Jeffrey R. Manishen

Two paramedics were convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life after misdiagnosing a fatal gunshot wound as a superficial BB gun injury and failing to transport the victim to a trauma hospital immediately.

The Crown sought a 2.5-year penitentiary sentence, arguing that uncharged offences like manslaughter should be considered aggravating factors.

The court rejected this argument, finding it fundamentally unfair since the Crown chose the specific charge.

Balancing the offenders' high moral blameworthiness for failing to follow their training against their lack of criminal records, positive community support, and the collateral consequences of their convictions, the court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence for each offender.

The appellant was acquitted by jury of second degree murder after shooting a man he found breaking into his truck, claiming self-defence.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury to consider the appellant's role in the incident under s. 34(2)(c) of the Criminal Code as a factor bearing on the reasonableness of his use of lethal force.

The majority held that the phrase 'the person's role in the incident' in s. 34(2)(c) captures the accused's conduct throughout the incident from beginning to end, without requiring that the conduct be unlawful, provocative or morally blameworthy.

The omission of this instruction was a material error that had a bearing on the acquittal, warranting a new trial.

The appeal was dismissed with Côté J. dissenting on the question of materiality.

The accused paramedics were charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life to a 19-year-old gunshot victim.

Upon arriving at the scene, the accused failed to recognize the victim had suffered a penetrating wound to the abdomen, instead concluding he was experiencing a psychiatric issue and had been shot by a BB gun.

They delayed transport, performed inappropriate lifts, and failed to take the victim to a lead trauma hospital.

The court found their actions constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of reasonably trained paramedics, endangering the victim's life.

Both accused were found guilty.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the accused applied to introduce character evidence of the deceased to support a claim of self-defence.

The accused had shot the deceased, who was attempting to steal his truck, and claimed the deceased made a threatening gesture as if holding a gun.

The proposed evidence included the deceased's prior convictions for fleeing police, outstanding property charges, a withdrawn assault charge, and photographs of the deceased with weapons.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence did not demonstrate a propensity for violence or the use of weapons, and its admission would not legitimately assist the jury while risking prejudice.

The Crown applied to admit statements made by the accused during a police interview following his arrest for murder.

The accused had shot a person attempting to steal his truck.

During the interview, the accused repeatedly asserted his right to remain silent based on legal advice.

The interviewing officer continued questioning, suggesting that explaining his actions could result in a lesser charge or support a claim of self-defence.

The court found that the officer's tactics constituted an implied inducement, overcoming the accused's will to remain silent.

The Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and the statements were ruled inadmissible.

The applicant, a police officer charged with fabricating evidence and obstructing justice, was severed from her co-accused.

Prior to her own trial, the Crown subpoenaed her to testify at the trial of her co-accused.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that compelling her to testify breached her right to remain silent and constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the predominant purpose of calling her was not to obtain incriminating evidence for her own trial, and that any prejudice was cured by the statutory protections against derivative use of compelled testimony under section 13 of the Charter and section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The applicant, a police officer charged with obstructing justice and fabricating evidence, sought a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of solicitor-client privilege.

During the investigation, her seized cell phone revealed text messages with a lawyer retained by the police association.

The court found the investigators' review and subsequent disclosure of these messages to co-accused was inadvertent and minimal.

Applying the tests from Regan and O'Connor, the court concluded there was no prejudice to the applicant's right to a fair trial and dismissed the application for a stay.

The accused, a police officer, was committed to stand trial on charges of obstructing justice and fabricating evidence, but discharged on two other counts of fabricating evidence following a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown subsequently added two counts of forgery to the indictment based on the same evidence, pursuant to section 574(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought an application to quash the two new counts.

The court dismissed the application regarding one count, finding sufficient evidence of a false notebook entry, but granted the application to quash the second count, concluding that the evidence regarding the condition of a Provincial Offence Notice was too speculative to support a forgery charge.

During long‑term offender sentencing proceedings, the defence sought to qualify a psychotherapist as an expert in the risk assessment of sexual offenders.

The proposed expert had administered certain assessment tools and prepared reports concerning the accused’s treatment and recidivism risk.

The court applied the admissibility criteria for expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and examined the witness’s qualifications, training, and professional background.

The judge concluded that the witness lacked sufficient training and expertise in risk assessment methodology to qualify as an expert in that field.

The witness was permitted to testify about treatment methods and testing used in therapy but was prohibited from providing opinion evidence on the accused’s risk of sexual recidivism.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice which held that the Crown could not appeal a judicial stay of proceedings under the Provincial Offences Act, but rather had to proceed by way of certiorari.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's reasoning in Jewitt to find that a judicial stay is tantamount to a dismissal.

Therefore, the Crown has a right of appeal under section 116(1)(b) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the accused's conviction for impaired driving.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge erred in law by re-weighing the evidence regarding whether the police officer had objective reasonable grounds to make a breath demand.

The trial judge's finding that reasonable grounds existed, based on a civilian tip and the officer's observations of swaying, odour of alcohol, and bloodshot eyes, was reasonably open to him.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.