistent with a witness attempting to recount a stressful relationship and its aftermath while being mindful that precision matters in court.
38The defence theory that Ms. Dang fabricated her complaint for financial advantage is not supported by the evidence. The accused voluntarily attended at his bank and obtained a $24,000 bank draft payable to Ms. Dang. There is no evidence that the draft was procured by duress, threat, or unlawful pressure. Further, the accused’s own conduct following the break-up is inconsistent with the defence depiction of Ms. Dang as a person trying to extract money from him. The evidence included that, in the period when the accused was sending the early‑November emails, he also sent an etransfer in an apparent effort to provoke engagement, and Ms. Dang’s evidence was that she declined or refused it with a message to the effect that she did not want it and did not need it. In addition, the emails of November 2 itself contain the accused’s own offers of money to Ms. Dang, and there is no evidence that she responded to those offers as a means of obtaining further funds. I accept that finances were an ongoing point of conflict between the parties and that financial accusations are interwoven through the accused’s emails, however, that does not establish that Ms. Dang’s complaint was motivated by financial gain, and the objective indicators just described undermine the defence’s theory she was motivated by financial gain and after Mr. Pepin-Jung’s accumulated wealth.
39I also do not accept the defence contention that Ms. Dang lied about what she spent on the parties in Italy in a way that should cause me to reject her evidence generally. There is no dispute that the financial narrative was explored in significant detail, and Ms. Dang did refine aspects of her evidence about amounts. But in my assessment those refinements went primarily to peripheral issues. The central issues in this prosecution are the accused’s post‑break-up conduct. Even if one accepts that Ms. Dang was imprecise at times about certain figures, the objective documentary evidence, being the emails themselves and the uncontested fact of the bank draft being voluntarily obtained and provided, anchors the overall narrative and does not support the inference that she engineered a false accusation to obtain money.
40The defence also challenged Ms. Dang’s stated fear concerning the threatened dissemination of intimate videos by arguing that, because she had seen the accused delete videos on his phone, she could not genuinely or reasonably have feared that he still possessed them. I do not accept that submission. Ms. Dang’s evidence was not that she believed deletion on the accused’s phone guaranteed permanent eradication. Rather, she repeatedly explained that, even if she saw a deletion occur, she remained concerned that copies could exist elsewhere, on the cloud, within applications, or on other storage media such as USB devices. That concern was not speculative; it was buttressed by the accused’s own subsequent words. In his November 3, 2024, emails, he admits he still had the videos she asked him to delete. Then, even in the November 5, email where he attempted retract the threat as a bluff, he further acknowledged he “kind of” still had the videos and that they were “just on WhatsApp,” offering reassurance to her while simultaneously acknowledging he had continued access to the videos. This provides objective support for Ms. Dang’s stated belief that deletion in her presence did not necessarily mean the videos were no longer available to him, and it supports the reasonableness of her ongoing concern about other copies or other means of access.
41Finally, the defence urged me to view Ms. Dang’s fear as exaggerated or opportunistic. Here again, the objective evidence corroborates her account. The accused sent three lengthy emails on November 2, 2024, followed by a rapid‑fire succession on November 3, 2024, many within minutes, and then an additional email on November 5, 2024. These communications included escalating accusations and explicit threats about the videos as leverage to compel her to engage with him. Ms. Dang did not respond to the emails, and the content and compressed timing of the messages are consistent with her description of being overwhelmed, frightened, and placed under pressure by their volume, tone, and threatening content.
42Taking all these considerations together, I conclude that Ms. Dang was a credible witness on the material issues. She testified carefully, demonstrated a concern for accuracy and for avoiding misinterpretation, and corrected herself where she believed she had erred. The defence theory that she was motivated by money is not borne out by the evidence, particularly considering the accused’s voluntary provision of the $24,000 bank draft, and his later efforts to use money as a tool to provoke engagement. I therefore accept and believe Ms. Dang’s evidence on the issues central to this prosecution.
