Johanna McNulty

The plaintiff sued for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale, alleging the defendants acted in bad faith by relying on a solicitor approval condition to annul the deal.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking a ruling that the defendants impliedly waived solicitor-client privilege by pleading they acted in good faith on their solicitor's advice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants did not base their defence on their state of mind, but merely answered the bad faith claim, and that the solicitor approval clause gave them an absolute right to cancel without waiving privilege over the solicitor's reasons.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of defence to withdraw an admission that they had entered into a conditional agreement of purchase and sale for a farm.

The plaintiff opposed the withdrawal.

The court applied the three-part test for withdrawing an admission and found that the proposed amendment raised a triable issue, as one of the three joint tenants had not signed the agreement.

The court also found that the admission was inadvertent and that there was no prejudice to the plaintiff, who had known from the beginning that the document was missing a signature.

The motion was granted.

The defendant moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) obtained ex parte by the plaintiffs on property located at 4684 Bartlett Road, Beamsville, Ontario.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts in their ex parte application, including prior construction lien proceedings, the non-perfection of the lien, and misleading statements about payment for the property.

The court also determined that the plaintiffs' claim was for liquidated damages under a construction contract, not a triable issue regarding an "interest in land" required for a CPL.

Consequently, the CPL was discharged due to non-disclosure and the absence of a valid interest in land claim.

The defendants hired the plaintiff to construct a modular home.

A dispute arose, and the plaintiff registered a construction lien.

The defendants obtained an order vacating the lien upon posting security and subsequently brought a motion to have the security returned, arguing the lien was not perfected within the statutory timelines under the Construction Lien Act.

The court found that the contract was abandoned at the latest on December 2, 2017, and since the statement of claim was issued more than 90 days later, the lien expired.

The court ordered the return of the security to the defendants.

The appellant mortgaged a golf course property to the respondent for $2,700,000.

After the appellant defaulted on the mortgage, the respondent obtained a default judgment for foreclosure and took possession of the property.

The appellant subsequently moved to set aside the default judgment and sought relief from forfeiture.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable prospect of payment, no evidence of ability to redeem, and no special circumstances warranting equitable intervention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, distinguishing the case from Winters v. Hunking on the basis that the appellant provided no appraisal evidence of property value or equity, the property was investment property rather than a family homestead, and the appellant's delay was inadequately explained.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion, the responding party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle and allegations of improper conduct.

The court found that the offer to settle did not strictly comply with Rule 49.10(1) because it included undeterminable costs, and the moving party's conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

Applying the principles of fair and reasonable costs, the court reduced the responding party's claimed hours for preparation and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $27,000.

The applicant mother sought parental support under section 32 of the Family Law Act from her adult daughter, claiming a need for $3,000 per month.

The applicant alleged she had provided care and support to the respondent from birth until age 16, when the respondent chose to live with her father.

The respondent opposed the claim and sought a restraining order, alleging a history of physical and emotional abuse, alienation from her father, exposure to domestic violence, and ongoing harassment including criminal charges and civil litigation.

The court found the applicant had not established entitlement to parental support on the basis of need, had not provided adequate care or support given the emotional and psychological abuse inflicted on the respondent, and that the applicant's unconscionable conduct constituted an obvious gross repudiation of the mother-daughter relationship.

The court dismissed the parental support claim and granted a restraining order.