WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1,172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
RYAN BARRETT
Before Justice Robert S. Gee
Heard on March 23, 24, 26 and 30, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on June 15, 2026
Raymond Woloshyn-Chick counsel for the Crown
Willow Petersen and Naomi Grekol-Herlich……………………………..for the accused
INTRODUCTION
1The accused, Ryan Barrett is charged with one count of sexual interference and one count of sexual assault for each of three complainants who have made similar allegations against him. All the complainants were in Grade 6 at a Hamilton area elementary school where the accused taught French. The incidents are alleged to have occurred in the school hallways, between classes or when students were entering or exiting the school from recess or the lunch period. The evidence is that the hallways at these times were crowded and somewhat tightly confined. Each complainant alleges that she was touched on the buttocks by the accused. The accused denies any intentional touching and maintains that any contact, should it have occurred, was inadvertent and a product of these crowded conditions.
CROWN CROSS COUNT SIMILAR FACT APPLICATION
2Before turning to the ultimate issue of whether the Crown has met its burden, the Crown’s cross count similar fact evidence application should be addressed. The Crown seeks to rely on the evidence of each complainant to support the allegations of the other complainants. The Crown submits that the evidence is highly probative of the issue of intent, and to rebut the defence position that any contact was accidental. The defence opposes the application, arguing that the similarities may arise from discussion among the complainants and that the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value.
3The principles governing admissibility of such evidence are well established and were set out by the Supreme Court in the case of R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908. The starting point is that the evidence of each complainant is presumptively inadmissible to support the evidence of other complainants. This is due to the risk that it invites improper propensity reasoning. It may only be admitted where its probative value, considered in light of the issue in dispute, outweighs its prejudicial effect. In this case, the key issue is not the identity of the perpetrator. The central issue is whether the touching, if it occurred, was intentional as alleged by the Crown or accidental as suggested by the defence. The Crown relies on the repetition and similarity of the alleged conduct to argue that these are not isolated incidental contacts occurring in a crowded environment, but rather a pattern of intentional touching.
4There are, in my view, significant similarities among the accounts. Each complainant described an incident occurring in a crowded hallway during a period of heavy student traffic. Each describes contact to the same area of the body, namely the buttocks. Each described the contact as being made by a hand. Each placed the accused in close proximity at the time of the contact and described him as moving away quickly thereafter. There is also evidence in each account of some form of post-contact awareness, whether in the form of looking back or, in the case of C.M., a statement that the contact was accidental.
5In the accounts of N.N. and I.M., both describe a two-stage interaction consisting of an initial light touch followed, after a short interval as they continued walking, by a second contact that they described as more deliberate, a “squish” or squeeze. C.M.’s description differs somewhat in that she describes a sweeping motion rather than two distinct contacts, but she too identifies the contact as involving fingers and palm.
6These similarities are clearly probative on the issue of intent. Repeated contact to the same part of the body, in similar circumstances and in at least two cases involving a second contact, tends to rebut the suggestion of accidental brushing. The pattern is not one that would be expected to arise frequently by coincidence.
7I have also considered carefully the issue of collusion or contamination. There is no question that the complainants spoke with one another about the incidents. They were classmates and, friends. The evidence establishes that they discussed their experiences in informal settings, including on the bus and at school, and later in a more organized setting when they approached a teacher to report what had occurred. These discussions included sharing the fact that something similar had happened, though not necessarily all the details.
8However, as the Supreme Court also held in R. v. Shearing, 2002 SCC 58, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 33, communication among witnesses does not, necessarily amount to collusion. The issue is whether there is a realistic possibility that the similarities in their accounts are the product of influence rather than independent recollection. These complainants were young students and friends, attempting to make sense of experiences they found confusing and uncomfortable. It is entirely natural that they would speak to one another. There is no evidence of any agreement or plan to fabricate allegations. The accounts are similar, but not identical. They differ in sequence, detail, and perception. Those differences are inconsistent with the suggestion of collusion and instead support the conclusion that the accounts are independently derived. I am therefore satisfied that the similarities are not the product of improper influence and that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. The application is granted. The evidence of each complainant is admissible across all counts.
ANALYSIS
9Turning to the evidence, C.M. described walking in a crowded hallway where students were closely packed together. She felt what she described as a sweeping motion across her buttocks, involving what she perceived to be fingers and palm, and she immediately turned to see the accused walking quickly away. She recalled that he stated that the contact was accidental before continuing. She was careful in her evidence to distinguish what she felt from what she observed, acknowledging that she did not see the moment of contact itself. She was also candid about details she could not recall. Despite rigorous cross-examination on the crowded nature of the hallway and the possibility of incidental contact, she maintained that the nature of what she experienced was not consistent with an accidental brush.
10N.N. and I.M. each described a sequence involving two contacts. N.N. testified that she felt an initial touch while walking in a busy hallway, followed some seconds later by a more distinct “squish.” She accepted that she was initially uncertain about the meaning of the first contact but testified that the second contact was qualitatively different and caused her concern. I.M. described a similar progression, initially dismissing the first contact as possibly incidental before experiencing a second, more pronounced squeeze. Both were candid under cross-examination, acknowledging the crowded conditions and the potential for incidental contact, but neither retreated from the position that the second contact stood out as different in character.
