Marie Sydney

The defendant, a former employee of the plaintiff geoscientific company, brought a motion to strike the statement of claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiff had sued the defendant for communicating with the Professional Geoscientists Association of Ontario, which led to a regulatory investigation into the company.

The court found that the defendant's communications with the quasi-judicial regulatory body were protected by absolute privilege, and that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action to the extent it relied on those communications.

The court further found the action constituted an abuse of process, as the plaintiff sought to weaponize legally protected communications with a regulator.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend, and costs of $7,916.78 were awarded to the defendant.

The third parties moved for summary judgment to dismiss the third party claim brought by the defendants, Michael Gillis and Julie Joanisse Gillis, against their financial advisors and firm.

The court found that the causes of action arose before and during the defendants’ bankruptcy and thus vested in the trustee in bankruptcy.

The claims were not transferred back to the defendants and were also found to be statute-barred.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the third party claim and struck the action as a nullity.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund following a motor vehicle accident.

The Fund denied benefits on the basis that the applicant was not ordinarily resident in Ontario at the time of the accident, pursuant to s. 25(1) of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act.

The Tribunal found that the applicant, a citizen of China and a refugee protection claimant subject to a conditional removal order, had temporary ties to Ontario and failed to produce material evidence regarding his immigration status.

The Tribunal concluded the applicant was not ordinarily resident in Ontario and dismissed the application.

The appellant (Third Parties) appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the motions judge lacked authority to order the discontinuance of a third-party action, erred in awarding costs to the respondent, and failed to address their cross-motion.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge had the authority to order discontinuance, with leave being subsumed in the order, and that the costs decision was within the judge's discretion.

The cross-motion issue was rendered moot.

The plaintiff, David Westlake, sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add a new cause of action related to alleged deficiencies in the construction of a roadway, beyond the initial claim concerning a cul-de-sac.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing the limitation period had expired and that they would suffer non-compensable prejudice.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim was reasonably discovered in January 2019, when a geotechnical report revealed the extent of the roadway damage, and that the delay in seeking amendment was not exceptional.

The court also found no actual non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, including due to the death of a key individual for one defendant, as the roadbed remained available for inspection and no procedural steps had been taken.

The motion for leave to amend was granted, without prejudice to the defendants' ability to raise a limitation defence at trial.

The defendant, Brian Jeffery, brought a motion for leave to discontinue his third-party claim against the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) and for a determination of costs, after the main action and other third-party claims had been dismissed.

The MTO refused to agree to a without-costs dismissal or discontinuance and brought a cross-motion for dismissal with costs for delay or summary judgment.

The court found that Jeffrey's third-party claim was not frivolous, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith.

Despite the MTO's insistence on costs, the court determined it was unreasonable for the MTO to do so, especially given Jeffrey's early offer to discontinue the claim.

The court granted Jeffrey's motion, discontinuing the third-party action against the MTO, and awarded partial indemnity costs in favour of Jeffrey.

The moving parties, defendants in a motor vehicle collision action, brought a motion to compel the Crown to provide further documentary discovery and produce a representative for oral discovery.

The action against the Crown was brought under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act (PTHIA).

The court considered conflicting jurisprudence on whether the Crown can be compelled to give discovery under the PTHIA.

Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the court followed the Court of Appeal's decision in Longo, holding that the Crown cannot be compelled to submit to documentary or oral discovery in such claims.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant Fund appealed an Arbitrator's decision finding that a taxi company's SPF 6 insurance policy was not a 'motor vehicle liability policy' under the Insurance Act, and therefore did not include Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs).

The court found that while the Arbitrator erred in law by concluding that a corporation is not a 'person' under the Act, the Arbitrator made no palpable and overriding error in determining that the taxis were not driven by employees, agents, or on behalf of the taxi company.

The court upheld the finding that an SPF 6 commercial general liability endorsement is not a motor vehicle liability policy intended to carry SABs.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal.

The appellant (defendants) had won their appeal, leading to the dismissal of the respondent's (plaintiff's) action.

The parties could not agree on the costs of the Superior Court motion, cross-motion, and other action costs.

The appellant sought over $108,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The respondent argued that the appellant should be disentitled to costs incurred after the close of pleadings due to a multi-year delay in bringing a summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal found no special circumstances to disentitle the appellant to costs, noting that both parties contributed to the delay.

However, the court found the total amount claimed by the appellant to be excessive given the straightforward nature of the case and the amounts in issue.

The court ordered the respondent to pay the appellant an all-inclusive sum of $75,000 for costs of the action, including the motion and cross-motion.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal in the all-inclusive sum of $10,000.

The appellant was also entitled to costs of the motion and cross-motion in the Superior Court, and prima facie entitled to costs of the action below, given the dismissal of the respondent's action.

The court set a schedule for the parties to submit written costs submissions if they could not agree on the quantum of the remaining costs.

The respondent, an undischarged bankrupt, discovered a potential professional negligence claim against his deceased wife's insurance agent.

