Lindsay Edwards

The Respondent mother sought a mistrial in a child protection proceeding after an off-record exchange was inadvertently broadcast in the virtual courtroom, raising concerns about an unknown third party and potential drug transactions.

The mother argued the judge became a compellable witness and the information was prejudicial.

The Society and father opposed, arguing against delay and that the judge could disabuse herself of the information.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the judge was not compellable, the information was not properly before the court, and the judge could disabuse herself of it.

The court emphasized that mistrials are a last resort and that continuing the trial was in the best interests of the child and the administration of justice.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection and an order for sole custody to the mother with supervised access to the father.

The court found the child in need of protection under section 74(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Child, Youth, and Family Services Act due to risks of physical harm arising from the paternal grandparents' long-term opioid addiction and recent cocaine use, the paternal uncle's drug issues, and the father's lack of insight into these risks and his own anger management difficulties.

The court granted sole custody to the mother and ordered weekly supervised access for the father at a third-party facility, emphasizing that unsupervised access would only be considered if the father addressed his living situation and anger management issues.

The initial finding that the child was also in need of protection under section 74(2)(h) was later corrected and removed.

The applicant, the maternal aunt of two young children in extended society care, sought a review of the Children's Aid Society's decision to refuse her application to adopt them.

The children had been living with a kinship/foster caregiver for a year and had strong ties to their paternal extended family.

The Child and Family Services Review Board confirmed the Society's decision, finding that moving the children to the applicant's care would disrupt their stable environment, sever their established parental bond with their current caregiver, and cause significant emotional harm, and that remaining in their current placement was in their best interests.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother brought a motion seeking an order dispensing with service of a society wardship application on the child’s father, citing serious safety concerns and the father’s history of sexual offences and absence from the child’s life.

The court considered the statutory framework under the Child and Family Services Act governing notice to parents in wardship proceedings.

The court held that the legislation strictly limits the circumstances in which service on a parent may be dispensed with and generally requires notice before a wardship order exceeding thirty days can be made.

While sympathetic to the mother’s concerns, the court concluded it lacked authority to fully dispense with service.

Service was temporarily dispensed with for thirty days under s. 39(7) of the Act pending further review after the Office of the Children’s Lawyer considered the matter.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that although the material before the motion judge was somewhat deficient, there was no palpable and overriding error in her reasons.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,500.

The appellant appealed an order regarding notice under the Building Code Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to notify the municipality of his change of address as required by the Assessment Act, and that the municipality had complied with the notice provision under s. 27(2) of the Building Code Act.