Court File and Parties

CITATION: Jetport Inc. v. Global Aerospace Underwriting Managers (Canada) Limited, 2013 ONSC 6380

COURT FILE NO.: CV-08-00357295 COURT FILE NO.: CV-10-412252 COURT FILE NO.: CV-11-438633-00A1

DATE: 20131011

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

RE: JETPORT INC., Appellant on the Appeal

AND:

GLOBAL AEROSPACE UNDERWRITING MANAGERS (CANADA) LIMITED, NATIONAL LIABILITY & FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, TEMPLE INSURANCE COMPANY, LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA AND MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, Defendants and on the Appeal

AND BETWEEN:

JETPORT INC., Plaintiff

AND:

JONES BROWN INC., Defendant

AND BETWEEN:

GLOBAL AEROSPACE UNDERWRITING MANAGERS (CANADA) LIMITED, Plaintiff (Moving Parties)

AND:

JONES BROWN INC. and GRANT ROBINSON, Defendants

AND:

JETPORT INC., Third Party

BEFORE: Frank J.

COUNSEL: David Chernos, Stuart Svonkin and James Gotowiec, for the Appellant Robert Fenn, Robert Bell and Patrick Floyd, for the Defendants, Respondents David C. Rosenbaum and Christopher J. Rae, for the Defendants

HEARD: September 11, 2013

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This is an appeal from the portions of the April 30, 2013 order of Master Graham requiring Jetport Inc. to answer certain questions it refused to answer on discovery and denying it answers to certain questions it sought to have answered on discovery.

[2] Jetport commenced an action against various insurers and an underwriting manager, Global Aerospace Underwriting Managers (Canada) Limited (“Global”). The action arose out of the insurers’ denial of Jetport’s claim for its losses arising out of the Nov. 11, 2007 crash of one of its aircraft, a Bombardier Global 5000 business jet (“Global 5000”) that had been delivered to Jetport just weeks earlier. Jetport’s action led to Global commencing an action against Jetport’s insurance broker, Jones Brown Inc. for contribution and indemnity. In turn, Jones Brown brought a third party claim against Jetport. Finally, Jetport sued Jones Brown in negligence.

[3] The three actions were ordered to be tried together by Whitaker J. His order also provided that there would be one set of discoveries for all three actions such that questions asked in one action are to be treated as having been asked in the other actions. Master Graham was appointed to case manage the three actions and is, as a result, seized with all discovery related matters.

[4] The examinations for discovery have given rise to multiple days of hearings before the Master and he has made multiple decisions. This is the third appeal from those decisions. What this may say about the use to which discovery is being put in this action, the appropriateness of the discoveries’ draw on judicial resources and the approach being taken generally in this litigation is not something on which my comments are required in order for me to dispose of the appeal. Accordingly, tempting though it may be, I make no comment, leaving the question for counsel to consider.

Background

[5] The background facts have been detailed by both Goldstein J. in Jetport v. Global Aerospace, 2013 ONSC 235, 224 A.C.W.S. (3d) 98, and Greer J. in Jetport v. Global Aerospace, 2013 ONSC 5459 [Jetport No. 2]. The coverage issues in dispute, broadly stated, are whether the Jetport employee who it alleges was the pilot of the Global 5000 breached a condition of the insurance policy known as the “Pilot Clause” and whether any reliance can be placed on that clause as a basis for denying coverage.

[6] Jetport alleges that its pilot was in compliance with the Pilot Clause. The Clause requires the pilot in command to have a total of logged flying hours that includes “at least 100 hours in the make and model of aircraft to be flown”. A critical issue with respect to the question of compliance is whether this 100 hours includes simulator training time. Jetport maintains that it does.

[7] Jetport alleges that, in any event, Global cannot rely on the Pilot Clause because it waived its ability to do so or is estopped from doing. The argument is based on Global’s previous conduct in granting Jetport similar exemptions to the Pilot Clause when requested and its having done so specifically with respect to the policy in issue. Global denies the relevance of previous exemptions, denies that it granted or would have granted an exemption and relies on the actual policy wording to deny coverage to Jetport.

