David C. Rosenbaum

The appellants, small and mid-size businesses, appealed a class action decision regarding business interruption insurance claims stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.

They sought coverage for revenue losses, arguing that the presence of SARS-CoV-2 or civil authority orders constituted "physical loss or damage" to their property under their insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that neither the virus's presence nor the civil authority orders met the "physical loss or damage" criteria for business interruption coverage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiffs, representing a class of small to medium-sized businesses, sought coverage under their business interruption insurance policies for losses sustained due to the COVID-19 pandemic and related civil authority orders.

The court held a common issues trial to determine whether the presence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus or government lockdown orders could cause 'physical loss or damage to property' within the meaning of the policies.

The court concluded that the virus does not physically alter or damage inanimate surfaces, and that the loss of use of the premises due to government orders does not constitute physical loss or damage.

Consequently, the court answered the certified common issues in the negative, finding no coverage under the business interruption provisions.

This appeal addresses issues of jurisdiction simpliciter and forum non conveniens in a complex international insurance coverage dispute.

Vale and RSA initiated actions in Ontario seeking coverage for environmental liabilities, primarily in Ontario, after Travelers commenced a similar action in New York.

The motion judge largely found Ontario had jurisdiction and was not forum non conveniens, except for North River.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurers' appeals, affirming Ontario's jurisdiction over them, and allowed Vale's appeal, finding Ontario also had jurisdiction over North River.

The court emphasized that a comprehensive general liability insurer underwriting Ontario risks connects itself to Ontario for jurisdictional purposes, and that the "first-to-file" rule does not automatically determine the appropriate forum.

The defendants in a certified class action regarding COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims brought a motion seeking joint adjudication and common case management of common questions across approximately 79 overlapping proceedings.

The motion was opposed by several plaintiffs in individual actions who wished to proceed independently.

The court dismissed the motion, affording deference to a prior case management decision that declined to stay the individual actions, and finding that forcing joint adjudication would inappropriately undermine the plaintiffs' right to opt out of the class proceeding and cause undue delay.

Supplemental reasons issued to correct an error in the court's previous decision (2022 ONSC 12).

The court corrected paragraph 4 to clarify that Lloyds should not have been listed as a party challenging the forum of the action.

Vale Canada and its primary insurer, RSA, brought actions against numerous excess insurers for coverage of environmental remediation costs incurred primarily in Ontario.

Several foreign excess insurers brought motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Ontario court or seeking a stay based on forum non conveniens in favour of an action in New York.

The court found it had jurisdiction over all moving insurers except North River Insurance Company, concluding that the insurers were 'carrying on business' in Ontario by participating in a global insurance program for an Ontario-based company.

The court declined to stay the actions for forum non conveniens, finding Ontario to be the 'centre of gravity' for the dispute.

Claims by Vale Canada against two UK insurers were stayed pending arbitration.

The plaintiffs brought an action against multiple insurers for indemnity regarding environmental damage.

Several foreign defendants failed to deliver statements of defence within the required time limits, and one was noted in default.

The defendants sought an extension of time to defend or bring jurisdictional motions, arguing the court should wait for the outcome of a parallel proceeding commenced by one of the insurers in the United States.

The court refused to delay the Ontario proceeding, finding no prejudice to the defendants in requiring them to respond timely, and ordered the defendants to deliver their statements of defence or motion records by a specified deadline.

Following the dismissal of the defendant insurers' motion to temporarily stay 17 individual actions pending the determination of certification in a class proceeding, the successful plaintiffs sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs requested $86,589, which the court found excessive for a relatively simple stay motion.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) and considering proportionality, the court fixed costs at $35,000 all-inclusive, payable by the defendant insurers.

The defendant insurers brought a motion to temporarily stay 17 individual actions for COVID-19 business interruption losses pending the certification of a related class action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was overlap in issues and facts, staying the individual actions would cause significant injustice and prejudice to the plaintiffs, who had legitimate reasons for pursuing their claims individually and expeditiously.

Following a decision in an estate litigation matter regarding the ownership of a painting, the successful respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis against the applicant co-estate trustees personally.

The court found that the applicants had acted unreasonably by commencing the application instead of accepting the respondent's pre-litigation offer to pay the appraised value of the painting.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $203,589 for fees and $12,493 for disbursements, and ordered the applicants to pay these costs personally rather than out of the estate.

The applicants, co-estate trustees, brought an application against the respondent, their brother and co-estate trustee, claiming a painting worth $30,000 was an asset of their late father's estate.

