L.P. Thibideau

The applicant sought to withdraw his guilty plea to sexual assault, arguing that the plea was not voluntary, not unequivocal, not informed, and that he did not understand the legal consequences.

The applicant claimed he believed he was pleading to a lesser charge related to photographs rather than sexual assault itself.

The court rejected the application, finding that the applicant was fully informed of the charge, the Crown's evidence, and the consequences of his plea.

The court found the applicant's evidence lacked credibility and was contradicted by written instructions, the preliminary hearing record, and the applicant's own conduct in court.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, contrary to sections 253.1(a) and 253.1(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence raised a Charter application challenging whether provincial offence officers were acting as peace officers and whether there were breaches of the right to counsel and the "as soon as practicable" requirement for breath sample demands.

The court found that the provincial offence officers were not peace officers for Charter purposes, that there was no breach of the right to counsel, and that the breath sample demand was made as soon as practicable.

The court convicted the accused on both charges based on the totality of evidence demonstrating impairment.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime (money over $5,000).

The Crown relied on expert evidence regarding the quantity of cocaine seized (104 grams packaged in four separate baggies), drug paraphernalia (scale, spoon, baggies), cash found in the residence, and a recorded telephone conversation.

The defence argued the cocaine was for personal use and that much of the money found belonged to the accused's partner.

The trial judge found that key facts relied upon by the Crown's expert were not proven at trial, significantly diminishing the probative value of the expert opinion.

The court found reasonable doubt existed regarding the trafficking charges and convicted only on simple possession.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking contrary to section 5(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and possession of a prohibited weapon.

The weapons charge was withdrawn during trial.

The Crown alleged that the accused possessed cocaine for trafficking purposes based on surveillance evidence showing him driving a rental vehicle in suspicious circumstances, his tenancy of an apartment where drugs and paraphernalia were found, and the presence of a scale in his bedroom.

The defence argued that the Crown had not proven the requisite knowledge and control for constructive possession, and that other occupants of the apartment could have been responsible for the drugs.

The court found that while the Crown established a drug trafficking operation existed at the apartment, the circumstantial evidence permitted reasonable exculpatory inferences regarding the accused's knowledge and control of the drugs, particularly given the possibility that drugs were recently deposited by another occupant and the limited visibility of drugs from the accused's bedroom.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed on his apartment on the grounds that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The applicant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and possession of a prohibited weapon following the seizure of 156.5 grams of cocaine and brass knuckles from his apartment.

The court examined the sufficiency of the ITO content, considering the credibility and reliability of three confidential informants, the degree of corroboration by police surveillance, and the quality of the investigation.

Despite identifying deficiencies in the ITO including incomplete criminal record disclosure and reliance on unproven informants, the court found that the totality of the circumstances provided sufficient reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The accused was charged with obstructing police and assaulting a police officer in resisting the arrest of her son.

The Crown alleged the accused physically interfered with an officer's lawful arrest of her son for armed robbery.

The defence argued the arrest was unlawful because the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that while the officer held a subjective belief in reasonable and probable grounds, the objective review revealed non-inculpatory factors (presence of an accompanying adult, appropriate behaviour of the suspect, unknown duration of association) that were not considered.

The court concluded the arrest was unlawful and therefore the officer was not engaged in lawful execution of duty.

The accused was acquitted of both charges, and the court found her actions constituted lawful defence of her son under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood on March 8, 2015, in St. Catharines.

The defence raised Charter applications alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) during the roadside investigation and arrest process, arguing that delays in making the approved screening device demand and providing right to counsel information breached the "forthwith" requirement.

The court found Charter breaches but admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a conviction.

The applicant mother sought retroactive child support for three children under a 1997 separation agreement, arguing that the respondent father failed to properly index child support payments to account for his income increases.

The father argued that he had complied with the agreement's indexing formula (the lesser of income increase or CPI increase) and that the mother had not provided clear notice of her intention to seek guideline support until 2012.

The court found that the father's interpretation of the agreement was reasonable, that the mother had received sufficient income information over the years, and that the delay in seeking retroactive support was unreasonable.

The court awarded retroactive support for only the three-year period prior to formal notice in 2012, fixing arrears at $2,318.00 and ongoing support at $904.00 per month for the remaining dependent child.

The applicant mother sought court approval for auto transplantation dental surgery for her daughter Juliana, who had lost three front teeth in a boating accident.

The respondent father opposed the procedure and favored waiting until the child reached maturity to undergo traditional dental implants.

The court found that the mother, as the primary custodial parent who had taken initiative in obtaining professional assistance, had the authority to make this medical decision.

The court approved the auto transplantation procedure, finding it to be a scientifically valid option with comparable success rates to the alternative procedure, and that it was in the best interests of the child.

A custody and access trial involving two young children born to unmarried parents who cohabited at the paternal grandparents' home before separating in January 2011.

The father sought sole custody with alternate weekend access to the mother; the mother sought sole custody with specific weekly access and child support from the father.

The court awarded sole custody to the father based on his more stable lifestyle, superior parenting regime, and demonstrated commitment to the children's welfare, while granting the mother significant access on alternate weekends and holidays.

The court found that the father's structured parenting approach was more beneficial than the mother's less supervised approach, and that the children responded better behaviorally in the father's care.

The court terminated the father's child support obligation as of September 1, 2012.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under the Child and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant apprehended a child based on allegations of physical and emotional abuse in the home where the child resided with his mother and the V. family.

The matter was resolved within two months through a consent order and subsequent supervision services agreement, with the application withdrawn.

The mother sought costs against the Society.

The court dismissed the costs claim, finding that the Society conducted a thorough investigation, acted fairly and reasonably, and properly reassessed its position as new information became available.

The court held that the Society's conduct met the standard of fairness expected of child protection agencies.