[8] Jetport looks to Jones Brown should it be held that Global is entitled to rely on the policy wording. Jetport alleges that Jones Brown was negligent in failing to take the necessary steps to obtain an exemption. Jetport relies on conversations between Jones Brown and Jetport’s employee, Roger Adair. Jones Brown denies that any request was made by Jetport for an exemption.

[9] The Master heard submissions in the various parties’ undertakings and refusals motions over several days. He provided oral reasons for each of the decisions that are the subject of this appeal following argument with respect to each question in issue. His reasons, therefore, are contained only in the transcript of the proceedings before him.

Standard of review

[10] The parties agree that the standard of review for decisions with respect to questions of privilege and relevance is correctness as these are questions of law: Creative Career Systems Inc. v. Ontario, 2012 ONSC 649, 27 C.P.C. (7th) 172, at para. 21, citing Leadbeater v. Ontario (2004), 2004 CanLII 14107 (ON SC), 70 O.R. (3d) 224 (S.C.J.), at para. 29 and Kennedy v. McKenzie (2005), 17 C.P.C. (6th) 229 (S.C.J.), at para. 15.

Refusals based on relevance

(a) Global’s refusals

[11] The Master held that Global was not required to answer the following questions:

Q. 1587: Whether Mr. Basey processed exemption requests for other customers.

Q. 1588: Whether other customers of Global had the same pilot clause as the one Jetport had in its policy.

Q. 1590: Whether other customers of Global had pilot clauses in their policies, what exemptions Global gave to the other customers from the provision of their pilot clauses, and what principles Global brought to bear in determining those requests.

[12] Global’s position is that Jetport’s pleading does not support any enquiry into Global’s course of conduct with other insureds. Further, as Jetport’s extensive discovery of Global has not disclosed any factual foundation for its allegations against Global, any further extension of discovery is unfounded.

[13] Jetport’s position is that the questions are relevant to its allegation that Global either did grant or, if asked, would have granted Jetport an exemption to the Pilot Clause permitting Mr. Adair to fly the Global 5000 aircraft. As well, the questions are relevant to the issue of the process by which exemptions to the Pilot Clause were sought and obtained. This is an issue in the action between Jetport and Jones Brown, on whom Jetport claims to have relied to ensure that the exemption was in place.

[14] The Master held that the questions were not relevant and therefore Global was not required to answer them. He reasoned that

(i) the pleading did not bring into play Global’s dealings with other customers; and

(ii) if Jetport intended to allege liability on the part of Global based on Global not treating Jetport in the same way it treated other customers, Jetport must plead that and it has not done so.

[15] With great respect to the Master, this mischaracterizes the basis on which Jetport seeks the information. It does not seek it to obtain evidence that might give rise to what clearly is an unpleaded cause of action against Global. Rather, Jetport seeks information regarding Global’s dealings with its other customers because that information is relevant to: (i) Global’s pleading that it adhered strictly to policy wordings; and (ii) Global’s denial that it would have granted the exemption to Jetport.

[16] Whether a question is relevant must be assessed by reference to “…the material issues in a particular case and in the context of the entirety of the evidence and the positions of the parties.” (Jetport No. 2, at para. 24, quoting R. v. Pilion, 2009 ONCA 248, 247 O.A.C. 127, at para. 33). As Perell J. stated in CIBC v. Deloitte & Touche, 2013 ONSC 917, 225 A.C.W.S. (3d) 390, at para. 68, “[t]o be relevant, evidence must increase or decrease the probability of the truth of the facts in issue.” Accordingly, there is no minimum probative value required for the evidence to be relevant: R. v. Arp, 1998 CanLII 769 (SCC), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339, at para. 38.

[17] Jetport pleads that it had on occasions in the past requested and obtained from Global a waiver of the express requirements of the policy. In response, at paragraph 22 of its statement of defence, Global denies that it gave a waiver or indicated that it would do so and states: “The Policy is a written contract with any amendments to be made in writing and agreed to by the parties through the plaintiff’s broker.”

[18] This pleading makes it relevant whether Global granted waivers to others of its customers as Global’s general practice may have probative value as to how it approached this policy of insurance. Inferences regarding how Global would have dealt with Jetport regarding the granting of the exemption may be drawn from Global’s course of dealings with other insureds.

[19] Global submits that even if the Master mischaracterized the issue, his decision is correct because the statement of claim does not provide a basis for these questions as nowhere is it pleaded that Global’s general course of conduct is to grant exemptions to its policies.