The respondent argued he had an oral agreement with his father before his death to keep the painting and pay the estate its appraised value.

The court reviewed extensive email correspondence and found corroborating evidence of the agreement.

The court dismissed the application, finding the painting was not an estate asset provided the respondent paid the $30,000, and noted the parties had spent nearly $500,000 in legal fees fighting over the painting.

The plaintiffs, having been successful on an underlying motion, sought $156,437.17 in costs.

The defendants, who were the moving parties on the underlying motion, argued for costs not exceeding $10,000.

The court considered the complexity and duration of the motion, the defendants' adjournment requests, their continuation of the motion to strike conspiracy claims despite decisive authority, and the plaintiffs' offer to settle.

The court found the plaintiffs' requested amount to be extraordinary and disproportionate to the nature of the pleadings motion, which was decided on written submissions.

Comparing to similar cases where costs ranged from $3,300 to $10,000, the court fixed the plaintiffs' costs at $9,000, including a $1,000 discount for the defendants' reasonable expense in responding to the plaintiffs' overreaching demand.

The plaintiffs' offer to settle was not considered a real compromise under Rule 49.13.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike out pleadings of conspiracy in the amended Statement of Claim.

The defendants sought an adjournment pending the outcome of leave applications to the Court of Appeal in related Divisional Court decisions, which was denied due to prior agreements between counsel.

Applying the binding Divisional Court decision in Jevco, the court held that the doctrine of merger could not be raised at the pleadings stage to strike a conspiracy claim.

The motion was dismissed.

Application under the Variation of Trusts Act seeking court approval of a variation to a family trust established in 1992.

The proposed variation would permit reorganization and distribution of trust assets to defer a significant capital gains tax liability arising from the Income Tax Act 21‑year deemed disposition rule.

All adult beneficiaries and trustees consented, and the Children’s Lawyer did not oppose the variation subject to a payment protecting contingent interests of minor and unborn beneficiaries.

The court applied the test from Finnell v. Schumacher Estate and related authorities, assessing whether the variation preserved the settlor’s intention and conferred a benefit on minor, unborn, unascertained, and incapable beneficiaries.

The court concluded that the variation preserved trust capital, benefited protected beneficiaries, and would be accepted by a prudent adult acting in self‑interest.

The plaintiff moved for leave to amend its statement of claim to add its insurance broker as a defendant and to assert negligence and breach of duty claims arising from insurers’ denial of coverage in related litigation.

The proposed claims were contingent on the plaintiff failing to obtain indemnity and defence costs from the insurers.

The court considered Rules 5.04(2) and 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure alongside the mandatory two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

It held that the plaintiff had knowledge of the material facts underlying the broker’s alleged negligence when the insurers denied coverage, more than two years before the motion to amend.

Because the limitation period had expired and no evidence rebutting discoverability was provided, the broker could not be added as a party.

The appellant, Jetport Inc., appealed a Master's order regarding discovery refusals in three related actions arising from an aviation insurance coverage dispute.

The court allowed the appeal in part, ordering the respondent insurer to answer questions about its course of conduct with other insureds regarding policy exemptions, finding them relevant to the pleadings.

The court also relieved the appellant from answering a question about claims against other third parties, as it was not relevant to mitigation.

However, the court upheld the Master's order requiring the appellant to answer questions about whether its employee sought legal advice from in-house counsel regarding a pilot clause, finding that disclosing the fact of such discussions did not breach solicitor-client privilege.

Following the dismissal of appeals from a master's decision rejecting claims of litigation privilege, the court determined costs.

The responding parties sought partial indemnity costs reflecting significant legal work and extensive materials filed on the appeal.

The court applied the principles under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that costs must be fair and reasonable and should reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations.

The court rejected arguments that the large volume of materials filed by the appellant should influence the award and noted that the appellant advanced an arguable legal position without misconduct.

The court awarded $8,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and tax to each group of respondents.

Appeal from a Master's order compelling production of communications and answers on discovery despite a claim of litigation privilege.

The appellant argued that emails and a meeting with its insurance broker were created for the dominant purpose of anticipated litigation following denial of insurance coverage for an aircraft crash.

The court held that the appellant failed to establish an evidentiary basis that the dominant purpose of the communications was litigation, noting that the available evidence suggested the discussions focused on advancing the insurance claim rather than preparing for litigation.

The court further held that any common interest litigation privilege between the insured and the broker would have been dissolved once the insured commenced an action against the broker.

The Master's order compelling disclosure was upheld.