8 total
Motion to amend pleadings and compel discovery seven years after setting down for trial largely dismissed.
The plaintiff insured brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of claim, for a further and better affidavit of documents, and to compel answers to undertakings, over seven years after setting the action down for trial.
The defendant insurer brought a cross-motion to compel answers to undertakings.
The court denied the plaintiff leave to amend the statement of claim, finding the proposed amendments would radically change the nature of the claim and cause non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.
The court also dismissed the motions to compel answers to undertakings, finding both parties had waived or satisfied their rights.
The court ordered the defendant to produce two witness statements but found the remaining requested documents were protected by litigation privilege.
Class action settlement approved where travel insurers paid 100% of claims for COVID-cancelled trips.
The plaintiffs brought an omnibus motion for certification, settlement approval, notice approval, discontinuance against one defendant, and class counsel fee approval in a proposed class action regarding cancelled educational trips due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The defendants, travel insurers, agreed to pay 100% of the claims submitted by the class members.
The court granted certification for settlement purposes, approved the settlement as fair and reasonable, approved the notice plan nunc pro tunc, allowed the discontinuance against Arch Insurance, and approved class counsel fees of $435,000 to be paid by the defendants in addition to the class compensation.
Incomplete facts defeated Rule 21 relief and the witness examination proceeded.
The moving parties sought determination of multiple pre-trial legal questions concerning whether supplier refunds or credits for cancelled educational trips had to be considered under trip contracts, the Travel Industry Act, and excess trip cancellation insurance policies, and also sought to quash a summons to examine their representative.
The court held the motions could not be resolved on a Rule 21 record because material facts remained disputed, the factual matrix was incomplete, and the proposed legal issues overlapped with unjust enrichment, trust, and unlawful means claims that would continue in any event.
The court further held that the requested examination was reasonably necessary because the responding insurers had shown the evidence sought was possibly relevant to the pending issues and the moving parties had not shown the summons was an abuse of process.
The motion to quash was dismissed and the Rule 21 motion was dismissed without prejudice.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidentiary basis for the appellants' allegations of bias.
The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claims, asserting a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The Court of Appeal found no evidentiary basis to support this serious legal claim or the suggestion that counsel behaved inappropriately.
The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the appellants.
A lawyer's good faith opinion about witness independence during settlement discussions does not constitute civil fraud.
Appellants appealed the motion judge's refusal to enforce a settlement agreement reached at a pre-trial conference in a motor vehicle accident action.
The motion judge found that counsel's description of witnesses as "independent" amounted to civil fraud because the witnesses' son lived across the street from the plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that counsel's statement was an opinion with a reasonable basis made in good faith, not a false statement of fact.
The court emphasized that findings of civil fraud against counsel could have devastating reputational consequences and could chill resolute advocacy.
The court also found that the defendant failed to exercise due diligence in investigating the witnesses' connection to the plaintiffs.
The court dismissed the appeal, upholding findings that the insurer met its contractual obligations.
The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim against their insurer.
The trial judge found that the insurer had fully met its contractual obligations to the appellants.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings of fact, noting that while the appellants framed the issue as one of fairness and family wellbeing, the case was fundamentally about the nature of the insurer's obligations under the insurance contract and whether those obligations were met.
The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500.
Court fixes partial indemnity costs payable by insurer following motion.
Following the release of reasons on an earlier motion, the court determined the appropriate costs awards among insurers involved in a dispute regarding indemnity exposure.
The court applied s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the significance of the motion’s outcome and the potential insurance liability implications.
After reviewing the bills of costs and submissions, the court reduced certain claimed hours and adjusted the hourly rate for one party before fixing partial indemnity costs.
Costs were awarded in favour of two defendants against the proposed statutory third party.
The proposed statutory third party was ordered to pay the costs within 60 days.
Court dismisses premature motion on characterization of intentional versus negligent driving.
The court considered a motion seeking determination of issues arising from pleadings alleging both intentional and negligent acts in a motor vehicle incident.
The moving party relied on the framework from prior Supreme Court authority addressing the characterization of intentional versus negligent conduct.
The court held that the pleadings and the driver’s guilty plea to dangerous driving did not permit a definitive characterization of the conduct at this early stage of the action.
Determining the issue without further evidentiary development risked injustice to the parties.
The motion was therefore dismissed as premature, without prejudice to renewal at a later stage.