[20] The rules require that a party plead only material facts and not evidence. This rule may be one that is more honoured in the breach, to some extent because it is not always evident whether something is prohibited evidence or necessary material fact.

[21] I agree with Jetport that the questions in issue are with respect to evidence that is not properly included in the pleading. How Global conducted itself with other customers regarding exemptions is not a material fact that must be proven by Jetport in order to establish its claim. This is in contrast to Jetport’s allegation that Global did or would have granted an exemption. What Jetport seeks is evidence from which the necessary material fact can be inferred.

[22] Jetport submits that the refused questions are also relevant to the process used to grant exemptions, which is an issue between it and Jones Brown. I do not read the questions as requiring Global to provide evidence as to the actual procedures it followed with other insureds when granting exemptions, if it did so. However, as I have already found the questions to be relevant, such a reading is not necessary for my decision.

[23] Global submits that the principle of proportionality should be applied to deny Jetport answers to these questions. The Master did not base his decision on considerations of proportionality. The record does not provide a basis for denying Jetport an answer to these questions on the grounds that an answer would require disproportionate effort.

[24] I find that the Master erred in refusing to require Global to answer Q. 1587, Q. 1588 and Q. 1590.

(b) Jetport’s refusal

[25] The Master ordered Jetport to answer the following question:

Q. 4706: Has Jetport asserted any claims against any third parties for damages as a result of the accident other than Global Aerospace?

[26] The Master ordered Jetport to answer this question based on it being relevant to the duty to mitigate and to matters of judicial economy.

[27] Jetport’s position is that the question does not relate to the issue of mitigation and instead concerns Jetport’s litigation tactics. Jones Brown is not entitled to such information.

[28] Jones Brown’s position is that the question seeks information regarding Jetport’s efforts to mitigate its damages and that as Jones Brown has pleaded failure to mitigate, the question is relevant.

[29] The breadth of this question is in dispute. Jetport argues that it so broad as to be of no relevance. The disagreement results from differing interpretations as to the meaning of the phrase ‘asserted any claims’. Jetport maintains that the question is asking Jetport whether it ever thought that there might be any claims against third parties for damages. The question cannot be understood in that way. I defer to the Master’s finding of fact that the asserting of a claim extends beyond having issued a claim but requires the pursuit of that party and not just thinking of the possibility of doing so. On that basis, the question is not overly broad.

[30] The sole basis for Jones Brown’s claim that it is entitled to an answer to this question is that the question is relevant to its “failure to mitigate” defence. (Jones Brown is not relying on judicial economy as a basis for requiring the question to be answered.) But, the question as worded does not engage issues of mitigation.

[31] Mitigation is a principle whereby a plaintiff cannot recover for losses that could reasonably have been avoided: Keneber Inc. v. Midland (1994), 1994 CanLII 7221 (ON SC), 16 O.R. (3d) 753 (O.C.G.D.), at para. 20 [Keneber], quoting S.M. Waddams: The Law of Contracts, 3d ed. at p. 514.

[32] The question asks about claims that would involve shifting the burden of loss from Jetport to another party. The Master paraphrased, and through that clarified the question as follows: ‘are you chasing anybody else, saying that damages being sued for are actually that other party’s fault?’ Claims against others for damages arising out of the accident are not relevant to mitigation. Such claims address who has to pay for a loss that has already occurred; but, to be relevant to mitigation, a claim must be for the purpose of avoiding or limiting a loss. As Howden J. said in Keneber, at para. 21, mitigation “does not mean a duty owed to another to avoid the consequences of his acts or omissions; rather it simply prevents a plaintiff from recovering losses which reasonable steps on its part could have avoided”.

[33] Jetport’s failure to bring a claim for the purposes of apportioning liability would not limit its recovery of the damages it seeks against Jones Brown. It cannot, therefore, be said that whether it has asserted any other claim for damages as a result of the accident is relevant to mitigation.

[34] I find that the Master erred in ordering the question to be answered on the basis relied on by Jones Brown: that the question is relevant to mitigation. But, I do so with reluctance. The exchange between counsel for Jetport and the Master regarding the refusal to answer this question, as I read it, is suggestive of exasperation on the Master’s part. Five years after the Jetport action against Global was commenced, and if this appeal is any indication, an enormous incursion of costs later, the parties are still wrangling over discovery questions. I read the Master’s comments as resulting from his determination to bring a measure of restraint and some practicality to the proceedings. This is an effort that should be applauded.

