J. Keenan Sprague

The defendant insurers moved for an order compelling the plaintiffs to appoint an appraiser under s. 128(5) of the Insurance Act, following a property loss claim.

The plaintiffs resisted, arguing abuse of process, delay, and that the case involved interpretive issues rather than just valuation.

The court granted the defendants' motion, affirming that appraisal is the preferred process for quantifying damages in property insurance cases, even when litigation is ongoing and coverage is disputed, and that it is not an abuse of process in this instance.

This is a costs ruling following a successful motion by the defendant to add the Ministry of Transportation as a third party in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, or alternatively partial indemnity, while the Ministry argued no costs should be awarded due to alleged delays and complexities caused by the defendant.

The plaintiff, though not a direct party to the motion, also sought costs for attendances.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of $15,000, finding no conduct warranting substantial indemnity, and denied costs to the plaintiff who lacked standing on the motion.

The defendant, Brian Jeffery, brought a motion to add Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario, represented by the Minister of Transportation (MTO), as a third party in a negligence action arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The MTO resisted, arguing lack of statutory authority and failure to provide timely notice under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act (PTHIA).

The court found that the PTHIA permits the Crown to be added as a third party for contribution and indemnity claims and that the defendant had a reasonable excuse for late notice, causing no prejudice to the MTO.

The motion was granted.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from successful motions by the plaintiffs and the Gomez defendants to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

The Danikas defendants had opposed setting aside the dismissal order against them and also opposed paying costs to the Gomez defendants.

The court ordered the Danikas defendants to pay $3,500 in costs to the plaintiffs (by consent) and $5,000 in costs to the Gomez defendants, finding the latter successful and that the "Reid factors" for setting aside the dismissal were satisfied.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence and occupiers' liability claim arising from a fall down stairs at a restaurant.

The motion judge dismissed the original claim based on the condition of the stairs but permitted amendment to plead an alternative theory based on failure to advise of an accessible washroom on the main floor.

A second motion judge dismissed the amended claim, finding it did not constitute a new cause of action and was therefore statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal but found the motion judge erred in his reasoning.

The amended claim did constitute a new cause of action based on a different duty of care and was properly barred by the Limitations Act as it was raised outside the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff and her small dog were attacked by the defendant's large dog, resulting in puncture wounds, scarring, and psychological trauma to the plaintiff.

Liability was previously established in an undefended proceeding.

Following an assessment of damages, the court awarded the plaintiff $28,000 in general damages, plus an OHIP subrogated claim and partial indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that dismissed their action in negligence and breach of contract against the respondent regarding a slip and fall on restaurant stairs.

The motion judge had dismissed the claim regarding hazards on the stairs but allowed the appellants to amend their claim to plead a breach of the Consumer Protection Act for failing to advise of a main floor washroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly dismissed the first branch of the claim due to a lack of evidence of stair hazards, and properly preserved the second branch regarding the failure to advise.