He commenced an action after his discharge, but the cause of action had vested in his trustee in bankruptcy.

The motion judge granted an order nunc pro tunc regularizing the proceeding.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge lacked authority to grant a nunc pro tunc order because it was sought after the expiry of the applicable limitation period.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision in a priority dispute regarding Statutory Accident Benefits.

The arbitrator found that the appellant's notice of termination for non-payment of premiums was defective because it failed to include an address where the insured could pay the outstanding amount, as required by O. Reg. 777/93.

Applying the new standard of review framework from Vavilov, the Superior Court held that the appellate standard applied to statutory appeals from insurance arbitrations.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision on a correctness standard, confirming that strict compliance with the statutory notice requirements is necessary to unilaterally terminate an insurance policy.

A case conference was held to schedule documentary and oral discoveries.

The parties agreed to exchange Affidavits of Documents by September 30, 2019, and to conduct examinations for discovery in November 2019.

The court noted a potential issue regarding Schedule B documents that may require a further case conference if unresolved.

An insurer mistakenly believed that a snowmobile was not covered under its automobile insurance policy and persuaded the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund to accept responsibility for paying statutory accident benefits to an injured passenger.

When the coverage error was discovered, the Fund sought reimbursement and the insurer refused, arguing that the Fund had lost its ability to contest priority once it accepted responsibility.

The arbitrator found the insurer was the priority insurer and ordered reimbursement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that the Fund is not an ordinary insurer in priority disputes under the Regulation and is entitled to resile from its acceptance of priority.

The court also clarified that section 7(6) of the Regulation permits an arbitrator to order full reimbursement of benefits paid, not merely impose sanctions.

This is a costs ruling following a successful motion by the defendant to add the Ministry of Transportation as a third party in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, or alternatively partial indemnity, while the Ministry argued no costs should be awarded due to alleged delays and complexities caused by the defendant.

The plaintiff, though not a direct party to the motion, also sought costs for attendances.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of $15,000, finding no conduct warranting substantial indemnity, and denied costs to the plaintiff who lacked standing on the motion.

The defendant, Brian Jeffery, brought a motion to add Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario, represented by the Minister of Transportation (MTO), as a third party in a negligence action arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The MTO resisted, arguing lack of statutory authority and failure to provide timely notice under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act (PTHIA).

The court found that the PTHIA permits the Crown to be added as a third party for contribution and indemnity claims and that the defendant had a reasonable excuse for late notice, causing no prejudice to the MTO.

The motion was granted.

An insurance priority dispute concerning whether an automobile insurance policy issued by Elite remained in force at the time of an accident.

Elite sent a purported notice of non-renewal in August 2010 for a policy ending September 20, 2010, based on the claimant's failure to register for a data-transmitting device within 12 months.

The arbitrator found the notice premature and that the policy had been terminated by mutual agreement of the parties despite the statutory continuation provision in section 236(5) of the Insurance Act.

The Superior Court appeal judge reversed, finding section 236(5) required the policy to remain in force.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the arbitrator's decision reasonable on both issues: the notice was premature and the policy was effectively terminated by the parties' conduct.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (Fund) appealed an arbitrator's decision that allowed it to withdraw its acceptance of priority for accident benefits.

Echelon General Insurance Company (Echelon) had initially notified the Fund that a snowmobile involved in an accident was uninsured, leading the Fund to accept priority.

The Fund later discovered Echelon's policy actually covered the snowmobile and sought restitution.

The arbitrator found Echelon failed to conduct a reasonable investigation as required by O. Reg. 283/95, s. 3.1, making its notice to the Fund improper.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that the Fund was not an "insurer" under the regulation and had specific, different treatment, including an exemption from the strict rules preventing withdrawal of priority acceptance.

The court affirmed that Echelon's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation meant no proper priority dispute was raised, and Echelon remained the priority insurer.

The defendant, Town of Gravenhurst, brought a motion to amend its third-party claim against Ontario to include new allegations of negligence related to a two-year driving prohibition for careless driving, distinct from the original claim concerning medical suspensions.

The court found the proposed amendments constituted a new cause of action.

Applying the recent Court of Appeal decision in Mega International Commercial Bank (Canada) v. Yung, the court confirmed that the discoverability principle applies to claims for contribution and indemnity under s. 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

Given the insufficient evidentiary record to determine when the new claim could have been reasonably discovered, the court allowed the amendment, preserving Ontario's right to plead a limitation period defence at trial.

The plaintiff moved for leave to amend her Statement of Claim to add the Crown and a road maintenance contractor as defendants after the presumptive expiry of the two-year limitation period.

The proposed defendants opposed the motion, arguing the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability.

The court found that the plaintiff had knowledge of the icy road conditions from the motor vehicle accident report and her own application for statutory accident benefits, but failed to show due diligence in investigating the potential liability of the road maintenance authorities within the limitation period.

The motion to amend the Statement of Claim was dismissed.