John William Wowk

The respondent insurer requested a reconsideration of a decision granting the applicant ongoing income replacement benefits (IRBs).

The adjudicator found that he had made errors of fact regarding the timeline of the applicant's medical restrictions and post-accident employment, and had violated procedural fairness by admitting late evidence in reply submissions without allowing the respondent to address it.

Upon correcting these errors, the adjudicator concluded that the applicant was able to perform the essential tasks of his post-accident employment as a shift supervisor and was not entitled to ongoing IRBs.

The adjudicator also corrected an error of law regarding the repayment of benefits, finding that the insurer was not required to prove material misrepresentation to claim repayment within the one-year statutory period.

The initial decision was varied to deny ongoing IRBs and order the applicant to repay $1,200.00 in overpaid benefits.

The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) beyond the 104-week mark.

The respondent insurer denied the benefits, arguing the applicant was able to return to work, and sought repayment for IRBs paid during a brief period when the applicant attempted to work.

The Tribunal found that the applicant suffered a complete inability to engage in employment for which he was reasonably suited by education, training, or experience, given his history of heavy labour and ongoing physical and psychological impairments.

The Tribunal held that the applicant's unsuccessful attempts to return to work did not disentitle him to IRBs, but rather entitled the respondent to deduct 70% of his post-accident earnings.

The applicant was awarded ongoing IRBs with interest, and the respondent's claim for repayment was dismissed.

The third parties moved for summary judgment to dismiss the third party claim brought by the defendants, Michael Gillis and Julie Joanisse Gillis, against their financial advisors and firm.

The court found that the causes of action arose before and during the defendants’ bankruptcy and thus vested in the trustee in bankruptcy.

The claims were not transferred back to the defendants and were also found to be statute-barred.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the third party claim and struck the action as a nullity.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after being shot in the hand by her husband while sitting on a stopped ATV during a hunting trip.

The respondent insurer denied the claim on the basis that the incident did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Tribunal held a preliminary issue hearing and found that while the purpose test was met, the causation test was not.

The shooting was an intervening act that broke the chain of causation, and the use or operation of the ATV did not directly cause the applicant's impairment.

The application was dismissed.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion where the plaintiffs were entirely successful in determining the order of examination for discovery.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs, condemning the defendant Aviva's tactical delay and deficient affidavit of documents.

The judge emphasized the importance of proper document disclosure in civil litigation and allowed for counsel's travel time and reasonable disbursements, noting that a litigant's choice of counsel should not be limited by geographical proximity.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for directions to determine the order of examinations for discovery.

The defendant insurer had served an affidavit of documents that was two years out of date and omitted the relevant insurance policy, claiming priority to examine the plaintiffs first.

The court found the insurer's affidavit of documents was deficient and a nullity, meaning it had not preserved its right to examine first.

The court ordered the insurer to serve a further and better affidavit of documents, struck the insurer's notice of examination and certificate of non-attendance, and ordered that the plaintiffs were entitled to examine the defendants first.