43I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Dang was harassed within the meaning of s. 264, and that the Crown has therefore proven the second element of the offence. The evidence establishes that the accused’s conduct placed Ms. Dang in a state of being tormented, troubled, and badgered, rather than merely annoyed or upset. After the relationship ended, Ms. Dang had disengaged and was not responding to him, yet the accused embarked upon a one‑sided torrent of exceptionally lengthy emails in rapid succession beginning on November 2, 2024, and continuing through November 3, followed by a further email on November 5, 2024. These emails escalated in tone and content, included repeated insults and accusations, and most significantly contained explicit references to intimate videos and threats to disseminate them. Ms. Dang testified that the volume and pace of the emails were overwhelming, that she experienced them as escalating and “unhinged,” and that she felt terrified and frightened as they arrived, particularly given the threatening content and her prior experience of the accused appearing at her home without invitation. In these circumstances, I find that the accused’s repeated, escalating, and unwanted communications amounted to harassment and that Ms. Dang was, in fact, harassed by them.
44I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proven the third element of the offence, namely that the accused had actual knowledge that Ms. Dang was harassed by his conduct. This conclusion flows from the totality of the surrounding circumstances and the content and structure of the accused’s communications. By October 11, 2024, the relationship had ended, Ms. Dang blocked the accused on their usual channels of communication, and she did not resume meaningful communication thereafter. In the weeks that followed, she did not respond to him, and when he attended at her residence and asked to speak with her, the evidence was that she directly told him that she did not want to speak with him.
45Against that backdrop, the accused commenced the November 2 to 5 email barrage. The emails were plainly directed at compelling contact, repeatedly demanding engagement and “closure,” and escalating when no reply was forthcoming. In my view, the accused’s own words demonstrate he knew his communications were unwanted and were having the effect of badgering Ms. Dang. The subject line of his very first email was “Please read. I need some closure,” and immediately began the body of the email with “don’t block my email”, which is not the language of a person who believes the recipient is receptive or participating, but rather of a person who knows there is a barrier and is attempting to overcome it. He continued sending email after email in the absence of any response, and he escalated to insults and explicit threats about intimate videos, including language designed to prompt her to respond. The sheer persistence, the compressed timing, and the escalating tone in the face of silence leads to the overwhelming inference that he knew his conduct was harassing.
46This inference is strengthened by evidence that the accused took steps consistent with an awareness that he was blocked and that his contact was not welcome. The fact that he used more than one email address, including an address Ms. Dang said she did not recognize, further supports the conclusion that he was attempting to ensure his messages reached her despite her efforts to disengage. The accused also sent an etransfer in the same general timeframe as part of his effort to provoke a response, which Ms. Dang declined and returned, stating she did not want it or need it which provided further notice, in practical terms, that she did not wish to engage with him.
47Finally, the accused’s own email language demonstrates his awareness that his behaviour would be perceived as stalking or harassment such statements he made like “You probably also think I tracked your car”, and the inclusion of taunting lines such as “You want to call somebody?” underscores that he understood his conduct was intrusive, alarming, and of a kind that might prompt police involvement.
48I have considered the defence submissions that the accused could not have known his actions were harassing because Ms. Dang did not explicitly and directly tell him, to stop contacting her, and because their historical communication pattern included very lengthy, stream of consciousness type messages and an on‑again/off‑again pattern of breaking up and reconciling. I do not find that these factors raise a reasonable doubt in the circumstances of this case. It is not a legal precondition to a finding of knowledge that a complainant must expressly utter the words do not contact me again, and, in any event, the circumstantial indicators here overwhelmingly point to knowledge.
49Most importantly, this time was materially different from the earlier on‑again/off‑again pattern. There was a longer period of non‑communication after October 11 than in prior break‑up cycles, Ms. Dang was not responding at all, and the accused knew or strongly suspected he was blocked, as reflected in his own opening remarks and his conduct in using alternative email addresses. The very fact that he repeatedly pleaded for engagement, warned her not to block him, and escalated when she remained silent demonstrates he understood she was not participating and did not welcome the contact. I therefore find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge that his repeated communications were harassing Ms. Dang.
50I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s conduct caused Ms. Dang to fear for her safety, and the Crown has therefore proven the fourth element of the offence. In reaching that conclusion, I have considered both Ms. Dang’s testimony describing her reaction to the emails and the content of those emails themselves. Ms. Dang testified that the volume and rapid succession of the emails were overwhelming, that the tone was escalating, and that the threats concerning her intimate videos were a principal reason she became frightened and decided to involve police. Her evidence about fear is also supported by the broader context she described, including her post‑break-up vigilance after the accused attended at her residence without invitation on more than one occasion, including an attendance while she was away that was captured by her home video system.