11Approximately three to four months before the allegations arose, the accused gave I.M. a form of discipline for talking during class. This was referred to as a “think sheet”. This incident was upsetting to her, and the other complainants were aware she received it. The defence suggestion was that this created frustration or animus toward the accused that could explain the allegations. Each complainant acknowledged the think sheet as an unpleasant but ordinary classroom interaction. None accepted that it motivated their complaints, and their responses were consistent, measured, and not defensive. I am satisfied that the think sheet did not create any motive to fabricate nor was it in any way a factor in the allegations being made. The nature of the disciplinary interaction was routine and unremarkable in a school setting and does not reasonably support an inference of fabrication.
12I found each complainant to be credible. Their accounts were sincere, internally consistent, and marked by appropriate concessions where memory was uncertain. I accept that each of them was touched as she described.
13The accused testified and denied any intentional touching. He also indicated he has neurodevelopmental issues that effect his speech, facial expressions and can make him hypersensitive to some sounds. One way he deals with this is to sometimes wear noise cancelling headphones. He described the hallways as crowded and at times chaotic, with students moving in close proximity. He acknowledged that incidental contact could and does occur in those conditions. He did not recall the specific incidents but maintained that any contact would have been accidental. In cross-examination, he was challenged directly on the pattern alleged by the complainants. He did not waver in his testimony and, reiterated that the environment was one in which incidental contact was common. His evidence was not obviously flawed nor inherently implausible and was consistent with the overall description of the environment given by the complainants themselves.
14I pause here to emphasize that this was a difficult case and, in my view, a close one. The Crown’s case, particularly as supported by the similar fact evidence, is strong. It is a natural human reaction to conclude that where multiple complainants independently describe similar experiences, those experiences must not only be real but intentional. However, the task of a trial judge in a criminal case is not to determine which version is more persuasive, nor to reason that multiple similar allegations must equate to proof of guilt, but to assess whether the Crown has proven each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt.
15The Supreme Court of Canada has recently reaffirmed this principle in R. v. Berg, 2026 SCC 21. In that case, the Court emphasized that a criminal conviction cannot rest simply on choosing one witness’s account over another. The Court cautioned against reasoning that effectively transforms a trial into a credibility contest, where the trier of fact convicts because they prefer or accept the complainant’s evidence. It made clear that the presumption of innocence requires more. Even where the complainant’s evidence is accepted, the trier of fact must still be satisfied, on the whole of the evidence, that guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and must not reject the accused’s evidence because the Crown’s evidence appears more compelling.
16The Court in Berg also clarified the proper use of the Court of Appeal decision in R. v. J.J.R.D., 2006 CanLII 40088 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 4749 and warned against treating that case as a licence to convict based on a “considered and reasoned acceptance” of the complainant’s testimony alone. Doing so risks reversing the burden of proof and undermining the W.(D.)1 framework. The proper approach remains to assess all the evidence and to determine whether the Crown has discharged its burden, not to decide which account is more credible in isolation.
17Those principles are directly at play here. I have accepted that the complainants were truthful and that the touching occurred. I have also accepted that the similarities among their accounts are real and probative. However, those findings do not end the analysis. I must still determine whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching was intentional.
18In that regard, the context remains critical. The events occurred in crowded hallways where proximity between individuals was unavoidable, and movement was constant. None of the complainants observed the moment of contact directly; rather, they inferred its source based on proximity and surrounding circumstances. While the similar fact evidence strongly supports an inference of intent, it does not eliminate all reasonable doubt, particularly when considered alongside the possibility of inadvertent contact in such conditions.
19The accused’s evidence, even though not wholly accepted, raises a reasonable possibility that the touching, though real, was not intentional. That possibility is based not on speculation, but in the very circumstances described by the complainants themselves. The similar fact evidence reduces the likelihood of coincidence, however, it does not exclude, to the level required in a criminal trial, a reasonable possibility that the contact, though real and understandably perceived as deliberate, may have occurred inadvertently in the circumstances described.
20It is important to be clear about the nature of this finding. This is not a finding that the accused did not touch the complainants. Nor is it a rejection of their evidence. It is a finding that the Crown has not proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the touching was intentional. That distinction is fundamental. The criminal standard is exacting by design, and where a reasonable doubt remains on an essential element, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused.
CONCLUSION
21In the end, after carefully considering the evidence as a whole, I am left with a reasonable doubt on the essential issue of intent. While I accept that each of the complainants was touched in the manner they described, and while I recognize the significance of the similarities in their accounts, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proven that those touches were intentional. The standard of proof in a criminal case is a high one, and it is not eased by the strength or sincerity of the evidence where a reasonable doubt remains upon the totality of that evidence. In these circumstances, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused. Accordingly, on each count before me, the accused is found not guilty.
Released: June 15, 2026
Signed: Justice Robert S. Gee
Footnotes
- R. v. W.(D.) 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742