Michael Edward Key

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Perell J. dated April 29, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The Plaintiff, Old Republic Insurance Company of Canada (ORIC), brought a motion seeking a further and better affidavit of documents from the Defendant, Jerry Van Dyke Travel Service Ltd. (JVD), regarding trips cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

ORIC, an insurer, sought documents related to payments retained by JVD from customers and correspondence between JVD and the Travel Industry Council of Ontario (TICO).

ORIC argued these documents were relevant to its claims of unjust enrichment, breach of trust, and the application of statutory obligations under the Travel Industry Act, particularly concerning coordination of benefits.

JVD opposed, arguing the requests were premature or sought non-existent documents, and that TICO communications were irrelevant.

The court granted ORIC's motion, finding that information on retained payments, even if requiring generation from JVD's electronic systems, constituted a relevant 'document' under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and that TICO communications were relevant to the interpretation and application of the Travel Industry Act, regardless of their binding nature on the court.

JVD was ordered to produce the requested documents.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside the costs provision of a 2018 formal judgment.

The formal order, drafted by the defendants' counsel and approved by the plaintiff's counsel, awarded costs against only one corporate defendant, contrary to the trial judge's endorsement which awarded costs against multiple defendants.

The corporate defendant against whom costs were awarded subsequently declared bankruptcy.

The court found that there was no meeting of the minds between counsel regarding the costs liability and that the formal order contained an error arising from an accidental slip or omission.

The court set aside the costs provision under Rule 59.06 and ordered a rehearing on the issue of costs.

The moving parties, defendants in a motor vehicle collision action, brought a motion to compel the Crown to provide further documentary discovery and produce a representative for oral discovery.

The action against the Crown was brought under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act (PTHIA).

The court considered conflicting jurisprudence on whether the Crown can be compelled to give discovery under the PTHIA.

Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the court followed the Court of Appeal's decision in Longo, holding that the Crown cannot be compelled to submit to documentary or oral discovery in such claims.

The motion was dismissed.

The moving parties sought determination of multiple pre-trial legal questions concerning whether supplier refunds or credits for cancelled educational trips had to be considered under trip contracts, the Travel Industry Act, and excess trip cancellation insurance policies, and also sought to quash a summons to examine their representative.

The court held the motions could not be resolved on a Rule 21 record because material facts remained disputed, the factual matrix was incomplete, and the proposed legal issues overlapped with unjust enrichment, trust, and unlawful means claims that would continue in any event.

The court further held that the requested examination was reasonably necessary because the responding insurers had shown the evidence sought was possibly relevant to the pending issues and the moving parties had not shown the summons was an abuse of process.

The motion to quash was dismissed and the Rule 21 motion was dismissed without prejudice.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion for a declaration that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend him against his daughter's negligent parenting claim.

The appellant was an occupant of a vehicle driven by an impaired driver at the time of the alleged injury.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was not covered under the automobile insurance policy because his liability did not arise from the use or operation of the automobile, but rather from his parenting decisions.

The plain language of section 239(1)(a) of the Insurance Act requires that an occupant's liability must arise from the use or operation of the automobile to be covered.

The defendants, Lauren Stephen (Son) and Brenda Stephen (Mother), brought separate motions for summary judgment to dismiss claims against them arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The Son, who caused the collision, argued he was not civilly liable due to a mental disorder at the time.

The Mother argued she was not vicariously liable as the Son lacked her consent to possess her vehicle, and denied negligence in her supervision or control of the vehicle keys.

The court granted both motions, finding the Son met the Buckley test for mental illness in negligence, and the Mother was neither vicariously liable nor negligent, as she did not give consent and could not have foreseen the Son's actions.

The plaintiff, Bradley Clayton Hunt, moved for a declaration that he was an "insured person" under the Insurance Act and that the defendant, Peel Mutual Insurance Company, was obligated to defend and indemnify him.

This arose from a motor vehicle collision where Hunt and his daughter were passengers.

Hunt's daughter subsequently sued him, alleging negligent parenting.

The defendant insurer denied coverage, arguing that the allegations of negligence against Hunt did not involve the "use or operation" of the vehicle as required by section 239 of the Insurance Act.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that there was no direct or proximate causal relationship between Hunt's alleged negligent acts (negligent parenting) and the use or operation of the vehicle, thus not triggering the duty to defend.

The plaintiffs initiated an action for injuries sustained by Vladislav Bukshtynov at McMaster University's indoor track, claiming $1.1 million in damages.

A jury found the Flying Angels Running Club and George Kerr 60% liable, Vladislav Bukshtynov 40% contributorily negligent, and McMaster University and Hwang Lee not liable.

Damages were assessed at $101,885.

This judgment addresses costs, considering Rule 49 offers and the plaintiff's litigation conduct.

The court denied the plaintiffs' request for a Sanderson order, finding the plaintiff's conduct, particularly the failure to secure ATE insurance and refusal to settle, to be irresponsible.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs up to the date of the defendants' Rule 49 offers, and partial indemnity costs to all defendants from that date until a mid-trial pretrial recommendation, followed by substantial indemnity costs to all defendants thereafter.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay McMaster University $95,000 and the Flying Angels Running Club, George Kerr, and Hwang Lee $69,156.

The defendants Flying Angels Running Club and George Kerr were ordered to pay the plaintiffs $43,108, to be deducted from the amounts owed by the plaintiffs.

The defendant organization moved to dismiss a personal injury action on the basis that the claim against it was commenced outside the applicable two‑year limitation period.

The plaintiffs had initially sued another party following a slip and fall at a fundraising skating event and later added the moving party after learning of its potential involvement through a third‑party claim.

The court considered the discoverability principles under s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and whether reasonable due diligence would have revealed the moving party’s role earlier.

The court found there was no trigger that would reasonably have alerted the plaintiffs to the moving party’s involvement in the ice rink setup prior to receiving the third‑party claim.

As a result, the limitation period had not expired and the action could proceed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim for defamation and mental distress against his former employer, and his third-party claim against an insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment, noting the age of the case.

The Court found no error in the dismissal of the counterclaim, as the employer's actions were justified by its investigation into the appellant's business practices.

The third-party claim was properly dismissed because the appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements of the 'claims made and reported' insurance policy.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice Gerald F. Day.

The Court of Appeal substantially agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $2,500.

The Ministry of the Attorney General appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding two orders by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The orders required the disclosure of the total amounts of legal fees paid by the Ministry to lawyers acting for intervenors and for Paul Bernardo on his criminal appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the disclosure of the total fee amounts would not reveal any privileged solicitor-client communications.

The Court also held that the disclosure did not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.