51I arrive at this conclusion even though, as the defence emphasized, Ms. Dang’s initial statement to police did not expressly state she feared for her safety. She spoke then about reputational concerns, specifically, that her biggest fear being that the accused was trying to portray her as a con artist, manipulator or gaslighter. However, the absence of an explicit expression of fear in an early statement is not determinative. Fear for safety may be proven by the whole of the evidence and by reasonable inferences from the circumstances, including the content of the communications and the complainant’s conduct and reactions, even where the complainant’s initial account may be framed about other concerns. In this case, Ms. Dang’s reputational fear was not disconnected from safety concerns, it formed part of her evidence about being placed under pressure and feeling vulnerable to harm, including professional and personal harm, in circumstances where the accused was escalating and threatening to publicize intimate material.
52Further, I reject any suggestion that fear for safety under s. 264 is limited to apprehension of immediate physical violence. The jurisprudence recognizes that criminal harassment can cause profound psychological harm. That understanding is consistent with the way harassment offences operate in practice, the gravamen is often the victim’s lived experience of being intimidated, destabilized, and made to feel unsafe in their daily life. In R. v. Doherty, 2012 ONCA 855, for example, the Court of Appeal recognized the significant mental impact criminal harassment can have on victims, noting that the complainant suffered mentally and physically and was “terrified,” illustrating that the harm addressed by s. 264 is not confined to physical injury. (See: paragraphs 12 to 15).
53Finally, I accept Ms. Dang’s evidence that the threats regarding the intimate videos were particularly frightening, and I find that fear was genuine and causally connected to the accused’s conduct. The defence argued that she could not have truly feared dissemination because she had seen the accused delete videos on his phone. But Ms. Dang’s evidence was that, even after witnessing those deletions, she remained concerned he had retained other copies or could still access the videos elsewhere, and that concern was borne out by the accused’s subsequent November 3 emails and specifically the November 5 email indicating that he still had the videos on WhatsApp even as he attempted to walk back his prior threats. Taken together, the escalating barrage of emails, the explicit threat to distribute intimate material, and the surrounding context amply establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s conduct caused Ms. Dang to fear for her safety within the meaning of s. 264.
54I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Dang’s fear, in all the circumstances, was reasonable. The test is an objective one, whether a reasonable person in Ms. Dang’s circumstances would have feared for their safety, considering the full context in which the accused’s conduct occurred. Here, the accused’s post‑break-up conduct was not confined to a single, isolated communication. Ms. Dang had ended the relationship and was disengaging, nonetheless, the accused attended at her residence without invitation on more than one occasion. Those attendances formed part of the broader circumstances informing how a reasonable person would experience the later, rapid escalation in email communications. In my view, any reasonable person in Ms. Dang’s position, having ended the relationship, having experienced uninvited attendances at their home, and then being confronted with an overwhelming, one‑sided, and escalating flood of communications, would reasonably feel intimidated and unsafe.
55Most significantly, the accused’s explicit threats regarding intimate videos would, on any objective assessment, cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety, including their psychological and emotional safety. The emails did not merely express anger or hurt feelings, they escalated to threats to disseminate videos of a very intimate nature if Ms. Dang did not engage. Ms. Dang testified that she is a private person working in a professional field and that the threatened dissemination of intimate images was profoundly alarming. The evidence goes on to support that her concern was not merely speculative. A reasonable person who receives a direct threat that intimate videos will be posted online, particularly from a former intimate partner who knows where they live and has recently attended at their home uninvited, would reasonably fear the consequences and reasonably feel unsafe. Accordingly, I find that Ms. Dang’s fear in the circumstances was reasonable, and the Crown has proven the fifth element beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
56In concluding, I find the Crown has proven all five elements of criminal harassment beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused engaged in repeated, unwanted, and escalating communications that amounted to harassment, he knew his conduct was harassing, it caused Ms. Dang to fear for her safety, and that fear was reasonable in all the circumstances. Mr. Pepin‑Jung is guilty as charged.
Released: April 16, 2026
Signed: Justice Robert S. Gee