Edona Caku Vila

The appellants, small and mid-size businesses, appealed a class action decision regarding business interruption insurance claims stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.

They sought coverage for revenue losses, arguing that the presence of SARS-CoV-2 or civil authority orders constituted "physical loss or damage" to their property under their insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that neither the virus's presence nor the civil authority orders met the "physical loss or damage" criteria for business interruption coverage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiffs, representing a class of small to medium-sized businesses, sought coverage under their business interruption insurance policies for losses sustained due to the COVID-19 pandemic and related civil authority orders.

The court held a common issues trial to determine whether the presence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus or government lockdown orders could cause 'physical loss or damage to property' within the meaning of the policies.

The court concluded that the virus does not physically alter or damage inanimate surfaces, and that the loss of use of the premises due to government orders does not constitute physical loss or damage.

Consequently, the court answered the certified common issues in the negative, finding no coverage under the business interruption provisions.

The City of Toronto appealed a motion judge's decision that dismissed the City's summary judgment motion and granted reverse summary judgment to the plaintiffs, Robyn Graham and David Mitchell.

The original action stemmed from Ms. Graham tripping on a pothole, and the City argued the claim was barred due to late notice under the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The motion judge found a reasonable excuse for the late notice and no prejudice to the City.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the City's appeal, affirming that the motion judge's grant of reverse summary judgment was procedurally fair and that her findings on reasonable excuse and lack of prejudice were supported by the evidence and applicable law.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment dismissal of his action against the City of Toronto, which was based on his failure to provide timely notice under s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, and the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors in her conclusion that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the three-year delay in providing notice, despite having sufficient information to investigate earlier.

The plaintiff sued the City of Toronto for injuries sustained after tripping on a pothole in a pedestrian crosswalk.

The City brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred because the plaintiff failed to provide notice within 10 days as required by s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act.

The court dismissed the City's motion and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on this issue, finding the plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for the delay and the City suffered no prejudice.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action against it for failure to provide notice within 10 days of the injury, as required by s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 2015 but did not notify the municipality until 2018, after retaining an expert who suggested a potential intersection design defect.

The court found the matter appropriate for summary judgment and held that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay under s. 42(8), as he had sufficient facts to investigate a potential claim against the municipality much earlier.

The action against the municipality was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence and occupiers' liability claim arising from a fall down stairs at a restaurant.

The motion judge dismissed the original claim based on the condition of the stairs but permitted amendment to plead an alternative theory based on failure to advise of an accessible washroom on the main floor.

A second motion judge dismissed the amended claim, finding it did not constitute a new cause of action and was therefore statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal but found the motion judge erred in his reasoning.

The amended claim did constitute a new cause of action based on a different duty of care and was properly barred by the Limitations Act as it was raised outside the two-year limitation period.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that dismissed their action in negligence and breach of contract against the respondent regarding a slip and fall on restaurant stairs.

The motion judge had dismissed the claim regarding hazards on the stairs but allowed the appellants to amend their claim to plead a breach of the Consumer Protection Act for failing to advise of a main floor washroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly dismissed the first branch of the claim due to a lack of evidence of stair hazards, and properly preserved the second branch regarding the failure to advise.