Edona Caku Vila

The appellants, small and mid-size businesses, appealed a class action decision regarding business interruption insurance claims stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.

They sought coverage for revenue losses, arguing that the presence of SARS-CoV-2 or civil authority orders constituted "physical loss or damage" to their property under their insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that neither the virus's presence nor the civil authority orders met the "physical loss or damage" criteria for business interruption coverage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The City of Toronto appealed a motion judge's decision that dismissed the City's summary judgment motion and granted reverse summary judgment to the plaintiffs, Robyn Graham and David Mitchell.

The original action stemmed from Ms. Graham tripping on a pothole, and the City argued the claim was barred due to late notice under the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The motion judge found a reasonable excuse for the late notice and no prejudice to the City.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the City's appeal, affirming that the motion judge's grant of reverse summary judgment was procedurally fair and that her findings on reasonable excuse and lack of prejudice were supported by the evidence and applicable law.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment dismissal of his action against the City of Toronto, which was based on his failure to provide timely notice under s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, and the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors in her conclusion that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the three-year delay in providing notice, despite having sufficient information to investigate earlier.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence and occupiers' liability claim arising from a fall down stairs at a restaurant.

The motion judge dismissed the original claim based on the condition of the stairs but permitted amendment to plead an alternative theory based on failure to advise of an accessible washroom on the main floor.

A second motion judge dismissed the amended claim, finding it did not constitute a new cause of action and was therefore statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal but found the motion judge erred in his reasoning.

The amended claim did constitute a new cause of action based on a different duty of care and was properly barred by the Limitations Act as it was raised outside the two-year limitation period.