Kally Ho

This judgment concerns the trial of Evan Dunlop-Dewar on sexual assault charges.

The court first provided reasons for preliminary rulings, including the severance of counts and the exclusion of the defendant's statement due to Charter Section 10(b) breaches and involuntariness.

Regarding the October 30th sexual assault allegation, the court found significant difficulties with the complainant's credibility and reliability, noting inconsistencies in her testimony, under-reporting of drug use, and evasive demeanour under cross-examination.

Despite forensic evidence of sexual contact, the Crown failed to prove the essential element of lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, as there was no direct evidence and circumstantial evidence did not establish incapacity.

The defendant was acquitted on counts 2, 3, and 4.

A five-year common-law peace bond was imposed, prohibiting contact and association with the complainant, with specific geographic considerations for their shared industry.

The appellant, Joseph Scott Hill, appealed his conviction and sentence for destroying or harvesting prescribed trees contrary to a Haldimand County by-law.

The appeal challenged the trial Justice of the Peace's interpretation of the "own use" exception and alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant also sought a reduced fine and restitution.

The court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the "own use" interpretation and no factual basis for the ineffective assistance claim.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request for costs, deeming the appeal not to meet the high threshold for a cost award.

Following a jury conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, the court conducted the required post-verdict fact-finding exercise and accepted the complainant's evidence in its entirety, including repeated forced anal, oral, and vaginal penetration, choking, degrading conduct, and profound long-term psychological harm.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence were paramount given the manipulative and degrading nature of the offence, while also recognizing the offender's lack of prior record, family support, work history, and rehabilitation prospects.

A defence forensic psychiatric opinion was not accepted as a reliable basis to conclude the offender posed a low future risk or lacked a paraphilic disorder.

Collateral consequences, including loss of career, public notoriety, and exposure to a civil claim, were considered but given limited weight.

A penitentiary sentence of five years and mandatory ancillary orders were imposed.

On a Crown application during a jury trial for sexual offences involving two complainants, the court considered whether cross-count similar fact reasoning could be left with the jury.

Applying the framework in Handy, the court held the allegations disclosed a sufficiently specific and distinctive pattern, including the surrounding context, degrading acts, and post-incident conduct, such that coincidence was objectively improbable.

The court found the probative value of the proposed similar fact reasoning outweighed both moral and reasoning prejudice, which could be managed by instruction.

The application was granted and a cross-count similar fact instruction would be given.

Prior to a jury trial for sexual assault, the defence brought several evidentiary motions.

The defence sought to exclude evidence of the accused's prior sexual communications with a complainant, renew an application for severance of counts, and exclude a PowerPoint presentation prepared by the Crown's expert witness on the neurobiology of trauma.

The court admitted the communications evidence, finding it essential to the narrative and the Crown's similar fact application.

The court dismissed the renewed severance application, concluding the accused's intention to testify did not undermine the viability of the similar fact evidence.

The court permitted the expert to use the PowerPoint presentation with specific modifications to prevent prejudice.

Finally, the court expanded the opening jury instructions to address nonconscious bias and false assumptions regarding consent.