Naaila Sangrar

The appellants and respondents own subdivided properties near Lake Ontario.

The appellants own a strip of land subject to an easement granting the respondents pedestrian access to use and enjoy the shores of Lake Ontario.

The appellants sought a declaration that the easement restricted the respondents to ingress and egress, and that 'shores' meant the area between the high and low water marks.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the respondents could use the grassy area of the strip for recreational activities.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred by relying on inadmissible subjective intent evidence.

The Court declared the easement restricts the respondents to pedestrian access for ingress and egress to the shores, defined as the land between the high and low water marks.

The applicant, Mississauga Hardware Centre Inc., sought interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief to compel the respondent, Prombank Investment Limited, to remove barriers restricting access to a shopping plaza.

Mississauga Hardware alleged breaches of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, the doctrine of non-derogation from grant, and the landlord's duty to act in good faith.

Prombank asserted its contractual right to control plaza access, arguing the restrictions were a reasonable response to parking issues caused by a neighbouring business and that the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or mitigate losses.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions and found no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunction.

The application was dismissed, with the court finding Prombank's actions to be a measured and reasonable response to the parking problems.

The applicants and respondents own neighbouring properties subdivided from a single parcel.

The respondents hold an easement over a strip of the applicants' land for pedestrian access to 'use and enjoy the shores of Lake Ontario'.

The applicants sought a declaration limiting the respondents' use to mere ingress and egress to the water.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the surrounding circumstances at the time the easement was created, including the zoning of the strip as an open space private park, indicated an intention to allow recreational use such as sitting and enjoying the view, rather than just passing through.

The defendant moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) obtained ex parte by the plaintiffs on property located at 4684 Bartlett Road, Beamsville, Ontario.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts in their ex parte application, including prior construction lien proceedings, the non-perfection of the lien, and misleading statements about payment for the property.

The court also determined that the plaintiffs' claim was for liquidated damages under a construction contract, not a triable issue regarding an "interest in land" required for a CPL.

Consequently, the CPL was discharged due to non-disclosure and the absence of a valid interest in land claim.

This case involved two applications heard together concerning an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a condominium unit.

The purchasers (Deangelis) sought specific performance, while the vendor (Weldan) sought a declaration that the agreement was validly terminated, forfeiture of the deposit, discharge of a Certificate of Pending Litigation, and damages.

The purchasers failed to close the transaction on the agreed-upon date due to a lack of funds, despite the agreement containing a "time of the essence" clause.

The court found no evidence of bad faith on the vendor's part and upheld the vendor's right to terminate the agreement due to the purchasers' anticipatory breach and failure to close.

The court declared the agreement validly terminated, the deposit forfeited, and ordered the purchasers to vacate the property.

In an estate dispute between siblings, the estate trustee moved to dismiss an application requiring an accounting of estate assets on the basis of delay.

The delay resulted largely from the applicant’s former lawyer, who had misled the client and failed to advance the proceeding while suffering from severe personal and mental health issues.

The court held that the delay was adequately explained, the applicant intended to pursue the claim, and the moving party had also failed to take steps to advance the matter or his own related motion regarding a purported will.

The court further found no non-compensable prejudice resulting from the delay.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to dismiss the application.

The appellant real estate brokerage appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for $17,850 in unpaid commission.

The trial judge had found the evidence of both parties lacked credibility and concluded that a side deal existed between the appellant's agent and the respondent, leading to the dismissal of the claim.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of review for findings of fact and credibility, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's decision.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant purchasers appealed the dismissal of their action regarding failed real estate transactions.

On the closing date, the vendor respondents tendered closing documents based on their interpretation of the purchase price, while the purchasers did not tender and admitted they lacked funds to close.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the vendors' interpretation of the purchase price was incorrect, the difference was insignificant and did not constitute a material defect in tender.

Because time was of the essence and the purchasers were not in a position to close, the trial judge did not err in dismissing the action.

The applicants sought a court order under s. 7(3)(c) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) permitting disclosure of members’ personal information in connection with an asset purchase transaction between two credit unions.

The disclosure was required so the purchasing credit union could assume deposits, mortgages, and loan accounts of the selling credit union’s members.

The court held that obtaining individual consent from hundreds of members was impractical and that the purchaser maintained privacy policies at least as stringent as those of the vendor.

Prior similar court orders were reviewed, demonstrating a consistent judicial approach to permitting such disclosures.

The court granted the order authorizing disclosure and continued use of the information solely to implement the transaction.