[35] Jetport is not required to answer Q. 4706.

Refusals based on privilege

[36] The remaining four questions the Master ordered Jetport to answer were refused by Jetport on the basis of solicitor-client privilege.

[37] These four questions require information to be provided by Roger Adair and Tim Armstrong.

[38] Mr. Armstrong is, and was at the relevant times, Jetport’s President and General Counsel. He is the sole in-house lawyer at Jetport. It is not in dispute for the purposes of this appeal that during the relevant time he was providing Jetport, including Mr. Adair, with legal advice “in respect of insurance issues that arose after the accident”, to use Jetport’s words.

[39] Mr. Adair was, and continues to be, the Director of Flight Operations for Jetport and claims to have piloted the Global 5000 when it crashed. He was produced by Jetport as its representative on the examinations for discovery. His evidence is that he believed he had requested an exemption to the 100 hour requirement of the Pilot Clause at a June 6, 2007 meeting and at two subsequent meetings. He thought that Grant Robinson of Jones Brown had obtained that exemption prior to the delivery of the Global 5000.

(a) overview of the law

[40] Solicitor-client privilege is a principle of fundamental justice and a Charter protected right of such importance that even the truth seeking function of the justice system may be required to yield to it. But, how the principle applies to particular situations is not always self-evident. That is true in this case.

[41] LeBel J., for the majority in Maranda v. Richer, 2003 SCC 67, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 193, at para. 28 [Maranda], considered how to determine whether solicitor-client privilege applies. He stated that the problem “must be solved in a way that is consistent with the general approach adopted in the case law to defining the content of solicitor-client privilege and to the need to protect that privilege.” This requires a consideration of the purpose of the privilege and its prerequisites.

[42] DesChamps J., in Maranda at para. 40, described the purpose of the privilege as being “to enable every individual to exercise his or her rights in an informed manner.” She continued, “[t]he privilege performs the social function of preserving the quality, freedom and confidentiality of information exchanged between a client and his or her lawyer in the context of a legal consultation.”

[43] For solicitor-client privilege to attach to a communication it must meet the following prerequisites:

(a) the communication must be between a solicitor and client;

(b) it must entail the seeking of legal advice; and,

(c) the advice sought must be intended to be confidential by the parties. (Solosky v. The Queen, 1979 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, at para. 28)

[44] This test is couched in terms of communications. But, the courts have cautioned against drawing too fine a line between a ‘communication’ and a ‘fact’. LeBel J., speaking for the majority in Maranda at para. 31, citing Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999), referred to the fineness of the distinction between a fact and a communication and the risk of eroding privilege in which making such a distinction can result.

[45] To avoid this erosion, only facts that have an independent existence outside of solicitor-client privileged communications are not protected by the privilege: Currie v. Symcor Inc. (2008), 2008 CanLII 37901 (ON SCDC), 244 O.A.C. 3 (Div. Ct.), at para. 49. This approach recognizes that not everything that happens in the solicitor-client client relationship falls within the ambit of privileged communications while at the same time acknowledging that apparently neutral information or facts can reveal volumes about a communication and can reveal information that would be protected by solicitor-client privilege (see Maranda, at paras. 27 and 48).

(b) the questions

[46] The Master ordered Jetport to answer the following questions:

(i) Q. 4619 asks if Mr. Adair had any discussions with anyone at Jetport with respect to the issue of whether he met the 100 hour Pilot Clause requirement. The question relates to a time period after Mr. Adair learned that Global might be raising an issue regarding the adequacy of his hours.

(ii) Q. 4620 asks whether Mr. Adair was seeking legal advice from Mr. Armstrong with respect to the issue of the 100 hour provision.

(iii) Q. 4621 asks whether Mr. Armstrong was providing Mr. Adair with legal advice when he spoke to Mr. Adair about the issue of the number of hours on make and model.

(iv) Q. 4630 asks when it was that Mr. Adair first articulated to anyone at Jetport that Mr. Robinson was supposed to obtain an exemption for Mr. Adair.

(c) analysis

[47] Jetport refused to answer Q. 4619, whether Mr. Adair had had any discussions with anyone at Jetport about whether he met the 100-hour requirement of the Pilot Clause, on the basis that to the extent that the discussions were with Mr. Armstrong, answering the question would disclose privileged information. Jetport argues that in the context of it having answered questions on discovery regarding Mr. Adair’s communications with non-lawyers at Jetport, this question can only relate to communications with Mr. Armstrong and communications with him are subject to solicitor-client privilege.

[48] Jones Brown’s position is, to begin with, that Jetport has not established Mr. Armstrong was acting in a legal capacity when the communications in question took place. But, in any event, like the other questions refused on the basis of privilege, this question does not seek disclosure of the substance of any communication between Mr. Adair and Mr. Armstrong.

[49] The Master required Jetport to answer the question on the basis that whether any discussions took place was relevant to Mr. Adair’s state of mind at the time “irrespective of any possible claims of privilege based on the substance of any such questions.”

[50] As I understand his reasons, the Master distinguished the issue of Mr. Adair’s state of mind to which the fact of a discussion with anyone was relevant, from the content of a discussion he might have had with Mr. Armstrong, which might be privileged. I do not take the Master to have based his decision on the purpose for which the information is sought. That is not a determining consideration. Even if the information is sought for a purpose other than to find out what advice was given or received, if it nonetheless reveals evidence that is protected by solicitor-client privilege, the information is privileged.

[51] I do not agree with Jetport that the answers it has already given to questions make it impossible for Q. 4619 to involve discussions with anyone other than Mr. Armstrong. But, even if it were apparent that any discussion could only have been with Mr. Armstrong, that does not necessarily mean that the fact that the discussion took place is cloaked in privilege. That a discussion occurred is separate from its substance. Whether that is a distinction that does not run afoul of the purpose of solicitor-client privilege and the law to which I have referred will depend, in these circumstances, on whether information can be extracted from the disclosure of the fact that a discussion took place, that would not otherwise be available to Jetport because of solicitor-client privilege (see Maranda, at para. 27). I do not see that to be a risk. Whether or not Mr. Adair had discussions with anyone at Jetport regarding the 100 hour requirement is not information from which any privileged evidence could be inferred.

[52] The Master was correct in ordering Jetport to answer Q. 4619.

[53] With respect to Q. 4620 - whether Mr. Adair sought legal advice with respect to the 100 hours requirement – the Master appears to have based his decision on the same reasoning he employed for the previous question. Again, as I understand it, The Master relied on the distinction between the fact of advice being sought and the content of any discussions.

[54] Jetport argues that, by revealing that a particular coverage issue was discussed, it would be revealing the substance of solicitor-client communications. While that may be true in some cases, it is not true in this case.

[55] There is no meaningful difference, in the circumstances of this case, between answering the question of whether Mr. Adair discussed insurance issues, which Jetport concedes would not breach solicitor-client privilege, or the question of whether Mr. Adair discussed the particular issue of the 100 hours requirement.

[56] It is a known fact that Mr. Adair’s hours of training is a coverage issue. It is also a fact that Mr. Armstrong provided legal advice to Mr. Adair about the insurance related issues. If Mr. Adair discussed the 100 hours requirement with Mr. Armstrong, revealing that fact does not reveal the nature or extent of the communications between solicitor and client. The answer does not allow Jones Brown to draw inferences or discern information that would not be available to it because of privilege.

[57] I am mindful of LeBel J.’s caution against drawing lines that are too fine in analysing what is and what is not a privileged communication. But, that caution does not provide license to risk distorting the purpose of the privilege.

[58] While privilege must be rigorously protected in all cases, how broadly the line should be drawn is influenced by what is in issue. Maranda involved a claim for privilege over a lawyer’s bill of account and its payment in connection with a criminal prosecution. The account was seized by the police in an authorized search of that lawyer’s office in the course of their investigation of the lawyer’s client who was suspected of money laundering and drug trafficking. It was held that disclosure of the amount of a lawyer’s billings would violate privilege.

[59] What was in issue in Maranda, as LeBel J. stated at para. 29, involved the fundamental principles of the right to silence and the protection from self-incrimination. The decision as to whether privilege applied had to be one that ensured those fundamental values were preserved. They are not at stake in this civil matter.

[60] The Master was correct in ordering Q. 4620 to be answered.

[61] The Master ordered Q. 4621 – whether Mr. Armstrong was providing legal advice to Mr. Adair when they spoke about the 100 hours requirement – to be answered based on the fact that Mr. Armstrong wore more than one hat at Jetport. The Master explained that unless he was “wearing his legal counsel hat”, a claim for solicitor-client privilege could not be substantiated.

[62] Jetport has the onus of establishing that a communication took place in the context of receiving and giving legal advice. Whether solicitor-client privilege extends to a particular communication with in-house counsel will depend on whether when that communication took place, the in-house counsel was acting in a legal capacity and not a business capacity: Humberplex Developments Inc. v. TransCanada Pipelines Ltd., 2011 ONSC 4815, 210 A.C.W.S. (3d) 548, at para. 24. Because Mr. Armstrong performed both legal and business functions, Jetport must establish that when the communications in issue took place, Mr. Armstrong was acting in his capacity of lawyer.

[63] Jetport asserts that Mr. Armstrong was acting solely as a lawyer when he had discussions with Mr. Adair throughout the relevant period. That assertion is not supported by the evidence. Mr. Armstrong was Mr. Adair’s boss. It cannot be assumed that all communications between them were in that context of the giving and receiving of legal advice.

[64] In any event, it flows from my above findings that the answer to the question of whether Mr. Armstrong was providing legal advice when he spoke to Mr. Adair regarding the hours of training does not disclose privileged information. If the answer to this question was cloaked with privilege the result would be that it would never be possible to determine whether solicitor-client privilege applied to a communication. That would be a distortion of the underlying purpose of solicitor-client privilege.

[65] The Master was correct in ordering Q. 4621 to be answered.

[66] The Master ordered Q. 4630 to be answered – when Mr. Adair articulated to anyone at Jetport that Mr. Robinson was to obtain an exemption to the Pilot Clause – on the basis of Jetport having pleaded that Mr. Robinson undertook to obtain an exemption for Mr. Adair. The Master held that if pleaded, a fact cannot be privileged and therefore a question about the timing of that fact does not involve privileged information.

[67] Jetport argues that Q. 4630 is not relevant, as the pleading does not raise any issues with respect to the timing of Mr. Adair raising Jones Brown’s alleged undertaking regarding the exemption. Based on the law referred to above at para. 16, this takes too narrow a view of relevance. This applies equally to Jetport’s submission that the questions involving the nature of legal advice are not relevant, as Jetport has not pleaded or relied on legal advice sought or given. This position also seems to disregard the rule on which Jetport relies regarding pleadings and the distinction between fact and evidence.

[68] The questions are relevant to the credibility of Jetport’s allegations against both Jones Brown and Global to the extent that those allegations rely on the evidence of Mr. Adair. The questions are intended to probe whether Mr. Adair’s conduct was consistent with his believing that Jones Brown had obtained an exemption for him. The legal advice itself is of no consequence to these questions.

[69] The reasons that prevent Q. 4619 – whether Mr. Adair had any discussions regarding the 100 hour issue – from being cloaked with solicitor-client privilege, apply equally here.

[70] The Master was correct in ordering Q. 4630 to be answered.

Summary

[71] The appeal is allowed with respect to Q. 1587, Q. 1588, and Q. 1590. Global is ordered to answer these questions.

[72] The appeal is allowed with respect to Q. 4706. Jetport is not required to answer this question.

[73] The appeal is dismissed with respect to Q. 4619, 4620, 4621 and 4630. Jetport must answer these questions.

[74] As the results are mixed, it would appear to me, without benefit of submissions, that each party should bear its own costs. I appreciate that Jones Brown can argue that it was entirely successful with respect to the portion of the appeal to which it responded. However, that fails to take into account that all parties have an interest in the answers to all the questions.

[75] If the parties do not come to an agreement on costs based on the preliminary view that I have expressed, I will accept written submissions of no greater than three pages in length along with a cost outline, supporting dockets and any case law on which the parties rely. All parties are to deliver their submissions within 30 days, sent to my attention at Judges’ Administration.

Frank J.

Date: October 11, 2013